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WHAT'S IN A NAME?: Law, Religion, and
Islamic Names
K.M. SHARMA"
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A NAME
"What's in a name? that which we call a rose/ By any other name
would smell as sweet." These memorable and oft-misunderstood lines
of Juliet's speech' in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, an outpouring of
B.A., M.A., LL.B., Diploma in Labor Laws, LL.M. (Rajasthan); LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard);
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, Sydney, N.S.W., Australia. The author
gratefully acknowledges the perceptive comments of his colleague, Professor George Win-
terton, who very graciously reviewed an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Since Juliet was referring specifically to surnames, her tardiness may perhaps be
understandable. The practice of surnames developed at the end of the fourteenth century
in England when it became essential to distinguish between the several "Johns" and
"Marys" in the same community. Hitherto a person's given name was the most important
one, given at baptism, and could only be changed at confirmation. PERCY H. REANEY, THE
ORIGIN OF ENGLISH SURNAMES 83 (1967); G.S. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J.
227, 227 (1905). Thus, in Juliet's time, since surnames were comparative latecomers,
they were accorded somewhat less respect, though first names of all kinds had been in
vogue from the most distant times in history. The play involves the tale of two young in-
nocent lovers unnecessarily dying for love through misunderstandings and because of the
really alive and deadly feud between their families (the Montagues and the Capulets). It
does not seem to concern Romeo that Juliet is of the opposing faction, but Juliet speaks at
last of the feud (though she does not know that Romeo is listening):
O Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo?
Deny thy father and refuse thy name;
Or, if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love,
And I'll no longer be a Capulet.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act. 2, sc. 2, 11. 33-36 (1594-95) [hereinafter
ROMEO AND JULIET], in THE ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE 1604, 1627 (A.L. Rowse ed.,
Greenwich House 1984) [hereinafter ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE]. "Wherefore" means
"why" and Juliet of Capulet is asking the absent Romeo of Montague why he is called
"Montague." Oh, if only he weren't. All she can lament is his cursed clan-name:
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself, though [you were] not a Montague.
What's Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man. 0, be some other name!
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
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romantic agony, should not be taken to mean that the versatile Bard
was a flimsy etymologist oblivious to the importance of the "naming
game" or the legal implications thereof.2 In fact, naming a newborn
child, except in cases where family tradition or the desire to propitiate
wealthy relatives or to honor some favorite relative or godparent take
precedence over personal wishes, is one of the important parental du-
ties and is a matter usually of considerable thought.3 Moreover, contro-
versies over legitimate and illegitimate children's names, particularly
surnames involving familial autonomy, divorced spouses or de facto
couples, and equal treatment, are arising today with much greater fre-
quency than before as century-old naming practices collide with modern
sensitivities about children's best interests and women's rights. Specifi-
cally, the traditional deference to a father's prerogative to name his
children the way he likes, unless forfeited by misconduct or neglect, has
been seriously questioned as being completely out-of-tune with current
social mores and gender-justice-oriented realities.
A recent tastefully produced book4 reminds us that the first thing
that Allah taught Adam was all the names of all the things. Many
Qur'anic verses (aayats), personal acts and sayings of the Prophet
And for that name which is no part of thee
Take all myself.
ROMEO AND JULIET, supra, at 11. 38-48; ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra, at 1627. Ro-
meo makes himself known and somewhat dramatically denounces his name, saying:
I take thee at thy word:
Call me but love, and I'll be now baptized;
Henceforth I never will be Romeo.
ROMEO AND JULIET, supra, at 11. 49-51; ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra, at 1627. Ro-
meo's and Juliet's fateful outcome attests, however, to the problems that arise as a result
of a system based on customs and traditions attached to surnames.
2. References to "Name" and "Names" occur frequently in Shakespeare's plays. For a
select sampling, see app. I.
3. For an examination of the various views of some philosophers, logicians, and lin-
guistics on the protean functions of names, see FARHANG ZABEEH, WHAT IS IN A NAME?:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF PROPER NAMES (1968).
4. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, MUSLIM NAMES - WITH QUOTATIONS FROM THE QUR'AN: A
FACET OF MUSLIM CULTURE (Ahmed Publishers, Sydney, Australia, 1997, Pp. ix+307)
[hereinafter AHMED]; see infra notes 40-49 and the accompanying text for some comments
on this book; see generally THE HOLY QUR-AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS
AND COMMENTARY (Ustadh Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans.; the Presidency of Islamic Re-
searches, Ifta, Call and Guidance rev. & ed., Holy Qur-iin Printing Complex, Al-Madinah
Al-Munawarah, 1410 H [1990], under the auspices of the Ministry of Hajj and Endow-
ment, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter ENGLISH TRANSLATION] (most references
to Qur'anic texts in this Article are to this monumental work, though, some capitaliza-
tions have been omitted); THE MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN (Marmaduke Pickthall
trans., Dorset Press, New York, n.d.).
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Muhammad (hadith)5 and those of his Companions constitute a major
source of Islamic law and religion, extolling the importance of carefully
selecting beautiful names for one's children,6 - for on the Day of Resur-
rection everyone will be summoned by their names and the names of
their fathers. For example, when the wife of Imraan gave birth to a
daughter who later became the mother of Prophet 'Isa, she told Allah: "I
have named her Maryam." 7 This indicates the importance of naming a
child soon after its birth. Many Muslims are not aware of the true
meaning or bearing on Islamic heritage of their names, particularly be-
cause of their unfamiliarity, or only a superficial acquaintance with
Arabic or Persian. Furthermore, the extremely complex vocabulary of
the Arabic language results in multiple meanings and subtle nuances;
thus, Muslims oftentimes end up selecting names which are bereft of
any real meaning, or have no relation to the existing stock of names.
Names go in and out of fashion for reasons that can be recorded,
but there are always fastidious individuals in India who complain that
they are tired of Rajiv or Sanjay or Priyanka or whatever may be the
vogue name of the year, and that they want something novel. In virtu-
ally all cultures, rich and varied, the search for a beautiful name begins
with the birth of a baby.8 Relatives and friends are approached for sug-
5. Of the different versions of the hadith that emerged in the ninth century, only six
are considered genuine. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 7, 112-13
(1982) (acknowledging existence of forgeries, fabrications and inauthentic hadith) [here-
inafter ESPOSITO]; ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION:
CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-23 (1990) [hereinafter AN-
NA'IM].
6. .For a commentary in verse from various Oriental sources on the ninety-nine
"beautiful names" of Allah in the form of stories, see SIR EDWIN ARNOLD, M.A. C.S.I.,
PEARLS OF THE FAITH OR ISLAM'S ROSARY, BEING THE NINETY-NINE BEAUTIFUL NAMES OF
ALLAH (ASMA-EL-HUSNA) (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, & Co., 5th ed. 1891)
(1883). These stories are of an uneven quality, but a fine example is furnished by No. 4,
al-Malik ("The King of Kings"). Id. at 9.
7. Sura Aal'Imraan 3:36. The mother of Maryam had expected a male child, but she
was not disappointed in Maryam's birth. For she had faith in Allah's Plan, as Maryam
was no ordinary girl, but a miracle-child destined to be the mother of the miracle-child,
'Isa.
8. In fact, the world in which things are nameless would be a strange world. Alice is
momentarily confronted with such a domain:
"This must be the wood," she said thoughtfully to herself,
"where things have no names. I wonder what'll become of
my name when I go in? I wouldn't like to lose it at all-because
they'd have to give me another, and it would be almost certain
to be an ugly one ......
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 61 (New
York: Avenel Books n.d.) (1871) [hereinafter CARROLL]. While in the majority of cases
children are given good, likeable, and propitious names, the practice of giving them names
which invite banter, scorn or embarrassment has also not been found wanting. For ex-
ample, in some parts of India and elsewhere, many parents, who have had the misfortune
of suffering a high incidence of infant mortality, deliberately give their surviving progeny
1998
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gestions, various scriptural sources are often consulted, and the numer-
ous names of gods and goddesses are explored in one's quest to select a
suitable name which will adequately mirror a particular virtue, an aes-
thetic value, or a religious affinity. 9 Most names originally meant
something, and are thus the repositories of history. In fact, a person's
name may have cultural and psychological implications that far tran-
scend mere identification.
The origin of the practice of naming individuals or anthroponymy is
somewhat obscure. One possible explanation is that after the discovery
of fire, nomads looked for the best and safest parts of the forest for habi-
tation. This search, in turn, necessitated identifying each member of the
community by some symbolic figure - a symbol of perception of differ-
ence whereby one quality was distinguished from another.10 The first
names that occurred to these nomads were probably names of animals,
trees, forest spirits, river deities and the many pagan gods and god-
desses they worshipped. As time passed, the primitive mind began to
perceive, differentiate and reflect upon sensations, desires and emo-
tions. Human sensitivity, pride, confidence and finer emotions of com-
passion, fairness, love and affection transformed one's way of looking at
the world. Accordingly, as the mind energized the desires, each emotion
was distinguished and thus knowledge commenced in the perception of
differences. Survival no longer being the sole concern of humans, they
had time to explore "[n]ature's majestic beauty, to name each fragrant
flower, each splendid plumed bird, each cascading river and each phe-
nomenon of nature. [Their] deities also became more beautiful and ac-
"unpleasant" names with meanings like "ugly," "disagreeable," "crippled," "blind," "lame,"
"bald," "downy faced" and the like. The superstitious purpose of such apotropic names is
to make the child undesirable to demons. See ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, ISLAMIC NAMES 20-
21 (1989) [hereinafter SCHIMMEL].
9. Major General Hind Ravi Singh Mann, when quizzed about his unusual name,
narrated the role his bua (father's sister) played in his naming. She was a follower of
Mahatma Gandhi and a Sanskrit scholar fired with overpowering desire to see a free In-
dia. Her brother was in a Multan jail, now in Pakistan, during the "Quit India" move-
ment when the future soldier was born. She thought it apt to name him Hind Ravi
Singh, thereby combining her love for the country "Hind" (India) and the Sanskrit word
"Ravi" (sun). Of course, "Singh" means lion. "Mann" is the surname of the major general.
Magic of a Name, HINDUSTAN TIMES (New Delhi), Feb. 12, 1997, at 12. Names generally
imply certain distinguishing features or attributes. When asked, "Must a name mean
something?," Humpty Dumpty responded: "Of course it must .... my name means the
shape I am.... With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost." CARROLL, su-
pra note 8, at 115-16.
10. Cf. Genesis 2:19: "Whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the
name thereof."
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quired in [their] minds shapes of beauty and delicacy."'1
II. MUSLIM CULTURE OF NAMES: QUR'ANIC AND OTHER
SOURCES
Mirrored in the names given to one's spouses and children was a
growing sensitivity. This sensitivity symbolized the differentiation of
qualities, the differences by which each quality was distinguishable
from the other. Knowledge of names therefore implied acquisition of the
qualities indicated. Girls were named after birds, 12 flowers, deities or
the softer qualities of a woman; boys were named after the gods and the
qualities of valor, honor, bravery, and joy. Speaking of the Islamic ex-
perience, in general, Muslim "parents tend to give to their male chil-
dren, names of religious significance or names bearing qualities of
manhood, courage and bravery, while the female children are given
names bearing on Islamic heritage or names depicting feminine quali-
ties, e.g., beauty, modesty, virtue."'
3
A. General Pattern of Names: Elegant, Beautiful and Divine
Many female names are, however, oftentimes chosen amongst
Muslims not because they necessarily reflect a particular virtue-chas-
tity (Afifa, Afaf, Amina, Muhsana, Nazaha), charity (Khayriyya, Atifa,
Awatif, Karima), and pursuit of the right religious path (Labiba, Mad-
diyya, Mujahida, Rashida) - or other divine Qur'anic attribute, but
only because they suggest delicacy and a finer sense of delectation. For
example, names like Abir (fragrance, aroma, scent), Ambarin (per-
fumed), Amna (safety), Andalib, Bulbul or Hazar (nightingale), Arij
(sweet smell), Faatina (beautiful, pretty, ravishing), Fattanah (ex-
tremely beautiful), Hadil (cooing of pigeons), Husn-e-Ara (adorned with
beauty), Lina (tender), Maliha (beautiful), Mahbuba (dear, beloved),
Naahid (in the bloom of youth), Naaima (soft), Nadi (tender), Nasim
(fragrant breeze), Raaiqa (serene), Rashiqa (graceful, elegant), Sabia
(enchanting, charming), Sarab (mirage), Shakila (well formed, beauti-
ful), Shamim (fragrant), Sharmin (shy, coy) are preferred, particularly
in elite Muslim families, because of their tenderness and aesthetic am-
bience. Similarly, the names of various flowers - viz., Banafsaj, Dalia
or Dahlia (multicolored), Gul (rose),14 Khuzama (tulip), Nargis (narcis-
11. VIMLA PATIL, BABY NAMES v (15th prtg. 1995) (1988).
12. In a light-hearted vein, in Australia, even today, girls are often referred to by men
colloquially as "birds," presumably to denote their teasing chirpiness and sweetness of
temper.
13. AHMED, supra note 4, at vi.
14. Names emanating from Gul - Gulbadan (rose body), Gulrukh, Guiru, Gul'adhar
(rose face), Gulbarg (rose petal), GuIrang (rose colored), Gulshan (rose garden), Gul-i
ra'na (lovely rose) - have been particularly popular in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.
1998
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sus), Nilufur (lotus), Rihana (sweet basil), Sausan (lily of the valley),
Yasmine (delicate Jasmine) - are very popular as female names.
Nevertheless, with ethnic names becoming more popular today
than ever before, as they often serve as a link to a particular ethnic or
national heritage, people often turn to the old ecclesiastical and juristic
sources for finding attractive names. 15 These sources are for Hindus,
the Vedic texts, the Upanishads, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata and
other ancient literary works; for Christians, the holy Bible; and for
Muslims, the holy Qur'an. In the selection of any appropriate name
which is a distinctive emblem of the cultural identity of the area and its
peoples, religious affiliation and indigenous language are important. A
woman called Anuradha can be presumed to be a Hindu; in choosing
this name, her parents, at the very minimum, were indicating her cul-
tural association with India and Hindu culture. 16 Thus, many names
Besides these names, Guldali (rose-twig), Gulfiliz (rose sprout), Gulseren (spreading
roses), Gulcin (gathering roses), Gulbahar (rose-spring), Gulbun (rose root), Gulperi (rose
fairy) are common among modern Turkish female names.
15. Incidentally, films have equally been one of the most powerful influences on some
parents in that the names of actors and actresses - and the characters in the movies -
are freely bestowed on the children of their fans. Similarly, works of literature can pro-
foundly influence name choices. For example, some of Shakespeare's heroines -
Rosalind, Olivia, Portia, Imogen, Juliet, and Cordelia - have been used as popular
names. Shahrzad is a name from the Thousand and One Nights and Shirin, Farhad,
Layla, Majnu are celebrated in numerous Persian and Turkish romances. For many
other examples, see PATRICK HANKS & FLAVIA HODGES, A DICTIONARY OF FIRST NAMES
xx-x1 (1990).
16. An amusing instance of what may be called a naming faux pas is narrated by the
Maharani (Queen) of Jaipur, now Rajmata (Queen Mother):
I never learned what my horoscope foretold except that the most
auspicious initial letter for my name was 'G,' so I was called
Gayatri, which is a religious incantation of the highest order. But
in the last days of her pregnancy my mother had been reading Rider
Haggard's novel She and had already made up her mind that if I
was a girl she would call me Ayesha, after the heroine of the book.
It was only when some Muslim friends came to call on her a few
days after I was born that she was reminded in surprised tones that
Ayesha was a Muslim name belonging to the Prophet
Mohammed's... favorite wife. By that time all my immediate
family had got used to the name and fond of it, so, although
Gayatri is my correct name, Ayesha remains the one my friends
know me by.
GAYATRI DEVI, A PRINCESS REMEMBERS: THE MEMOIRS OF THE MAHARANI OF JAIPUR 36
(2d rev. ed. 1995). Today, many Muslim names are not uncommon even among Hindus,
e.g., Bibi, Jawahar, Kamal, Khushboo, Parveen, Rana, Roshan, Roshani, Sardar, Shab-
nam, Shah, Shamim, Sanam, Munmun, Yasmin, Fakir, Kabir, Sabram, Masoom, Bhak-
tawar. The son of the famous Muslim Bengali poet Nazrul ul-Islam, 'whose wife was
VOL. 26:2
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are culture- and language-specific in form.
In the context of culture-language specificity, it is no exaggeration
to say that by far the richest source or cornucopia of names in the Mus-
lim world has been the historical and moral legacy of the holy Qur'an.
Islam's most sacred and revered scripture, the Qur'an, is the compila-
tion of divinely-inspired Allah's revelations to the Prophet Muhammad.
Significantly, Islam is the second largest religion and source of law in
the world; its followers are spread all over the globe. Conservative es-
timates indicate that "[n]early one-fifth of the people in the world today
are Muslim, and Islamic law is at the very core of their beliefs and so-
cial system."
17
This religious commonality results in a naturally striking degree of
homogeneity and resemblance in the names of Muslims, irrespective of
the country and the legal system and the location in which they live.
Presumably, this is so, because Arabic, and to a lesser extent, Persian
and Turkish languages, predominated in Muslim culture during its as-
cension and gradual expansion to countries far beyond Arabia. Nearly
every country has a version of the Arabic Leila ("born at night"). A sig-
nificant percentage of Swahili names are simply minor variants of the
Arabic. Furthermore, the unifying influence of the holy Qur'an, which
is considered to be the primary regulator of the conduct and behavior of
Muslims, and the reverential practice of choosing names from amongst
the celestial attributes of Allah also account for this pattern of similar-
Hindu, bore the name Muhammad Krishna. Afia Dil, A Comparative Study of the Per-
sonal Names and Nicknames of the Bengali-Speaking Hindus and Muslims, in STUDIES IN
BENGAL 70 (W.M. Gunderson ed., 1976).
17. John Makdisi & Marianne Makdisi, Islamic Law Bibliography: Revised and Up-
dated List of Secondary Sources, 87 L. LIBR. J. 69, 71 (1995). The core beliefs of Islamic
society and the criteria for being a true Muslim are delineated in the Qur'an. Although
the Qur'an is the principal source of Islamic law, it should not be treated, however, as a
code of law in the Western sense. On a liberal construction of the 6219 aayats (verses) of
the Qur'an around 600 encompass a legal aspect, whereas, according to an exacting
reading, no more than eighty aayats concern legal injunctions. AN-NAIIM, supra note 5,
at 20; ESPOSITO, supra note 5, at 3. According to KEITH HODKINSON, MUSLIM FAMILY
LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 3 (1984), however, "[t]here are no more than 200 verses [of the
Qur'an] concerned with what we would term 'law' in the Western sense." On the perva-
sive influence of Islam and Islamization in various parts of Africa and Asia, one scholar
has suggested that "personal names" may be used for the study of religious change in a
given cultural context. As an example, examining the biographical literature on Iranian
Muslims, he found an interesting correlation between the recurrence of four categories of
names, Arab Old Testament/Qur'anic, Persian, and Muslim names, and successive phases
in the progress of conversion to Islam in Iran. Richard Bulliet, Conversion to Islam and
the Emergence of a Muslim Society in Iran, in CONVERSION TO ISLAM 30 (Nehemia
Levtzion ed., 1979).
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ity and enduring popularity of these names. Muslims' acceptance of
Allah's message places them on a righteous path, with the expectation
that they live and conduct themselves in accordance with His law and
teachings as revealed in the Qur'an. The Islamic pantheon is unusually
rich in images of divine attributes, representing a wide range of sym-
bolic, social, and meditative meanings.
18
Many popular Arabic names, coming from the ninety-nine attrib-
utes of Allah listed in the Qur'an, 19 are often prefixed with Abdul, Ab-
del, or Abd, each meaning "servant of," for composing an almost endless
variety and combination of beautiful Qur'anic names. For example, Ab-
dul Azim (Servant of The Almighty Allah), Abdul Khaaliq (Servant of
The Creator), Abdur Rahman (Servant of The Most Gracious), Abdel
Nasser (Servant of The Victorious One) and so on. Similarly, the
Prophet's name, Muhammad (praiseworthy, possessing fine qualities),
with its estimated five-hundred variants, such as Mahmud, Ahmed,
Hamid, Hamdi - derived from the same root, hamida, that is, to praise
- are the most popular names that abound in virtually all Muslim
countries. A pious, but apocryphal, Muslim saying goes, "If you have a
hundred sons, name them all Muhammad." Another group of Muslim
18. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist recently re-
jected complaints by a coalition of Muslim groups offended by a frieze, depicting the
Prophet Muhammad, and turned down their plea that the marble sculpture in the Su-
preme Court's chamber be removed or altered. He disagreed the sculpture was a sacrile-
gious "form of idol worship" and drew attention to the rich symbolism of the Qur'anic mo-
tifs and Islamic beliefs. It is true that in Islam the depiction of a prophet is considered a
form of apostasy, because it may encourage believers to worship someone other than Al-
lah. The friezes though, carved of ivory Spanish marble and in place since the Court
building opened in 1935, show allegorical figures and a process of eighteen great lawgiv-
ers. Muhammad is included among other historical figures including Confucius, Moses,
Napoleon and Charlemagne. The bearded Muhammad is shown clutching a scimitar in-
his right hand and the Qur'an in his left hand. The coalition had also complained that the
curved oriental sword in the Prophet's right hand "reflects long-held stereotypes of Mus-
lims as intolerant conquerors." Furthermore, the protesters said, Supreme Court litera-
ture about the frieze incorrectly identifies Muhammad as the "founder of Islam," when he
is in fact recognized as "the last in line of prophets that includes Abraham, Moses and Je-
sus." Rehnquist replied that the depiction of Muhammad "was intended only to recognize
him, among many other lawgivers, as an important figure in the history of law; it [was]
not intended as a form of idol worship," and that '[a]ltering the depiction of Mohammed
would impair the artistic integrity of the whole." Rehnquist also dismissed the objection
to the curved sword in the marble Muhammad's hand as reinforcing the stereotypical im-
age of Muslims as intolerant conquerors: "I would point out that swords are used
throughout the Court's architecture as a symbol of justice and that nearly a dozen swords
appear in the courtroom friezes alone." Rehnquist said the description and literature,
however, would be changed to identify Muhammad as a "Prophet of Islam," and not
"Founder of Islam." The rewording, based upon "input of numerous Muslim groups,"
would also say that the figure "is a well-intentioned attempt by the sculptor Adolph
Weinman to honor Mohammed, and it bears no resemblance to Mohammed." Aziz
Haniffa, Religion: Court Rejects Plea to Deface Figure, INDIA ABROAD (New York), Mar.
21, 1997, at 38.
19. For a listing of these names, see app. I.
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names is usually derived from those of the Prophet's descendants or
immediate family.
20
Nothing gratifies law-abiding and pious Muslims more than the
discovery that their names have a Qur'anic lineage, origin, background
or association. 21 For the bulk of the Qur'an - the corpus of Islamic
ethico-legal norms (or Sharia) - comprises general moral directives for
what true Muslims ought to do. Thus, names of all the apostles, either
with their full names or derivatives, and of the other major characters
which appear in the Qur'an, are a source of particular joy. 22 After all,
the "most beautiful names belong to Allah"23 and it is He who "taught
Adam [all] the names of all the things."24 Therefore, according to
Qur'anic law, one must dissociate with people who use Allah's name de-
gradingly or suggest anything disparaging to His dignity or unity.
25
20. These include, for boys, Ali (cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet), Bakr (father of
Prophet's favorite wife, Aisha), Hamza (Prophet's uncle and hero of a widespread saga),
Hasan and Husayn (sons of Fatima and Ali), 'Umar (Omar) (second "guided" caliph and
one of the staunch supporters of the Prophet), and Uthman (Usman) (son-in-law of the
Prophet). Notable female names include Aisha, Hafsa, Khadija, Maimuna, Rayhana,
Umm-Salamah and Zaynab (Zainab) (Prophet's wives), Ruqayya and Umm-Kulthum
(Kulsum) (Prophet's daughters), Aamina (Prophet's mother), and Zahra (Zuhra) (family
name of the Prophet's mother). Zaynab (Zainab), also the name of a flower, is probably
one of the most popular female names; it featured four times in the Prophet's personal
life. The first was his daughter by Khadija; the second, Zaynab bint-Khuzayma, married
him in 625 but died soon thereafter; the third was Zaynab bint-Jahsh, cousin of the
Prophet, whom he married after his adopted son, Zayd ibn-Haritha, divorced her; and the
last Zaynab was Prophet's granddaughter by Fatima and Ali.
21. AHMED, supra note 4, at i.
22. Id. In fact, since Muslim names are most profuse in the number of constituent
words, one would end up composing a complete dictionary of Arabic, Persian and Turkish
since almost every word has appeared as a proper name.
23. Sura Al-A'raaf 7:180.
24. Sura Al-Baqarah 2:31.
25. The most beautiful names
Belong to Allah:
So call on Him by them;
But shun such men as
Distort His Names:
For what they do, they will
Soon be requited.
Sura Al-A'raaf 7:180. Cf. sura Bani Israa'il 17:110. Interestingly, the Aurangabad bench
of Mumbai [Bombay] High Court (Maharashtra, India) recently directed the police to reg-
ister a criminal case against actors and producers of a new Hindi movie Judaai - a
somewhat inspired adaptation of Indecent Proposal - if they determine that the song,
"MuJhe pyar hua, pyar hua, Allah miya" (I have fallen in love, fallen in love, Oh God), had
hurt religious sentiments of Muslims. A petition filed by one S.A. Ansari, seeking a ban
on the song, had alleged that the song had defiled the pious name of Allah. File Case
Against Judaai [High Court], SUNDAY PIONEER (New Delhi), Mar. 16, 1997, at 6. The
context, however, suggests otherwise; the innocuous reference to Allah is in no way in-
tended to trivialize His name. The romantic ecstasy and exuberance, permeating the
song, can be best understood if one appreciates that the use of the suffix miya, a respect-
ful but loving form of address for a venerable person, after Allah is designed only to
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B. Arabic Name Structure26 and Cross-Cultural Adaptations
Generally speaking, Arab names, Qur'anic or otherwise, particu-
larly in Arabia, today conform to a certain pattern. First, kunya (sur-
name of relationship), which is the paternal or matronymical designa-
tion of a person as father (Abu) or mother (Umm) of the son or
daughter, for example, Abu Hamid (father of Hamid), Umm Zarina
(mother of Zarina). Second, ism, is a given personal name sometimes
supplemented by a nickname, such as Ibrahim or Tariq. Third, nasab,
which expresses the lineage in relation to one's forefathers, for example,
son (ibn, bin) or daughter (bint) of so and so. Fourth, nisba, indicating
one's native place of birth, residence or origin or membership of a relig-
ious allegiance and the like, for example, Al Shammari, Al Harbi. And,
fifth, laqab (nickname), which later tended to evolve into a proper
name, or a family or clan name which could also be a honorific designa-
tion (either assumed by an individual or given to him by others).27
This pattern, in the strict sequence of kunya, ism, nasab, nisba and
laquab, though partly regulated by law in some Middle-Eastern coun-
tries, has been significantly transformed. As Islam spread to new coun-
tries from Arabia, many Muslim names adapted themselves to many
variations in form and choice of local language, traditions, cultures or
places where the person bearing that name happened to live. Moreover,
as the family system and the laws thereof developed, the practice of
having a separate surname derived either from the village or tribe or
the vocation (somewhat analogous to Arabic nisba) also evolved. The
complexity of the system of names and surnames increased over a pe-
riod of centuries in the wake of increased commerce, the development of
the caste system (particularly in the Indian subcontinent), invasions
and the resultant assimilation of races and cultures, as well as the
faster modes of communication and urbanization. Indeed, the influence
of local cultures on Muslim names cannot be underestimated.
C. Surnames: Absence of Uniformity?
As a result, the naming models in the various countries of the In-
dian subcontinent, 28 Indonesia, and Malaysia vary significantly from
rhyme with hua (happened). Telling Allah that one "has been smitten with love" is cer-
tainly not disrespectful to His holy name!
26. See generally SCHIMMEL, supra note 8, at 1-13.
27. Id.
28. The Indian subcontinent consists of the countries Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh,
Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, and the Islands of Andaman, Nicobar and Maldive.
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the Arab models. For example, in Egypt, Iran and Turkey surnames
are well-established, presumably because of legal sanctions, and they
are perpetuated from generation to generation. Whereas in the Indian
subcontinent, complete laissez-faire exists in the selection of names
which renders the necessity of continuing the surnames from fathers to
sons somewhat redundant. Nevertheless, one should not overlook the
noble human sentiment that, in addition to contributing to reinforce a
child's continuity of identity and relationship with one's biological or
psychological parents as part of a nuclear family unit, a surname often
operates as a vehicle for transferring to a child the goodwill associated
with a particular name in a community.
29
Since the personal names taken from the attributes of Allah are of
limited number, most of them are commonly used. This limited avail-
ability led to a great number of individuals bearing the same name,
naturally necessitating the practice of adding second names. The sec-
ond name or surname serves to distinguish a population with a finite
number of given names and is not to be understood as a class name.
Rather, the surname may make identification easier when use of the
first name fails to do so. This is especially true where many persons
have the same first or middle name, as a result of the increase in
population. The resulting complexities of these compound and many-
worded names, however, have rendered the task of librarians particu-
larly difficult in identifying the real "personal name" and "surname" of
a given author. As one scholar rued, it was "no easy matter for cata-
loguers without a special knowledge of Arabic culture to deal with
names of such complexity [for in] addition to the intrinsic complexity of
such names, there [were] also special features characterizing Muslim
names of different nationalities such as Spanish, Moorish, Turkish,
Egyptian, Arabic, Persian, Afghan and Indian."30 Similar difficulties
have also been encountered in establishing the "surname" as part of
traditional Arabic-Muslim or other names in a foreign court.
31
29. Described as "the simplest, most literal and most obvious of all symbols of iden-
tity," Harold R. Isaacs, Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe, in ETHNICITY:
THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 29, 46 (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975), a
'surname, can reflect one's cultural, ethnic, religious or familial heritage." Note, Parents'
Selection of Children's Surnames, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 583 (1983); Teresa Scassa, Na-
tional Identity, Ethnic Surnames and the State, 11 CAN. J. L. & SOC'Y 167, 169 (1996).
See, e.g., Carroll v. Johnson, 565 S.W. 2d 10 (Ark. 1978) (biological parental relationship);
Nellia v. Pressman, 282 A. 2d 539 (D.C. 1971) (continuity of familial identity); In re Har-
ris, 236 S.E. 2d 426, 429 (W. Va. 1977) (transmission of surname's goodwill).
30. S.R. RANGANATHAN, CLASSIFIED CATALOGUE CODE: WITH ADDITIONAL RULES FOR
DICTIONARY CATALOGUE CODE 235 (5th ed. 1964). For expressions of similar concerns,
see, for example, R.C. Dogra, Cataloguing Urdu Names, 5 INT'L LIBR. REV. 351 (1973);
M.S. Ashoor, The Formation of Muslim Names, 9 INT'L LIBR. REV. 491 (1977); ABDUL
HUQ, A STUDY OF BENGALI MUSLIM PERSONAL NAMES TO ASCERTAIN THE FEASIBILITY OF
APPLICATION OF A MECHANISTIC RULE FOR THEIR ARRANGEMENT (1970).
31. Walter Pintens & Michael R. Will, Names, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
1998
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D. Salient Characteristics in the Indian Subcontinent
Some Muslim names are very long, particularly on the Indian sub-
continent. For example, the name of the famous poet Ghalib, Mirza
Asadullah Khan Ghalib known familiarly as Mirza Nosha, holder of the
titles Nijm ud Daula, Dabir ul Mulk, Asadullah Khan Bahadur, Nizam
Jang, poetically named Ghalib in Persian and Asad in Urdu, was long
enough to be exasperating. Such names led some readers to complain,
as did Vincent Smith, an eminent British historian of India, that "the
length of these Muhammadan names is terrible."32 Another lengthy
name that readily comes to mind is that of the most "bizarre and exotic
ruler[s] in India," 33 who, in 1947, was "reputed to be the richest man in
the world [and was] [slo stingy... that he smoked down the butts [of
cigarettes] left behind by his guests" 34: Rustum-i-Dauran, Arustu-i-
Zeman, Wal Mamalik, Asif Jah, Nawab Mir Osman, Alikhar Bahadur,
Musafrul Mulk Nizam al-Mulk, Sipah Solar, Fateh Jang, His Exalted
Highness, Most Faithful Ally of the British Crown, the Seventh Nizam
of Hyderabad.
Besides their length, Muslim names have another feature that
compounds the reader's difficulty, particularly where the reader is used
to names made up of one or more forenames and a surname. Shorter
names are relatively unknown in Muslim society, except for those who,
while overseas, were obliged to use, for official purposes, one of their
names as a surname. In some families, there is indeed a time-honored
tradition, as against any legal requirement, of conferring upon a son the
last element of the father's name. For example, in the noble Loharu
family, to whom Ghalib was related by marriage, the names end in "ud
Din Ahmad Khan"--Ami'n ud Din Ahmad Khan, Ziya ud Din Ahmad
Khan, Ala ud Din Ahmad Khan, and so on. This is the exception rather
than the rule. Often there is nothing in the names to show that fathers,
COMPARATIVE LAW 52 n.482 (1995). Incidentally, it would be a mistake to assume that
surnames are necessarily unlimited in number and that they always come last in a given
name. On the contrary, a country like The Peoples Republic of China, with a population
of over one billion, has only a few hundred surnames. The same holds true for Korea and
Vietnam, though to a lesser extent. In China alone, over eighty million people have the
common surname "Li" and over seventy million share the surnames "Wang" and "Zhang."
Similarly, in large parts of the world, China, Japan, Korea, Cambodia, Vietnam, in parts
of Africa, and Hungary, name order is reversed; the family name comes first. Id. at 46
nn.415-16.
32. MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W.H. SLEEMAN, K.C.B., RAMBLES AND RECOLLECTIONS OF
INDIAN OFFICIAL 524 n.2 (Vincent A. Smith ed., rev. & annot., 1915).
33. LARRY COLLINS & DOMINIQUE LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT 179 (1975).
34. Id.
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sons and brothers are related, for the surname does not automatically
continue through the generations of a family. Many Hindu names
share this same characteristic.
Muslim names, particularly on the Indian subcontinent, comprise
three essential. elements: first, prefixed styles of address similar to
"Doctor," "Professor," and "The Reverend," are more numerous; second,
personal names which generally consist of a single word; and third, suf-
fixed styles indicating ancestry, or local connections, or other attributes.
Some Muslim names may reflect examples of each.
Among the prefixed style, the appellations or laqab, Mirza, Mir,
Sayyid, Hakeem, Qazi and Munshi are relatively more common. Mirza
is the style appropriate to a man of Mughal or Turkish descent. Mir,
apparently an abbreviation of Ameer, generally implies that the man so
addressed is a Sayyid, one who claims descent from the Prophet
Muhammad's daughter, Fatima and Ali ibn Abu Talib. Sayyid itself, a
title of respect, is a common prefixed style of address, meaning lord,
master or chief. Hakeem is a physician who practices the traditional
Greek system of medicine as modified and popularized by the Arabs
throughout the Muslim world. Qazi or Qadi or Kazi is one who dis-
penses Muslim law, conducts marriages, performs religious ceremonies,
and so on.35 Munshi, a writer or secretary, denotes a functionary of im-
portance in the old Mughal administration of law and justice. Maulvi
best describes a person well-versed in Islamic learning and Shariat,
while Maulana ("our master") has a similar, though perhaps less pre-
cise, connotation.
Among titles more exalted than these the most common is Nawab
(Nabob), roughly equivalent to the English "Lord," meaning something
like "one who exercised delegated powers" over either a very small or a
very large area entrusted to him by a ruler. The tradition of conferring
the honorary title, khitab, on scholars and other important personalities
by Muslim rulers continued under and after the British. Khitabs, al-
ways prefixed to a given name, are not considered to be part of the
name, but serve only as an honorable accessory contributing to deter-
35. The Prophet and the early caliphs decided many matters in person, but later,
since the time of the Umayyads came the qadis, who were religious judges working under
the guidance of the Shariat. Since religion and law are confluent streams in Islam, the
qualifications necessary for the appointment of a qadi were that he be a Muslim of
blameless life thoroughly learned in the law. It was this officer, the qadi of the texts of
Islamic jurisprudence, which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had in view
when they laid down that in India the place of the kazi had been taken by the civil court:
Mahomed Ismail v. Ahmed Moolla, 43 I.A. 127, 134 (1916). But in Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan, the term kazi is also applied to certain petty religious officiants and the two
classes of kazis must be sharply distinguished. In the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent there
are enactments regulating their appointment and rights. See generally Asaf A.A. Fyzee,
The Adab al-Qadi in Islamic Law, 6 MALAYAN L. REV. 406 (1946); ASAF A.A. FYZEE, A
MODERN APPROACH TO ISLAM 37-46 (1963).
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mination of one's descent.
The prefixed style is followed by the personal name. For instance,
again, in Ghalib's case, the personal name is Asadullah, meaning "Lion
of God [Asad Alah]." Asadullah was also an honorific title of caliph Ali,
the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. Like all Muslim names, the
personal name is meaningful, and Ghalib often plays upon the literal
meanings of his name and the names of his correspondents in his com-
munications to them.
36
The personal name is generally followed by one or more suffixed
styles. It may begin with Khan, indicating either that he is of Afghan
or Pathan stock, or else that he or one of his ancestors has been granted
the title by some ruler. Khan Bahadur is a more exalted title. Other
suffixed styles may denote ancestry, either physical or spiritual; others
indicate a family connection with some famous place. Generally the
most significant of these suffixed styles is an assumed literary pseudo-
nym, used by writers. Classical forms of Urdu poetry mandate that the
poet identify herself or himself in a sprightly pun in the final couplet by
introducing her or his takhallus (pen-name),37 usually consisting of one
or two syllables only. Indeed, most writers in Urdu literature are best
known by their literary names. For example, the famous Indian judge,
Saiyyid Akbar Hussain (1846-1921), is better known by his takhallus
and place name, that is, "Akbar Allahabadi" (Akbar of Allahabad).
38
Finally, some individuals have a familiar name - a call name
which is usually the last part of the name - by which their friends ad-
dress them informally. An erroneous assumption exists that "Sahib"
corresponds to the English "Mr." The correspondence is, however, only
a partial one, for "Sahib" - suffixed to the name or style of the person
addressed or referred to - is appropriate not only in relationships of a
rather formal kind, but also to familiar and informal relationships. The
words "Khanam" ( a lady, a princess, a wife), "Bano" (a lady, a princess,
36. See generally 1 GHALIB - LIFE AND LETrERS (Ralph Russell & Khurshidul Islam
trans. & eds., 1969). The abbreviated and paraphrased information in this section owes
much to "Note on Muslim Names and Their Pronunciation and Transliteration." Id. at 13-
16.
37. The pen-name was often chosen by the writer himself, sometimes by his patron
and frequently by his ustadh (teacher). If he belonged to a religious fraternity (e.g., Sufi),
his spiritual guru might do so. The pen-names usually reflect the writer's personality,
family, or aspirations.
38. The variant Urdu forms of authors' names as given by publishers on the title
page, spine of a book, foreword, preface, introduction, and dust cover, etc., has often made
the task of catalogers particularly difficult in identifying the real personal name and sur-
name of a given authority. Thus, inspired by the popularity of takhallus (pen-name) -
and collecting a detailed list of these from amongst diverse sources - one distinguished
librarian has suggested that it "will save thousands of hours of labour by cataloguers and
by users, if authors are entered under their Takhallus, or by the best known part of the
name, or the call name, like Western surnames." Dogra, supra note 30, at 354.
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a gentlewoman), "Jan" (lady, sweetheart), and "Khatun" (a noble
woman) are often suffixed to the personal names of Muslim women as a
sort of title. The word "Begum," for a lady, is similarly used, sometimes
prefixed, but more often suffixed, to the personal name. So are the
words "Mussamat" and "Bibi," which are now becoming somewhat ob-
solescent. 39 These are essentially matters of cultural peculiarities.
III. SOME DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF MUSLIM NAMES
A. Allah's Law: Islamic Religious Heritage and Biblical Allusions
A distinctive feature of Ahmad's Muslim Names is that it pains-
takingly gives the meaning or bearing on Islamic heritage of the Mus-
lim names. If a name or its derivative is found in the Qur'an, then, the
relevant chapter (sura) and verse (aayat), both in Arabic and in Eng-
lish, have been given. Since Islam acknowledges much of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition - Muslims trace their origins to Abraham, as do
Christians and Jews - and many of the stories featured in both the Old
and the New Testament also appear in the Qur'an, Biblical allusions or
analogues have been given. Judaism is particularly important as it
most closely resembles Islam. The Qur'an states that Jacob (Yaqub)
and Abrahim (Ibrahim), who founded Judaism, were the first humans
to submit fully to Allah's law.
Thus, in the entries, "Ayyub," "Daud," "Harun," "Ibrahim," "Idris,"
"Ilyas, .... Isa," "Ismail," "Ishaq," "Maryam," 'MVusa," "Rahil," "Sara,"
"Sulayman," 'Yahya," "Yaqub," 'Yunus," "Yusuf," "Uzayr," and "Za-
karia," one learns that in the Bible, they are mentioned as Job, David,
Aaron, Abraham, 40 Enoch, Elias, Jesus, Ishmael, Isaac, Mary, Moses, 41
Rachel, Sarah, Solomon, John, Jacob, Jonah, Joseph, Ezra, and
Zachariah, respectively. Obviously, some names such as Zakaria can be
borne by a Christian or by a Muslim, particularly in the Indian subcon-
39. The titles of many cases decided by the courts of Indian subcontinent, including
the Privy Council, abound in such prefixed or suffixed titles. See, e.g., Sardar Muhammad
v. Mussammat Maryam Bibi, A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 666; Azim-Un-Nissa Begum v. Dale, 6 Mad.
H.C.R. 455 (1871); Aziz Bano v. Muhammad Ibrahim Husain, 47 I.L.R. (All.) 823 (1925);
Nadir Mirza Begum v. Munir Begum, A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 411; Muhammad Raza v. Abbas
Bandi Bibi, 59 I.A. 236 (1932); Rashid Abmad v. Anisa Khatun, 59 I.A. 21 (1931); Sayeeda
Khanam v. Muhammad Sami, P.L.D. 1952 Lah. 113; Abdul Wahid v. Mussammat Nuran
Bibi, 12 I.A. 91 (1885); Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, 43 I.A. 294 (1916); Muntaz Abmad v.
Zubaida Jan, 16 I.A. 205 (1889); Nawab Umjad Ally Khan v. Mussammat Mohumdee Be-
gum, 11 M.I.A. 517 (1867); Nur-ud-din Ahmed v. Masuda Khanam, P.L.D. 1957 Dacca
242; Rabia Khatoon v. Mukhtar Abmad, A.I.R. 1966 All. 548. (Emphasis added.)
40. As "Allah did take Abraham [Ibrahim] for a friend," sura An-Nisaa 4:125, he is
distinguished with the honorific title, Khalilullah, that is, "Friend of Allah."
41. Since Allah spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai, the title of Moses (Musa) is also Ka-
limulllah, that is, one to whom Allah spoke.
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tinent. Interaction among Christianity, Judaism and Islam has thus
often been mutually beneficial, particularly in the appreciation of
names. From a theological perspective, Islam is viewed by Muslims as
the last revelation of God's word in its true and pristine purity, which
had previously been revealed to the prophets of Judaism and Christi-
anity in forms suitable for the conditions and traditions of those times
and places. 42 Allah had sent 124, 000 prophets before Muhammad, and
twenty-five Jewish-Christian prophets from Adam to Jesus ('Isa) are
mentioned in the Qur'an.
The book, Muslim Names, is not a stereotyped catalog of common
names. Rather, it is a scholarly work of reference on the etymology of
Muslim names, with meticulous annotations in the broad area of Islam
and Sharia. As the work correctly notes: "To a general reader, the
names themselves may not give enough indication, unless identified
whether a name was borne by an Imaam, a Khalifa, a Sahaabi, a Mu-
jahid, a Sultan, a saint, an author or a jurist who shaped the history of
Islam."4 3 Therefore, wherever appropriate, a famous personality of the
past who bore the relevant name has also been mentioned. For in-
stance, under the entry "Aziz,"4 4 the name of Ibn Sa'ud 'Abdul Aziz,
42. Sura An-Nisaa 4:163-65:
We have sent thee
Inspiration, as We sent it
To Noah and the Messengers
After him: We sent
Inspiration to Abraham.
Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob
And the Tribes, to Jesus,
Job, Jonah, Aaron, and Solomon,
And to David We gave
The Psalms.
Of some messengers We have
Already told thee the story;
Of others we have not;-
And to Moses God spoke direct:-
Messengers who gave good news
As well as warning,
That mankind, after (the coming)
Of the messengers, should have
No plea against Allah:
For Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise.
43. AHMED, supra note 4, at ii. Ordinarily, though most Muslim names indicate the
sex of an individual, there are some names, Qur'anic or otherwise, which are widely used
for both sexes, for example, Hikmat (wisdom, sagacity), Badr (full moon), Ihab (gift or do-
nation), Ihsan (charity, benefaction), 'Ismat (sinlessness, purity, chastity), Jannah (gar-
den or paradise), Karam (generosity, magnanimity), Manal (attainment, acquisition),
Manar (beacon, lighthouse), and Rida (contentment, satisfaction). Amal (hope), though
predominantly a female name in Egypt, is also occasionally used as a male name in Syria
and Lebanon. Similarly, Jamal (beauty, grace, comely), used as a female name in Syria, is
used as a male name elsewhere.
44. Id. at 22-23. Meaning "[m]ighty, strong, prince, noble, honourable, illustrious,
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founder of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is mentioned. 45 Five
famous jurists - Abu Hanifa (700-767), founder of the Hanafi school of
Islamic law; Ameer Ali (1849-1928), a great Indian judge (and Privy
Councillor) who wrote several learned treaties on Islam and Islamic
law; Jafar as-Sadiq (699-765), the sixth Imaam of the Shiites and the
founder of the Ja'fari school of law; Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal
(780-855), founder of the Hanbal school of law; and Muhammad ibn
Idris ash-Shaafi'i (767-820), founder of the Shafi school of law - feature
under the entries of "Abu," "Ameer," "Jafar," "Hanbar' and "Shaft'," re-
spectively. Another significant name is that of Sulaiman the Magnifi-
cent (1494-1566), who was the world famous Ottoman caliph, under the
entry "Sulayman" (a Messenger of Allah, son of the Prophet Daud).
Such references, even though interstitial, enhance the utility of the
book, not only as a linguistic dictionary, but also as an interesting and
valuable reservoir of biographical information on legal personages.
B. User-Friendly Transliteration and Emphasis on Arabic Sources
Another commendable feature of Muslim Names is that, along with
their English spellings in common use, the names have also been identi-
fied and spelled in their original languages as well, that is, Arabic (A),
Persian (P), or Turkish (T) in Arabic script. This is important, because
rendering Arabic, Persian and Turkish words and phrases into their
precise English phonetic equivalents - complete with accents, gaps and
symbols - is often problematic, especially in a book for the general
reader, who is apt to be intimidated by words dressed in their full
panoply of diacriticals. Moreover, the results could be often confusing,
for Q'run, Badawin or Ramzan do not correspond to the spellings most
people easily recognize (Koran, bedouin, Ramadan). Unless one is a
linguistic czar and an unrelenting follower of a particular system of
transliteration, Arabic words can be spelled phonetically - Abdullah,
Abdallah, Abd'Allah. 46
highly esteemed, dearly loved, beloved (which is one] of the names of Allah: Al-Aziz...
The All-Mighty." Id.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Thomas E. Lawrence, popularly known as Lawrence of Arabia, certainly did so,
writing Jeddah or Jiddah as his mood fluctuated and shunned his publishers' entreaties
to impose uniformity. See generally THOMAS E. LAWRENCE, SECRET DISPATCHES FROM
ARABIA (1939); THOMAS E. LAWRENCE, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM (1935). In retrospect,
he was, perhaps, a model of restraint, for, modern transliterations of that famous city's
name in various romanized spellings have included Jaddah, Jedda, Jeddah, Jidda, Jid-
dah, Judda, Juddah, Jadda, Djiddah, Dijuddah, Djouddah, Gedda, Dsjiddah, Djettah and .3
Dscheddah - to mention only some - and all seem acceptable! ROBERT LACEY, THE
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The Arab world places a heavy emphasis on the most frequently
given names in the Arab world which is, of course, understandable in
that, apart from being important in their own right, these names are
the principal source of the most common Muslim names in virtually
every part of the globe where Islam is practiced. 47 Moreover, Arabic,
the main language of over 182 million or so people, is the sixth most
common first language in the world, and it is the language most hon-
ored as the sacred script of Islam and the vehicle of religion.48 Fur-
thermore, since the Muslim/Arab world has witnessed, in recent years,
a renaissance in all things Islamic, one does not need the gift of clair-
voyance to say that it is likely to have profound effect on the choice of
names as well. Muslim Names should, therefore, prove a fertile source
of pleasant-sounding and auspicious names, derived from general words
and the Qur'an for good qualities, encouraging their bearers to try to
conform to the characteristics exemplified by them.
49
KINGDOM - ARABIA & THE HOUSE OF SAUD 538 (1981). For the names in Arabic, AHMED,
supra note 4, has also given, wherever possible, the three root letters, for the convenience
of an inquiring reader; in most Arabic lexicons, words are usually not arranged alphabeti-
cally, but only under the root letters system.
47. Some names, e.g., Ishmael, Hager, however, have acquired pejorative association
in their European forms, while the persons in the Arabic form (Ismail, Hajar, etc.) they
represent are sacred personages held in high esteem in Islam. ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
supra note 4, at x. Unfortunately, one Muslim name, "Abdul," has given rise to an unflat-
tering Australian nickname, Abdul, meaning "a bloke with a dark complexion, or he is a
bull artist - from the old song 'Abdul the bulbul Emir'." TAFFY DAVIES, AUSTRALIAN
NICKNAMES 17 (1977).
48. The linguistic nationalism of Kamal Ataturk, involving standardizing and mod-
ernizing of the Turkish language, however, had its curious impact on the language of
given names, in particular, in freeing them from Arabic influences. Scassa, supra note 29,
at 178 n.45. The alphabet was changed from Arabic to Roman along with linguistic
changes in names. Richard W. Bulliet, First Names and Political Change in Modern Tur-
key, 9 INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 489, 493 (1978) [hereinafter Bulliet]: "[1]n the nine-
teenth century virtually all male names contained in the lists were of Arabic origin. To-
day, however, it is evident that names of Turkish linguistic origin are quite common." Id.
49. Some experimental psychologists and social scientists have indicated that a name
exercises constraint upon the one who bears it and also tends to generate expectations
which may shape an individual's perception of the name bearer's personality and identity.
See, e.g., Barbara A. Buchanan & James L. Bruning, Connotative Meanings of First
Names and Nicknames on Three Dimensions, 85 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 143 (1971); Avner Falk,
Identity and Name Changes, 62 PSYCHOANALYTIC REV. 647, 651, 655 (concluding that
names "symbolize the identity of the person" and "have strong effective value"); Charles
E. Joubert, Individuals'Ratings of Their Given Names on Several Dimensions, 131 J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 301 (1991); Albert Mehrabian, Interrelationships Among Name Desirability,
Name Uniqueness, Emotion Characteristics Connoted by Names, and Temperament, 22 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1797 (1992); Mary V. Seemar, Name and Identity, 25 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 129 (1980) (noting the many attributes of identity including ethnicity, relig-
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IV. NAMES AND NAMING PRACTICES: SOME LEGAL ISSUES IN
THE ISLAMIC WORLD
A person should ideally have the freedom to use and change his
name as he or she pleases, as long as the purpose is not fraudulent and
the result does not impinge upon the rights of others.50 In practice this
is not so, particularly in Muslim societies. For while place-names are
properly considered a matter of public concern, personal names also
seem to be increasingly conditioned by various societal pressures, leg-
islation, regulations and decrees.
Since the name of an individual represents the principal means of
identification, the state has a strong interest regarding the assumption
and change of names for maintaining public order (for example, law en-
forcement), as well as enforcing general obligations of citizens (for ex-
ample, taxes, electoral privileges). The state interest for administrative
and related purposes needs to be appraised against the backdrop of the
rights, privileges and legitimate expectations of an individual, both un-
der the respective legal systems and major human rights' instruments.
As the experience of some countries, notably Pakistan, counsels, many
substantial concerns - protection of gender equality, autonomy, pri-
vacy, and minority rights - implicated in the choice and change of
names, deserve safeguarding as a part of human rights norms and aspi-
ion, blood line or geneaology, gender, social stratum, birth order - are reflected in a name
given to a child); William B. Schoenberg & Michael Murphy, The Relationship Between the
Uniqueness of a Given Name and Personality, 93 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 147-48 (1974);
RICHARD D. ALFORD, NAMING AND IDENTITY: A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF PERSONAL
NAMING PRACTICES 141 (1988) [hereinafter ALFORD] (noting that "first names, for the
most part,... symbolize personal identity"); Wilber G. Gaffney, Tell Me Your Name and
Your Business; or Some Considerations upon the Purposeful Naming of Children, 19
NAMES 34, 35 (1971) (explaining that one's character and profession is determined by the
first name under which one grew to adulthood).
50. Since frequent name-changing may lead to problems, however, many countries
have introduced restrictions in this respect. See Pintens & Will, supra note 31, at 73-81.
An amusing instance of name-change is narrated by Barbara Fletcher (whose nickname is
"Rainbow"):
My own name has changed three times in the last 40 years. My
mother remarried when I was nine years old, my step-father legally
adopted me and my middle and last names changed. At twenty I
married and changed my name. When I was forty, I remarried
and my name changed again. Now, I often daily choose a name
from this book when meeting new people in nonlegal situations.
BARBARA FLETCHER, DON'T BLAME THE STORK?: THE CYCLOPEDIA OF UNUSUAL NAMES
269 (1981) [hereinafter FLETCHER]. Incidentally, the book is dedicated to pediatrician
Dr. Robert Stork.
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rations. 51
A. The Giving of Names to Children by Their Parents
Most countries, particularly those that follow the common law rule,
affirm the parents' freedom and privilege to choose any one of several
surnames for their child: the traditional paternal surname, the mater-
nal surname, a hyphenated combination thereof, which is the tradi-
tional method in Spain, or some other unrelated to either of the parents'
surnames. Statutes and regulations that compel a child to take a par-
ticular surname, in contravention of the parental choice do, however,
raise the issue of whether such a requirement representing an uncon-
stitutional intrusion into the sanctum sanctorum of the family.
5 2
Apparently, there are few worthwhile reported cases or practices in
51. See generally infra notes 95-143 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Sydney v. Pingree, 564 F. Supp. 412, 413 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (fusing par-
ents' surnames "Ledbetter" and "Skylar" into child's surname "Skybetter"); O'Brien v. Til-
son, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (creating child's surname "Arneson" from fa-
ther's first name "Arne" plus son); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 721 (D. Haw. 1979)
(fusing mother's surname "Jech" with father's surname "Befurt" into child's surname "Je-
bef'). These district courts declared statutes mandating the patronymic for marital and
the mother's surname for nonmarital offspring unconstitutional, primarily on the basis of
right of privacy in childbearing matters. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (in-
structing child in a foreign language a fundamental right); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (sending children to a private school a fundamental right); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (seeking abortion a fundamental right); Secretary of the Common-
wealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 725 (Mass. 1977) (stating "the common law princi-
ple of freedom of choice in the matter of names extends to the name chosen by a married
couple for their child"); and Jones v. McDowell, 281S.E.2d 192, 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that the requirement that nonmarital child's name be changed to the father's
surname upon establishment of paternity is arbitrary and "denies such mothers a pro-
tected liberty interest"). O'Brien also relied on the mother's equal protection rights,
which mandated patronymic to be infringed. 523 F. Supp. at 496; Haxel v. Wells, 918
S.W.2d 742, 745 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (reading the statute as requiring that a child bear the
declared father's surname "would result in a violation of the Equal Protection Clause").
But see Robertson v. Pfister, 523 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988), which declared the
state's naming statute, requiring child conceived before parents' divorce to bear father's
surname constitutional, as reasonably designed to insure accuracy of vital statistics, in
contradiction to the federal court's opinion in Sydney v. Pingree, supra, which had earlier,
under nearly identical facts, declared the very same statute unconstitutional. In Henne v.
Wright, 904 F.2d 1209, 1215 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1032 (1991), however,
the court sustained the constitutionality of a naming statute on much narrower grounds
of administrative convenience over the powerful dissent of Judge Arnold, but without un-
dermining the broad sweep of constitutional concerns. For a thorough examination of the
cases involving equal protection arguments challenging statutes that require that a child
bear the patronym, see Merle H. Weiner, "We Are Family". Valuing Associationalism in
Disputes over Children's Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625, 1753-60 (1997); see generally
Aeyal M. Gross, Rights and Normalization: A Critical Study of European Human Rights
Case Law on the Choice and Change of Names, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 269 (1996); Carolus
van Nijnatten, In the Name of the Third - Changing the Law of Naming Children in the
Netherlands, 10 INT'L J. L. POL. & FAM. 219 (1996).
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any of the Muslim countries where state compulsion to adopt a par-
ticular surname has given rise to the constitutional issues of privacy,
parental autonomy and equal protection, despite the wealth of Islam
and Sharia's humanistic and theological heritage. It is a different mat-
ter, however, that Muslims living in the United States would enjoy a
similar constitutional protection in the selection of surnames as avail-
able to Americans. A heightened appreciation of women's contribution
to society and the consequent questioning of patronymic naming con-
ventions have stimulated recent litigation over naming statutes and
regulations.
Some of the extant statutes, like those in Algeria,5 3 Egypt,54 Ethio-
pia, 55 Iran,5 6 Iraq,5 7 and Turkey,5 8 however, that require the adoption of
family names in the Western sense, do not go far enough to require or
insist upon a particular name. Primarily for administrative conven-
ience and for identifying and registering its citizenry, these statutes re-
quire only that a family name, which is in practice overwhelmingly pat-
ronymic, be given to a child for transmission from generation to
generation. This requirement often has resulted in the invention of
family names based on personal predilections alone, 59 particularly in
Turkey.
Insofar as the first names are concerned, most Islamic countries do
not seem to have any formal restrictions. The choice of first names is
generally seen to be the proper function and province of parents alone
as an integral part of their dominion of care and superintendence.
Thus, there are no legally ordained limits on the names parents may
bestow upon their children, other than usage or custom. In this respect,
however, some Islamic statutory regimes do impose some restrictions,
extolling the significance of philological esteem and considerations to-
ward reinforcing cultural, religious and nationalist sensibilities. The
extent to which these restrictions have been inspired by the French law
of forenames is only a matter of intuitive speculation. In Algeria, 60 An-
53. ALGERIAN CIVIL CODE [C. cIv.] art. 28 para. 1 (1882) (Alg.) (as amended), in 5
COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE MIDDLE EAST (Gamal B. Badr ed., 1988).
54. EGYPTIAN CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] arts. 38, 39 (1948-1949) (Egypt) (as amended by
Law 461 of 1955 and in 1970).
55. ETHIOPIAN CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 33 para. 1 (Eth.).
56. IRANIAN CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 997 (1928-1935) (Iran); THE CIVIL CODE OF IRAN
145 (M.A.R. Taleghany trans., 1995) [hereinafter TALEGHANY]; LAW ON CIVIL STATUS art.
3.
57. IRAQI CIVIL CODE [C. cIv.] art. 40 (1951) (Iraq); IRAQI CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS
(1959) (as amended until 1987).
58. Names Law - Law No. 2525 of June 21, 1934, Resmi Gaz. No. 2741 of July 2,
1934; SYLVIE NAUTRA, LE NOM EN DROIT COMPAR9 106 (1977) [hereinafter NAUTR].
59. SCHIMMEL, supra note 8, at 80-81.
60. C. CIv. Alg., supra note 53, at art. 28 para. 2 (there is though an exception for
children of non-Muslim parents).
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gola, 6 1 Turkey,62 and Morocco63 the selection of the first name is re-
stricted to native ones. Moroccan law requires such a choice to be made
only from amongst names appearing on a specific list. Ethiopian law
allows the father to choose the first forename and the mother to choose
the second one. 64 In Turkey, both parents have to choose the name to-
gether. In the absence of parental consensus, the father's choice pre-
vails.65 The theoretical basis for traditional deference to the imposition
of the custom of patronymic surnames is that the father is the head of
the household, and he has an absolute duty to support his children.
66
B. Legitimacy, Illegitimacy and Adoption: Mother's or Father's Name,
or Both?
New concerns and controversies have surfaced in many countries
over the naming of children or the changing of their names in the wake
of divorces, remarriages, separation of unmarried couples, and in births
outside of marriage. How have the Islamic countries that adhere to a
strict moral code of traditional religious values responded to these con-
cerns of harmonizing filial and parental rights in names? Or, has pat-
rimonial control and preference persisted, though their roots lie in pal-
pably sexist medieval practices that are increasingly becoming
anachronistic and patently discriminatory in modern society?
67
An illegitimate child, known at early common law as a nullius fil-
ius, or a child of nobody, did not acquire a hereditary surname, except
as gained only by reputation or baptism. With the passage of time, it
became customary and eventually statutory for a nonmarital offspring
to assume the birth-name of his mother, or any name chosen by her, or
even the paternal surname if both parents so agreed. Similarly, in
situations where the father is not always known - for example, in the
61. Law on Civil Status Register No. 10/77 (Lei do registro) of Apr. 9, 1977, art. 1
para. 2 (at least one of the two first names has to sound "national").
62. H. Krfiger, Vornamen im tuirkischen Recht, 35 DAS STANDESAMT 33, 36 (1982)
[hereinafter Kriiger]; NAUTRte, supra note 58; Bulliet, supra note 48.
63. Pintens & Will, supra note 31, at 79 n.808. According to Scassa, supra note 29, at
178-79 n.46, article 4(4) of a Tunisian law of 1959 has the same effect.
64. C. cIv. Eth., supra note 55, at art. 34 para. 1 & 2.
65. Tugrul Ansay, Law of Persons, in INTRODUCTION TO TURKISH LAW 105, 115 (Tu-
grul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr., eds., 3d ed. 1987); KrUger, supra note 62, at 34.
66. See, e.g., TURKISH CIVIL CODE [C. Civ.] art. 152 (1926) (Turk.) (as amended lastly
by Law 3678 of 1990): "The husband is the head of the family and must set up the family
home and provide maintenance to the wife and children." Id.
67. Cynthia Blevins Doll, Harmonizing Filial and Parental Rights in Names: Prog-
ress, Pitfalls, and Constitutional Problems, 35 How. L.J. 227, 260 (1992); Lisa Kelly, Di-
vining the Deep and Inscrutable: Toward a Gender-Neutral, Child-Centered Approach to
Child Name Change Proceedings, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 34-55 (1996); Omi, The Name of
the Maiden, 12 Wis. WOMEN'S L. J. 253, 267-98 (1997); Lynn M. Curtis, Sexism and Bias
in the Name of Tradition: Missouri's Standard of Inequality Regarding Children's Sur-
names, 66 UMKC L. REV. 169 (1997).
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case of anonymous sperm donors and prostitutes - children usually re-
ceive their mother's surname.
But what should be the surname of a Muslim child born as a result
of embryo transfer or obtained from a surrogate mother? Procreation
outside of marriage, whether biologically or artificially, is inherently
problematic from an Islamic perspective. 68 Unlike in the Bible, when
Sarah, Rachel and Leah, afflicted with infertility, gave their handmaid-
ens (Hager, Bilah, and Zilpah) to have children for their husbands,69 no
such surrogates have been found in the Qur'an. Since the child belongs
to the womb that bore it, it seems as though the mother would have the
natural right to name the child, irrespective of the identity of genetic
pair.
The concepts of legitimacy and illegitimacy are an integral part of
Islamic law, though increasingly liberalized or even dispensed with
68. Cf. sura Ash-Shuraa 42:49-50; sura A-Furqan 25:54. This position was recently
reinforced at a seminar on "Ethical Implications of Use of Assisted Reproduction Technol-
ogy [ART] for Treatment of Human Infertility," organized by the world's top Islamic Uni-
versity Al-Azhar and six other important Islamic research institutes of Muslim countries.
Attended by many experts in the fields of religion, medicine and sociology from nine Is-
lamic countries, a seminar communique termed ART (test tube babies and other related
procedures) permissible in Islam only within the context of marriage between a man and
a woman (who are not separated by divorce or death) and only in case of a medical re-
quirement for adopting such a method of treatment. More specifically:
The sperm provided for reproduction should be obtained from husband only
while the ovum to be fertilized should be obtained from the wife.
The carrier of the fetus should be the wife of giving the ovum fertilized by
her husband.
No reproduction is permissible with the help of a third party in the form of a
donated zygote, oval cell, fetus or uterus.
No ART is permissible in case the wife is dead or a decree occurs, for the ab-
sence of marriage relationship in this case negates affiliation. It should be
also ascertained that there is no pregnancy after the elapse of the waiting
period instituted by Islamic Sharia.
ART is only permissible in the case which provides medical justification far
from any other reasons unacceptable according to Sharia.
Menopause or pre-puberty conception is precarious for mother and child.
Besides, as it affects a third party, it is unacceptable.
Test tube baby permissible in Islam; terms AI-Azhar, PAK. TRIB. (South Sydney), Oct. 10,
1997, at 4.
69. Genesis 16:1-4, 15; 30:1-10. The practice of "female slaves as surrogates... was
not without its difficulties," as Jacob's experience revealed. THOMAS A. SHANNON,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HuMAN BEINGS 3 (1988). In more mod-
ern times, however, the Vatican has strongly condemned in vitro fertilization, artificial
insemination by donor, and surrogate motherhood, for, the "child has the right to be con-
ceived, carried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up within marriage: it is
through the secure and recognized relationship to his own parents that the child can dis-
cover his own identity and achieve his own proper human development." LORI B.
ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAVE
NEW BABIES 162 (1989), quoting the Vatican "Instruction on Respect for Human Life in
Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day."
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around the globe. As such, these concepts have considerable bearing on
the acquisition of a surname in certain circumstances. In a good many
Muslim countries today, children of either sex born in wedlock receive
their father's surname at birth70 and are entitled to inherit from him.
Illegitimate children have no such right to inherit property through
their father and the mother is most likely to be punished for illicit sex-
ual liaisons (zina).71 Thus, the status of legitimacy assumes a criminal
dimension in Islamic law.
When paternity cannot be established, or, if established, is unac-
knowledged by the father, certain Islamic countries either resort to the
use of a surname invented by government officials, as if the offspring
were a foundling child, 72 or permit the mother to choose freely the sur-
name of one of her consanguineal kin, or her own surname. 73 Once pa-
ternity has been lawfully established, a Muslim who voluntarily ac-
knowledges a child to be his offspring - but not a product of zina, that
is, adultery, incest or fornication - establishes a parental link toward
creating a presumption of legitimacy. Logically, then, the normal legal
status of the transmission of the father's surname for legitimate chil-
70. This unwritten tradition - implicit in sura An-Nisaa 4:34 which recognizes that
"men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given them more
(strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means [and] there-
fore the righteous women are devoutly obedient [to their husbands] "has now also been
reflected in legislation of some of the countries of the Islamic world, e.g., Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia and Turkey. See Pintens & Will, supra note 31, at 52 n.480.
71. NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 78
(1969).
72. A foundling child, or child of unknown parentage, often abandoned by the par-
ents, obviously, cannot inherit a surname from them. Such a duty naturally devolved
upon the person or institution having custody of the child - a position now statutorily
provided in most states in America. Charles Dickens satirized the naming of abandoned
children in his famous novel Oliver Twist:
Mrs. Mann... added, after a moment's reflection, 'How comes
he [Oliver] to have any name at all, then?'
The beadle drew himself up with great pride, and said, 'I
inwented it.'
You, Mr. Bumble!'
'I, Mrs. Mann. We name our fondlings in alphabetical order.
The last was a S, - Swubble, I named him. This was a T, -
Twist, I named him. The next one as comes will be Unwin,
and the next Vilkins. I have got names ready made to the end
of the alphabet, and all the way through it again, when we
come to Z.'
'Why, you're quite a literary character, sir!' said Mrs. Mann.
CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 10 (Dodd, Mead & Co. ed.,1941) (1838) (emphasis in the
original).
73. Pintens & Will, supra note 31, at 57 nn.519-26.
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dren becomes applicable.74
Although in most legal systems it is possible for the adopted child
to bear, in one way or another the name of the adoptive parent, its con-
sequences vary from country to country and may even differ within one
country, depending upon the nature of the adoption involved. Tabnia,
the concept of adoption, is alien to most Muslim societies ever since
sura Al-Ahzab 33:37 abolished the pre-Islamic custom of adoption
whereby an adopted child could be assimilated by law into another
family.7 5 It has been, of course, suggested that the acknowledgment of
74. CHRISTIAN KOHLER, DAS VATERSCHAFTSANERKENNTNIS IM ISLAMRECHT... 211
n.128 (Paderborn 1976); Pintens & Will, supra note 31, at 58 nn.537-38. The position may
nonetheless be different for purposes of inheritance, if the stringent conditions of ac-
knowledgment (iqrar) of paternity are not met, that is, (a) the child is of unknown pater-
nity; (b) there is no definite proof that the child is the offspring of zina; and (c) there can
be no rebuttal of the presumption of paternity of another by the acknowledgment. The
distinction between status of legitimacy and the process of legitimation is crucial. "No
statement by one ... that another (proved to be illegitimate) is his son can make [him]
legitimate, but where no proof of that kind has been given such a[n] ... acknowledgment
is substantive evidence that the person so acknowledged is the legitimate son of the per-
son... provided his legitimacy be possible." Sadik Husain v. Hashim Ali, 43 I.A. 212, 234
(1916). See the very learned judgment of Mahmood, J., on the subject in the leading case,
Muhammad Allahadad Khan v. Muhammad Ismail Khan, 10 I.L.R. (All.) 289 (1888). Le-
gitimation per subsequens matrimonium is not known to Islamic law. F.A. Mann, Legiti-
mation and Adoption in Private International Law, 57 L.Q. REV. 112 (1941).
75. This sura AI-Ahzab 33:37, in general, and the words, "one who had received the
grace of Allah and thy favour" appearing therein, in particular, call for some explanation.
They refer to Zayd ibn-Haritha. One of the first to embrace Islam, he was freedman
(emancipated slave) of the holy Prophet, who loved him as a son and gave him in mar-
riage his own cousin Zaynab bint-Jahsh. (The Prophet always called Zayd son - as
slaves were often called after their master's name - having perhaps lost their father's
names altogether when they were slaves. Cf. sura AI-Ahzab 33:5.) The marriage, how-
ever, turned out to be very unhappy and Zayd wished to divorce Zaynab. This obviously
distressed the Prophet greatly, but Islam permits the marital bond to be dissolved, pro-
vided that all interests concerned are safeguarded. Zaynab, as it was her dearest wish,
was raised to be a Mother of the Believers, and then the Prophet married her to help him
in duties of leadership in guiding and instructing women who came into the fold of Islam.
The Prophet's Consorts of Purity (azwaj mutahharat) were not like that of ordinary
women or ordinary wives. Rather, they occupied an exalted position toward discharging
special duties and responsibilities and had no place in the sacred household of the
Prophet if they "desire[d] the life of this world, and its glitter." If such were the case,
then, they could be "set... free" and "provide[d] for... enjoyment... in a handsome
manner." Sura Al-Ahzab 33:28. In this context, the pagan superstition and taboo about
"adopted sons" had to be destroyed by Allah's command:
Fear Allah. Then when Zaid
Had dissolved (his marriage)
With her
We joined her
In marriage to thee:
In order that (in future)
There may be no difficulty
To the Believers in (the matter
Of) marriage with the wives
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paternity of a child of unascertained parentage (lakit) amounts, in one
sense, to a form of adoption. 76 Moreover, some jurists would even argue
that the said authority does not prohibit adoption, but merely classifies
it into the category of acts known as mubah - the acts towards which
religion is indifferent. Such arguments have not found favor with most
legislators in Muslim countries, and by and large, there is very limited
law of adoption in the Muslim world. 77 Hence, the question of naming
such a child is, at best, only hypothetical in most Muslim countries.
The Somali, Tunisian and Turkish laws, however, now allow adop-
tion.78 In conformity with the Qur'anic exhortation, 79 Somali law dic-
tates that unless the adoptee is of unknown descent it must retain its
natural father's name.80 In Tunisia, in the expectation that only chil-
dren of unknown parentage (majhul al-nasab) would be adopted, the
law allows the adoptee to take its adoptive father's surname (laqab).
81
Of their adopted sons, when
The latter have dissolved
(Their marriage) with them.
And Allah's command must
Be fulfilled.
Sura Al-Ahzab 33:37.
For, Allah has not
Made your adopted sons
Your sons. Such is (only)
Your (manner of) speech
By your mouths.
Sura Al-Ahzab 33:4. Otherwise, taken too literally, a man's calling another's offspring
"his son" may create needless complications, by erecting false relationships to the detri-
ment of or loss of true blood relations. Thus, only those who have been "wives of your
sons proceeding from your loins" (sura An-Nisaa 4:23) are within the prohibited degrees of
marriage, and this does not include "adopted sons."
76. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 166 (1964).
77. Muhammad Allahadad Khan, supra note 74, at 341 (Mahmood, J.). Adoption by
Muslims is permissible in Sri Lanka under a uniformly applicable statute introduced in
1941. But in Ghouse v. Ghouse, 1 Sri Lanka Rep. 25 (1988), the Supreme Court of Sri
Lanka ruled that the principles of Islamic law prevented Muslim parents - who had
validly adopted under the statute - conferring rights of inheritance. Savitri Goonese-
kere, The Best Interests of the Child: A South Asian Perspective, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 117,
136-37 (1994).
78. SOMALI FAMILY CODE [C. FAM.] arts. 110-14 (1975) (Somal.); TUNISIAN LAW OF
GUARDIANSHIP AND ADOPTION arts. 8-16 (1958) [hereinafter TUNISIAN LAW OF...
ADOPTION]; C. civ. Turk., supra note 66, at arts. 253-58.
79. Sura Al-Ahzab 33:5.
80. C. FAM. Somal., supra note 78, at art. 110.
81. TUNISIAN LAW OF... ADOPTION, supra note 78, at art. 14: "The adoptee gets
adopter's surname; also its first name may be changed. If so desired by the adopter the
new name of the adoptee may be recorded in the adoption order."
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Both in Somalia and Tunisia adoption by men and women and of male
and female children is permissible, but the law enforces strict rules re-
lating to difference of age between the adopted child and the adoptive
parent. Significantly, in deference to sura Al-Ahzab 33:37, allowing
marriage to an adopted son's former wife, the Turkish law provides that
a marriage would override the relationship created by adoption 2 - an
expedient amalgam of secularism and religion!
C. Married Woman's Right to Her Maiden-Antenuptial Name: Gender
Equality?
English common law permitted a woman to retain her birth-name
when married. She generally adopted the name of the husband by us-
age, but was not required by law to do so; she could legally bear a name
different from that of her husband's. This surprisingly liberal approach
prevailed despite the feudal doctrine of coverture.8 3 For example, Lady
Elizabeth Hatton, the second wife, feme covert, of Sir Edward Coke, did
not adopt the surname of her husband,8 4 and today not all women adopt
82. C. CIV. Turk., supra note 66, at art. 92 read with art. 121.
83. A married woman was not legally recognized as a separate being; her identity
merged into her husband's. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover,
she performs every thing; and is therefore called in our law-french
feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron,
or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or
lord; and her condition during the marriage is called her coverture.
Coverture gave birth to the custom whereby the married woman drops her own surname
and assumes her husband's. See generally LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 41 (1969): Julia C. Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is
Custom?, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 779; ALFORD, supra note 49, at 157-58 (in the United
States, although three million women assume their husbands' surnames upon marriage
each year, there are only around one-thousand or so court sanctioned name changes an-
nually); Carey Quan Gerlenter, Taking Names: Most Brides Now Are Using Their Hus-
bands' Surname, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 1986, at C1 ("some husbands who are uncom-
fortable about a wife keeping her own name will accept her hyphenating her name
[although] [m]ost [men] won't hyphenate theirs, though"); Lance Morrow, The Strange
Burden of a Name, TIME, Mar. 8, 1993, at 76.
84. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF SIR EDWARD COKE 125 (1956) ("Lady Hatton kept her own name, from pride, people
said; plain Mistress Coke would not become her"); M. TURNER-SAMUELS, THE LAW OF
MARRIED WOMEN 345 (1957). Similarly, in the celebrated case, Cowley v. Cowley, App.
Cas. 450 (1901), Lord Cowley sought to prevent his former wife from bearing his name
and arms. Because a wife could not be legally compelled to embrace her husband's name,
the House of Lords refused to require that she cease using "Cowley" as a surname, for a
person may assume any name unless it was a product of improper motives, or amounted
to a commercial appropriation. The House, however, enjoined her from using the title
"Countess." See also infra notes 123-25 and the accompanying text.
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the name of their husbands when they marry.8 5
Similarly, in the codified regimes of Iraq,8 6 Ethiopia,87 Morocco"8
and Senegal8 9 the wife maintains her own name, though, in practice,
her husband's name is invariably used. Moreover, Turkish law compels
the wife to take her husband's name at the time of celebrating mar-
riage.9 0 In Muslim culture, it seems settled immemorial custom that,
upon marriage, a woman replaces her own maiden name or nisba by her
husband's surname. For example, an unmarried girl of the name,
Shamim Ara Hassan, when married to a Tariq Ali Siddiqi, will hence-
forth be known as Shamim Ara Siddiqi and not Hassan as a matter of
public record.
As at common law, could Shamim legally retain her maiden name?
Or, after the marriage, could she reassume her birth-given surname?
Many countries now provide a statutory mechanism for supplementing
or supplanting the common law, but Islamic religious rules usually for-
bid the change of name.9 1 Muslim marriage is a sacred civil contract
under Islam involving offer or ijab and acceptance or qubul. As such, a
Muslim wife should be able to neutralize the assumption of the immu-
tality of the name, as well as any cumbrous process involved in chang-
ing it, by simply stipulating in the marriage contract or nikahanama
any conditions relating to the use of surname for herself and her chil-
dren. Or she may do so simply by way of a subsequent contract if the
husband agrees.
The validity of such contractual stipulations would be recognized as
long as they do not negate the essential aspects of the nikah or mar-
riage itself, or are otherwise not repugnant to Islamic law or social pol-
icy. Since free consent of both the parties is essential, Islamic law fol-
lows the rule of contractual freedom for a valid marriage contract. The
doctrine of freedom of marital stipulation, khiyar-al-shart, permissible
under Sharia, is specifically recognized by legislation in Iran, Jordan,
85. Many women decide to go by two surnames, one for professional purposes and the
other for social life. For example, Susan Brandeis Gilbert, daughter of the late Justice
Louis D. Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court, used her maiden name in her law
practice and her husband's name on social occasions. Susan Brandeis Gilbert is Dead:
Lawyer Was Daughter of Jurist, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1975, at 44. Such a choice, however,
may not be completely free from any legal complications, as it may collide with the spe-
cific requirements of a given statute.
86. C. Civ. Iraq, supra note 57, at art. 40.
87. C. civ. Eth., supra note 55, at art. 40 para. 1.
88. Morrocan Code of Personal Status and Succession art. 94. (1957-1958) [C. Per.
Stat. & Suc.] (Moroc.).
89. C. FAM. art. 7 (Somal.).
90. C. civ. Turk., supra note 66, at art. 153.
91. LEVY REUBEN, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ISLAM 53 (1957). It is though permit-
ted by some legislation. See, e.g., C. civ. Alg., supra note 53, at art 29; SYRIAN CIVIL CODE
[C. CIV.] art. 41 (1876) (Syria); C. CIV. Turk., supra note 66, at art. 26. Pintens & Will,
supra note 31, at 73 nn.717-18.
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Morocco, North Yemen, Syria, and Tunisia. 92 All lawful conditions mu-
tually agreed upon at the time of marriage, including those relating to
the adoption of surnames for the spouses and their children, would ap-
pear judicially enforceable in these countries. The acceptance of the
emergence of women as equals of men, a most significant revolution in
many societies, however, has been grudgingly slow in Islamic cultures.
Names of Muslim women are, therefore, intimately involved with their
status and societal enforcement thereof.
D. Law and Religion: Qur'anic Epithets and Names
Has Islam been relatively inhospitable to the growth of a secular
democratic polity? To answer this question, an examination of the na-
ture and role of religion in human civilization, and the place it may
have in defining the self-identity of a group, becomes increasingly rele-
vant. There is an obvious need for objectively appraising the claim of
Sharia as the law laid down by God or the continuing relevance to mod-
ern conditions of the accumulated weight of some of the Islamic tradi-
tion. Perhaps there is an even greater need to assess the hold of ortho-
doxy by interpreting the teaching of Islam. Unlike other religions,
Islam has shown a remarkable persistence of belief and habits of
thought in spite of the centuries separating the present from the years
of its revelation and early growth. For instance, Islam does not recog-
nize the sovereignty of man over the affairs of civic society because, it is
not to man, but to "Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the
earth: He forgiveth whom He wills, and punisheth whom He wills. But
Allah is [ever] Forgiving, Most Merciful." 93 This need not, by itself, im-
ply that a secular conception of sovereignty is ruled out in Islam. For
one can look on almost every statement in the Qur'an which has a
bearing on secular affairs. According to a well-known hadith, in favor
of reinterpretation in the light of knowledge and experience, 94
Muhammad is reported to have admonished his followers that in mat-
ters of this world he was only a human being; that he was as fallible as
anyone else.
No doubt the orthodox would exclude from secular affairs every-
thing on which the Qur'an is explicit. In some Islamic countries, the
rise of fundamentalism recently saw an unusually bizarre resurgence of
devout orthodoxy. Pakistan enacted a law which prohibited over 3.5
92. C. civ. Iran, supra note 56, at art. 1119; TALEGHANY, supra note 56, at 163;
JORDANIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS art. 19 (1976); C. PER. STAT. & SUC. (Moroc.), su-
pra note 88, at art. 38 (1957-1958); NORTH YEMEN FAMILY LAW art. 4 (1978); SYRIAN LAW
OF PERSONAL STATUS art. 14 (1953); TUNISIAN CODE OF PERSONAL STATUS art. 11 (1956)
(amended in 1959).
93. Sura AI-Fath 48:14.
94. SAHIH MUSLIM 1259 (Abdul Hamind Siddiqi trans., Kitab Bhawan, New Delhi
1978) (Hadith 5831).
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million members of the Ahmadiyya community, known as Ahmadis,
from practicing their faith as Muslims. Specifically, the law prohibited
the use of Islamic prayers, salutations, epithets and names. Signifi-
cantly, though "Islam was the very raison d'6tre of Pakistan,"95 Paki-
stan was intended to function as a modern, democratic state, with all
the members of the new nation (1947) having equal rights of citizen-
ship, regardless of their religion, caste or origin. 96 Indeed, article 20 of
the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan guarantees
that:
[s]ubject to law, public order and morality, -
(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propa-
gate his religion; and
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have
the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions. 97
Articles 21, 22 and 38 respectively forbid discrimination regarding
taxation, 98 educational policies, 99 and the allocation of funds and con-
cessions that the state may make to religious denominations or institu-
tions.100
Ahmadis view themselves as Muslims within the pale of Islam. 101
95. Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World 174 (1976).
96. In an address to the delegates to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, at
the creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah
stated:
[Y]ou are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques
or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan.... You may
belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the
business of the State.... We are starting in the days when there is no
discrimination, no distinction between one community and another. We
are all starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens
and equal citizens of one State .... Now, I think we should keep that in
front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith
of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.
Quoted in ISHTIAQ AHMAD, THE CONCEPT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IDEOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY IN PAKISTAN 79 (1987); STANLEY A. WOLPERT, JINNAH OF
PAKISTAN 337-39 (1984). The secularist vision, however, did not survive for long after
Jinnah's death in 1948. Even earlier, in a parody of Jinnah's title Quaid-e-Azam (the
"great leader"), many mullahs referred to Jinnah as Kafir-e-Azam (the "great infidel").
SIBTE HAsAN, THE BATTLE OF IDEAS IN PAKISTAN 180 (1st ed. 1986).
97. PAK. CONST. art. 20 (1973), reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1986).
98. Id. art. 21.
99. Id. art. 22.
100. Id. art. 38.
101. Ahmadiyyat, a sect entirely within the fold of Islam, is in no way a new religion.
Their beliefs are in no way a repudiation of the basic tenets of Islam, but are, rather,
plausible interpretations of the same doctrines. The essential doctrine of Islam is that
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Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) of Quadian, India, founded the re-
vivalist Ahmadiyya Movement in 1889. His followers believe that he is
the personification of the long-awaited al-Mehdi (messiah) whose arri-
val was foretold by the Prophet Muhammad. The Ahmadis do not be-
lieve that Prophet Muhammad was chronologically the last prophet;
rather he was so only spiritually, embodying all the quintessence of
prophethood in its most consummate and pristine form. Thus, other
prophets can undoubtedly appear, but only through an indispensable
allegiance to Prophet Muhammad and that too as his penumbral rem-
nant. This interpretation of the Prophet's "finality"10 2 is, however, an
there is but one God and that Muhammad is His Prophet. Thus, "[a]ny person who pro-
fesses the religion of Islam, in other words, accepts the unity of God and the prophetic
character of Mohammad is a Moslem .... 2 SYED AMEER ALi, MAHOMMEDAN LAW 22
(Tagore Law Lectures, Calcutta, 4th ed. 1912). This is the indispensable minimum; a be-
lief short of this is not Islam; a belief in excess of this is, for the law courts at least (in In-
dia), a redundancy. It has been thus held in India that, despite their peculiar beliefs, the
Ahmadis are Muslims, for a court of law is not concerned with peculiarities in belief, or-
thodoxy or heterodoxy, so long as the minimum of belief exists. See, e.g., Narantakath v.
Parakkal, 45 I.L.R. (Mad.) 986 (1922).
As far as the fundamental belief or acts of worship are concerned the
Ahmadi Muslims have neither taken anything out nor added anything
new to the religion of Islam. [They] make their declaration of faith
by reciting the same kalima which was recited by the Prophet
Muhammad himself [There is no God but Allah and
Muhammad is the Messenger/Prophet of Allah]; they say their
prayers and fast in the same manner as the Holy Prophet of Islam
[Muhammad] did; and their Qiblah [where they face when they say
their prayers], their Ka'aba [holy building in Mecca, Saudi Arabia],
their Azan [call to prayer] and their Quran are all exactly the same
as that of the other [Sunni] Muslims.
WAHEED AHMAD, A BOOK OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 169 (1988). See generally
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Ahmadiyyat: The Renaissance of Islam (1978); Louis J.
Hammann, Ahmadiyyat: An Introduction (1985); Yohanan Friedmann, Prophecy Con-
tinuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background 1-2, 16-22,
119-26 (1989).
102. This is derived from sura Al-Ahzab 33:40:
Muhammad is not
The father of any
Of your men, but (he is)
The Messenger of Allah,
And the Seal of the Prophets:
And Allah has full knowledge
Of all things.
Sunni interpretation of this sura is that the holy Prophet Muhammad closed the long line
of Messengers and, though Allah's teaching will always be continuous, there will be no
Prophet after Muhammad. The later ages may have thinkers and reformers, but not
Prophets. This assertion, in no way lightly made, is a serious decree full of wisdom, for,
1
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anathema to orthodox mainstream Muslims, that is, Sunnis. In par-
ticular, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim to prophethood (even though one
subservient to Prophet Muhammad) is deeply resented and deemed
blasphemous by the ummah (Islamic community).
Anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment, dating back to the lifetime of Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad, forced Ahmadis to organize themselves as a separate
and somewhat alienated group within the broader spectrum of Islam,
against their own volition. 103 Though long harassed, the Ahmadis were
nevertheless relatively safe before 1953. Thereafter, under the pressure
of the late Maulana Abul A'la Maududi,10 4 their ostracization 10 5 and
persistent victimization' 06 ultimately led to a constitutional amendment
in 1974 that proclaimed them a non-Muslim minority. 10 7 Beginning in
1978, under the escalated Islamization of Pakistan, Ahmadis were first
effectively disenfranchised.108 Subsequently, they were dispossessed of
"Allah has full knowledge of all things."
103. Naeem Osman Memon, Ahmadiyyat or Qadianism: Islam or Apostasy? 326-29
(1989).
104. The then-Head of Jamat-i-Islami (Party of Islam). See generally Adam
Muhammad Ajiri, Some Aspects of Maududi's Contributions to Modern Islamic Thought,
12 MUSLIM EDUC. Q. 52 (1995); RAFIZ ZAKARIA, THE STRUGGLE WITHIN ISLAM: THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN RELIGION AND POLITICS 229 (1988).
105. ANTONIO R. GUALTIERI, CONSCIENCE AND COERCION: AHMADI MUSLIMS AND
ORTHODOXY IN PAKISTAN 47 (1989).
106. Id. at 47, 69; MUJEEB-UR-REHMAN, PERSECUTION OF AHMADIS IN PAKISTAN: AN
OBJECTIVE STUDY (1993); Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 36 I.C.J.
REV. 16 (1986).
107. Second Amend., Act XLIX of 1974 (amending PAK. CONST. of 1973), in SAFDAR
MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAKISTAN 1038 (2d rev. ed. 1990) [herein-
after MAHMOOD]; JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM AND POLITICS 163 (1984). Article 260 (3) (a) of
the Pakistan Constitution, quoted below, defines who is a Muslim:
Muslim means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of
Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified Prophethood of
Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets and
does not believe or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer,
any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense
of the word or any description whatsoever, after Muhammad
(peace be upon him)....
PAK. CONST. art. 260 (3) (a). If this alone was not enough to exclude "Ahmadis," article
260 (3) (b) explicitly states that Ahmadis and other religious groups are non-Muslims:
[N]on-Muslim means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a
person belonging to the Christians, Hindus, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi
community, a person of the Quadiani Group or Lahori Group (who
call themselves 'Alimadis' or by any other name) or a Bahai,
and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes.
PAK. CONST. art. 260 (3) (b).
108. JUDGE GUSTAF PETREN ET AL., PAKISTAN: HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MARTIAL LAW
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the right to profess, practice, or propagate their religious beliefs and to
adopt Muslim names, through the Martial Law Ordinance XX of April
26, 1984.109
Despite its length, Ordinance XX merits quotation in its precious
fullness, particularly to appreciate the restrictions imposed on the use
of certain Islamic names:
WHEREAS it is expedient to amend the law to prohibit the Quadiani
group,l1 0] Lahori group[" 1] and Ahmadis from indulging in anti-
Islamic activities .... the President is pleased to make and promulgate
the following Ordinance:
1. Short title and commencement.
(1) This Ordinance may be called the Anti-Islamic Activities of the
Quadiani Group, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punish-
105 (1987). An amendment to the Constitution, providing for separate electorates for
non-Muslims, effectively meant that Ahmadis, pursuant to article 260 (3), were required
to enroll as non-Muslims in order to vote or run for office. Such a requirement amounted
to an admission by Ahmadis - contrary to their faith and religious beliefs - that they
were non-Muslims. PAK. CONST. of 1973 arts. 50, 260 (3) (a)-(b) (amended 1985), in
MAHMOOD, supra note 107, at 860. Undeniably, rapid Islamization of the laws in Paki-
stan was the primary objective of the military ruler, General Zia-ul-Haq. See generally
Charles H. Kennedy, Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 63 PAC. AFF. 62 (1990);
RASHIDA PATEL, ISLAMISATION OF LAWS IN PAKISTAN? (1986); Daniel P. Collins, Islamiza-
tion of Pakistani Laws: A Historical Perspective, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 511 (1988); ISLAMIC
REASSERTION IN PAKISTAN: THE APPLICATION OF ISLAMIC LAWS IN A MODERN STATE (Anita
M. Weiss ed., 1986); RUBYA MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN (1994).
109. Ordinance XX of 1984: Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group, Lahori
Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984, 36 P.L.D. 102 (1984)
(Pak.). "Quadiani" and "Lahori" refer to to the two divergent schools of thought amongst
the Ahmadis. See generally Linda J. Berberian, Pakistan Ordinance XX of 1984: Interna-
tional Implications on Human Rights, 9 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 661 (1987).
110. Though referring and naming people after their place of origin is customary and
commonplace in the Muslim culture, dubbing Ahmadis as a group collectively as Quadi-
anis is gratuitously disparaging. While it is understandable to refer to as Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad Quadiani (as he hailed from Quadian), his followers, diverse in origin and coming
from different places, should not be slighted in this way.
111. A dissident group of Ahmadis, deriving their name by choice from Lahore (the city
of their headquarters), who believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was merely a reformer (mujad-
did) and not a prophet. See generally HAZRAT MIRZA BASFUR-UD-DIN MAHMUD AHMAD OF
QADIAN, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SPLIT: A REPLY TO A PAMPHLET ENTITLED THE SPLIT' BY
M. MUHAMMAD ALl M.A., OF LAHORE (1924); CAESAR E. FARAH, ISLAM 243-44 (5th ed.
1994); Charles H. Kennedy, Towards the Definition of a Muslim in an Islamic State: The
Case of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, in RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC MINORITY POLITICS IN SOUTH
ASIA 71 (Dhirendra Vajpeyi & Yogendra K. Malik eds., 1989).
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ment) Ordinance, 1984.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Ordinance to override orders or decisions of courts.
The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding any
order or decision of any court.
3. Addition of new sections 298B and 298C ....
In the Pakistan Penal Code [1860], after section 298A, the following
new sections shall be added, namely:
298B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for cer-
tain holy personages or places.
(1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call
themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name) who by words, either spo-
ken or written, or by visible representation,
(a) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or compan-
ion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as 'Ameer-ul-
Mumineen' [Leader of the Faithful], 'Khalifa-tul-Mumineen' [Caliph of
the Faithful], 'Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen' [Caliph of the Muslims], 'Sahabi'
[Companion] or 'Razi Allah Anho' [May God be Pleased With Them];
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy
Prophet (peace be upon him), as 'Ummul-Mumineen' [Mother of the
Faithful];
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the
family (Ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon
him), as Ahle-bait; or
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as 'Masjid'
[Mosque];
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years,[11 2] and shall also be liable to fine.
112. Ordinance XXI changed the punishment under this section (as well as under sec-
tion 298C) from "up to three years" to up to "ten years" for anyone who outrages "the re-
ligious feelings of any citizens of Pakistan." Ordinance XXI of 1991, in AMNESTY
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(2) any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call them-
selves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or
written, or by visible presentation, refers to the mode or form of call to
prayers followed by his faith as 'Azan', or recites Azan as used by the
Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
298C. Person of Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or
preaching or propagating his faith.
Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call them-
selves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name) who directly or indirectly, poses
himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or
preaches or propagates his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or
by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the
religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine....
Designed to regain "moral purity of early Islam"1 13 even further, in
1986, President Zia-ul-Haq's ambition mandated blasphemy punishable
by death, adding section 295C to the Pakistan Penal Code. Known as
the "Blasphemy Law," section 295C has been increasingly used to
prosecute Ahmadis, the bate noire of the clergy.
In Zaheeruddin v. State,11 4 some Ahmadis appealed their conviction
under section 298C of the Pakistan Penal Code for wearing a badge
having Kalma Tayyaba inserted on it - "There is no God but Allah and
Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah" - on their persons and claiming
to be Muslims, to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The appellees chal-
lenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of Ordinance XX. Over a four-
to-one dissent, the Pakistan Supreme Court surprisingly sustained the
constitutionality of the impugned provisions. The Ahmadis' argued the
Ordinance had seriously eroded the freedom of religion and conscience,
both enshrined in article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution and recog-
nized by Islam, to practice their faith freely. The Court's principal con-
clusions were:
(1) Because Ahmais are non-Muslims, under article 260 (3) (b) of the
INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN, VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF AHMADIS 5 (1991) [herein-
after AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
113. Ayesha Jalal, The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State of Pakistan,
in WOMEN, ISLAM & THE STATE 77, 101 (Denis Kandiyoti ed., 1991).
114. 26 S.C.M.R. (S. Ct.) 1718 (1993) (Pak.).
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Pakistan Constitution, their representation as Muslims is fraud and
deception upon the general public.
115
(2) Because Muslims have exclusive use of their Islamic epithets,
names and practices under the corporation and trademark law of vari-
ous countries, including England, India and the United States, the
Ahmadis' use of these is constitutionally proscribed.
116
(3) Ahmadis' beliefs and representations, including the use of Muslim
names and practices as Muslims, offend and outrage the religious sus-
ceptibilities of Pakistan's Muslim majority, that is, Sunnis.117
(4) In the interest of law and order, Ahmadis are not allowed to offend
the Sunni populace by practicing their faith.118
(5) Ordinance XX was constitutional and did not violate the principles
of freedom of religion as guaranteed in article 20 of the Pakistan Con-
stitution. 119
Although all are highly suspect, these conclusions can be refuted ef-
fectively. 120 Such a detailed exercise is obviously beyond the limited
scope of this Article. Nevertheless, some comments on conclusion (2),
above, regarding the proprietary nature of the use of epithets and
names, are in order.
If an individual possesses a property right in such intangibles as
her/his name, likeness, personality and history, then any appropriation
of such rights for commercial exploitation is impermissible. This con-
cern led to the necessity of providing some protection for the holder of a
name. Thus, both in civil law and common law jurisdictions, the name
was first located within the framework of property rights, premised on
115. Id. at 1775-78.
116. Id. at 1751-58. It is not clear whether these Islamic practices and epithets were
actually registered under the laws of Pakistan.
117. Id. at 1765, 1777-78.
118. Id. at 1758-65. Many Pakistanis regard Ahmadis as unbelievers (kafirs) who
should not have a right to exist in an Islamic country. See generally AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, supra note 112.
119. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S. Ct.) at 1779.
120. This has been commendably done elsewhere. See also KAREN PARKER, RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION IN PAKISTAN: THE AHMADI CASE AT THE SUPREME COURT (1993); ANN
ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 159-60 (1991)
[hereinafter MAYER]; Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Is-
lamic Law, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 349, 408-09 (1996); see, e.g., Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, En-
forced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya
Community in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 275 (1995); Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Re-
ligion [and] Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 40 (1995).
VOL. 26:2
WHAT'S IN A NAME?
the theory that the name and the rights accompanying it have charac-
teristics singularly common to property and property rights.
Du Boulay v. Du Boulay121 discussed these rights. The appellants,
members of the Du Boulay family, sued the respondent, son of a former
slave of the family, who also used the name Du Boulay. Appellants
sought a declaration that their name, property of their family, could not
be used by a person unrelated to them. The following principle, articu-
lated by Lord Chelmsford, has sharply influenced the development of a
property right in a name in the common law world today:
In this country we do not recognize the absolute right of a person to a
particular name to that extent of entitling him to prevent the assump-
tion of that name by a Stranger. The right to the exclusive use of a
name in connection with a trade or a business is familiar to our
law .... But the mere assumption of a name, which is the patronymic
of a family, by a Stranger who had never before been called by that
name, whatever cause of annoyance it may be to the family, is a griev-
ance for which our Law affords no redress.
22
This doctrine was applied, with greater vigor, in the much-
publicized case of Cowley v. Cowley.123 Lord Cowley's wife persevered in
using his name and title despite her remarriage to a commoner. Lord
Cowley sought to restrain his former wife from this use, presumably on
the theory that his peerage was a form of property, albeit an incorporeal
hereditament. The House of Lords, sitting as a Committee for Privi-
leges, however, ruled that, although Countess Cowley used Earl
Cowley's name, she had neither endeavored to participate or to share in
his hereditary privilege of earldom, nor had she caused him any pecuni-
ary damage. Rejecting his appeal, Lord Lindley reinforced the long-
standing principle that the common law recognized no "property" right
in a name per se and that the "controversy between the parties [was]
reduced to a dispute about the use of a name as distinguished from a
dignity. Speaking generally, the law of this country allows any person
to assume and use any name, provided its use is not calculated to de-
ceive and to inflict pecuniary loss."124
The aspects of the commercial value of a name, and the rights at-
tached thereto, inform the regulation of the right in a name in most
common law countries. Thus, apart from questions of unfair competi-
tion and use in business, there is no property right in a name. In other
words, a name is, in itself, incapable of ownership like any other thing.
So, merely using another person's name cannot be prevented, unless, as
mentioned earlier, it is inspired by improper motives such as defama-
121. 16 Eng. Rep. 638 (1869).
122. Id. at 644-45.
123. App. Cas. 450 (1901).
124. Id. at 460.
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tion, or its use amounts to a meaningful or purposeful commercial ap-
propriation.
125
Thus, one certainly cannot quibble with the animating observations
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan that:
[i]ntentionally using trade names, trade marks, property marks or de-
scriptions of others [as one's own] amounts to an offense and not only
the perpetrator can be imprisoned and fined but [also] damages can be
recovered and injunction to restrain ... issued.... For example, the
Coca Cola Company will not permit anyone to sell, even a few ounces of
his own product.., marked Coca Cola .... The principles involved
are: do not deceive and do not violate the property rights of others.
126
Had the Court stopped here, one could not have questioned the
broad accuracy of its statement concerning the unauthorized commer-
cial exploitation of one's name. The Court, however, went further and
intoned: "[Iln this Ideological State, the [Ahmadis], who are non-
Muslims want to pass off their faith as Islam [and a Muslim believer,]
will not tolerate a Government which is not prepared to save him of
such deceptions or forgeries."
127
The curious analogy between religion and trade, advanced by the
Court, is not only flippant, but outright misconceived. It nonchalantly
assumes that there can be a copyright on God and that the ennobling
concept of religion can be degraded to the mundane level of a routine
merchandise (like Coca Cola). Religion as an abstract sentiment or idea
is manifestly unpatentable. References to trademarks and company
law are, thus, totally inappropriate in that religion is not a commercial
property, nor is Islam a registered corporate entity.
Moreover, contrary to the Court's avid fondness for the United
States' cases in support of its tortured reasoning, many American
precedents, neither discussed nor mentioned, stand exactly for a dia-
metrically opposite proposition. That is, religious prayers, terms,
names, and practices simply cannot be trademarked or protected
through the aegis of intellectual property laws. 128 The terms "Islam,"
125. 65 C.J.S. Names § 13 (1966).
126. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S. Ct.) at 1753-54.
127. Id. at 1754. Such a statement, sub silentio, seems to recognize (if not outrightly
legitimize) the manipulation of Islam to introduce regressive legislation for political expe-
diency.
128. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Mirza Ahmad Sohrab, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 525, 527, affl'd, 29
N.Y.S.2d 509 (1941) ("plaintiffs have no right to a monopoly of the name of a religion [and
the] defendants, who purport to be members of the same religion, have an equal right to
use the name of the religion [for] their own meetings, lectures, classes and other activi-
ties" and that the Baha'i defendants did not intend to deceive the public into believing
that their acts were affiliated with those of the plaintiffs); Christian Science Board of Di-
rectors of First Church of Christ v. Evans, 520 A.2d 1347, 1353 (N.J. 1987) (a New Jersey
church, not affiliated with the Christian Science Church, Boston, but also bearing the
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"Muslim," "Masjid" and, arguably, the terms and epithets laboriously
enumerated in section 298B of the Pakistan Penal Code - "Ameer-ul-
Mumineen" (Leader of the Faithful), "Khalifa-tul-Mumineen" (Caliph of
the Faithful), "Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen" (Caliph of the Muslims), "Sa-
habi" (Companion), "Razi Allah Anho" (May God Be Pleased With
Them), "Ummul-Mumineen" (Mother of the Faithful) - are generic in
nature and are thus neither patentable nor subject to asserted regula-
tion under trademark law. Unfortunately, the Zaheeruddin court did
not feel any discomfiture in addressing a religious issue in terms more
appropriate to the commercial world.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court was right in upholding the
constitutionality of the oppressive Ordinance, thereby justifiably
abridging the freedom of religion of the Ahmadis, including their right
to use any Islamic epithets and names, the implications of the Court's
decision nevertheless need to be weighed carefully in the broader con-
text of Muslim countries' obligations to observe the minimum human
rights norms envisioned in many international instruments on the
subject. It is respectfully submitted that, despite its apparent erudition
in repeatedly referring to cases from Australia, the United Kingdom,
India, and the United States, the Court has not only thoroughly failed
to appreciate the subtle nuances and the true import of these overseas
precedents on the subject of law and religion, but also it has in the pro-
cess wrongly deprived the Ahmadis from using ordinary generic Islamic
names and epithets in total disregard of their religious tenets and sin-
cere beliefs. The Court's observation "that the Ahmadis will face [no]
difficulty in coining new names, epithets, titles and descriptions for
their personages, places and practices,"'129 rather than adopting Islamic
ones, is gratuitous and assumes that only Muslims enjoy some kind of
name "Christian Science Church," was free to do so, for religious names and terms are
"generic" and thus cannot be subjected to trademark law); General Conference Corp. of
Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 F.2d 228
(9th Cir. 1989) (since "Seventh-Day Adventist" is a generic term, its unauthorized use
could not deceive the public); Board of Provincial Elders of Southern Province of Moravian
Church v. Jones, 159 S.E.2d 545 (N.C. 1968) (defendant was free to use the name
"Moravian" in connection with any religious activity despite nonaffiliation with plaintiffs);
New Thought Church v. Chapin, 144 N.Y.S. 1026, 1028 (N.Y. App. Div. 1913) (the "New
Thought Church" could not prevent defendants from conducting services under the name
"New Thought Services" for the plaintiff "surely is not in a position to successfully claim a
monopoly of teaching [a] form of religious faith by means of organizations known by the
generic names of churches"). See generally Howard J. Halperin, Annotation, Right of
Charitable or Religious Association or Corporation to Protection Against Use of Same or
Similar Name by Another, 37 A.L.R.3d 277 (1971 & Supp. 1997).
129. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S. Ct.) at 1779.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
monopoly in this respect. Such a loathsome specter of discrimination is
not only violative of the universality of the concept of human rights, but
also blithely ignores the evident proposition of law that generic names
belong to the public domain, there being absolutely no exclusive private
right to their use.
The United Nations Charter, 130 the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, 3 1 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 132 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, 3 3 and the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief'3 4 have all been accepted, in one form or another, by many Islamic
countries - including, one would believe, Pakistan. If so, then, the
minimum norms of these instruments are expected to be preserved
through a reasoned and enlightened interpretation of Islam. Such an
interpretation of Sharia which would enable contemporary Muslim
countries to maintain their commitment to the dynamism of the Qur'an,
while at the same time complying with the international standards,
135
130. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55 (extolling freedom of religion). See generally Brice
Dickson, The United Nations and Freedom of Religion, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 327 (1995).
131. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 143-46 (Louis Henkin et al.
eds., 3d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. See generally THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
132. G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 131, at 151-60
(guaranteeing freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching). Article 24 (2) provides: "Every child shall be registered immediately after birth
and shall have a name." See generally Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Re-
ligion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance
and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487 (1988).
133. G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 131, at 174-80 (article 16 of this Con-
vention specifically assures a married woman equal rights regarding the choice of the
surname). See generally Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Are the Shari'a and the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1949 (1995); Leila P.
Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An Incomplete Un-
derstanding of Gradualism, 30 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 311 (1995).
134. G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1981), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 131, at 171-74 (religious beliefs should
be respected as fundamental elements of life).
135. See generally AN-NA'IM, supra note 5; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Human Rights in
the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 (1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Civil Rights in the
Islamic Constitutional Tradition: Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 267 (1992); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International
Law in the Muslim Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,
Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: Challenge and Response, 20
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 317 (1987); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Religious Minorities Under
Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1987); Mehrzad
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should include, inter alia, the freedom of religion and related rights of
minority groups like the Ahmadis who have been the most savage vic-
tims of bigotry, intolerance and unrelenting suppression.
Ordinance XX, notwithstanding its dubious constitutionality, vio-
lates most of the norms of international human rights, including the
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights: "Every person has the
right to freedom of conscience and worship in accordance with his re-
ligious beliefs." 136 Instead of facing an enforced apostasy, Ahmadis or
any such sects, should have the right to self-determination, including
the right to choose Qur'anic names and epithets. Any brutal repression
and discrimination against any ethnic and religious minorities, solely
because of their different religious beliefs and practices, is most perni-
cious and should not be allowed to be justified by recourse to medieval
constructs of Islam. The perceptive suggestions of a study, that regres-
sive interpretations of Islam have seriously inhibited the progress and
reform of matters affecting women, are equally apposite to the subject-
matter of our present discussion:
The only version of Islam that has developed and flourished at all is
conservative, bigoted and fanatical, and it is from this that the emerg-
ing elite attempt to derive their philosophical bearings. In the absence
of any serious work towards progressive interpretations of religion, of
distinguishing between its spirit and symbols, Pakistan seems to be in
the grip of the unenlightened and the close-minded. And since the po-
litical process has been subverted, the masses, whose belief may be Is-
lam, but whose concern is not religion but the real issues of existence,
have been by-passed.
137
Appalling then is that the Ahmadis' use of Islamic names and epi-
thets could expose them to the draconian mandatory death penalty for
"posing as Muslims" under the Blashphemy Law, 138 though traditional
Boroujerdi, Can Islam be Secularizd?, in IN TRANSITION: ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND
IDENTITY IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES 57 (M. R. Ghanoonparvar & Faridoun Farrokh
eds., 1993); Michael King, Religion into Law, Law and Religion: The Construction of a
Secular Identity for Islam, in NATIONALISM, RACISM AND THE RULE OF LAW - (Peter Fitz-
patrick ed., 1995); MAYER, supra note 120; Riffat Hassan, Religious Human Rights and
the Qur'an, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 85 (1996), in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES 361 (John Witte, Jr., & Jonathan D. van der
Vyver eds., 1996).
136. UNIVERSAL ISLAMIC DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Salim Azzam ed., London,
Islamic Council of Europe 1981).
137. WOMEN OF PAKISTAN, TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK? 17 (Khawar Mum-
taz & Farida Shaheed eds., 1987).
138. PAK. PENAL CODE § 295C (1860) (as amended).
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sources of Sharia do not mandate it. Ample authority exists in the
Qur'an that prohibits the practice of compulsion or duress in matters of
religion. 139 Faith (iman), the quintessence of religion, cannot be im-
posed on the recalcitrant, but implies only willful and voluntary sub-
mission. Sharia does not deny the followers of other faiths the freedom
to practice and to retain the religion of their choice.
Furthermore, the Qur'an is silent on the death sentence for apos-
tasy. Whatever authority exists on the subject in the Sunna has been
open to diverse interpretations. Overwhelming juristic opinion has
supported the view that apostasy alone - unless accompanied by high
treason (hirabah) - does not call for any punishment, death or other-
wise.140 "[Alpostasy by itself, however condemnable as a spiritual of-
fence,[14 11 entails no temporal penalty. This is the essence of the free-
dom to change one's religion and the Qur'an is explicit on it."142
Zaheeruddin raises many thorny issues, not only in the realm of
human rights of one's religious freedom and the politicization of Islam
and the exercise of cloaking regressive laws in Islamic terms for bla-
tantly political purposes, but also on the extent of the role that law
ought to be allowed to play in the selection and regulation of names.
After all, absent any compelling state interest, the choosing of a name
should be a highly private and individual matter.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Names and naming processes are, after all, not a light-hearted
business. 143 A complex interplay of law and religious values is involved,
as names originate in the language and culture of the varied heritages
of a given society. Relatively sparse literature exists, and that too not
easily accessible, on this specific aspect, at least, from an Islamic per-
spective. Despite the recent global comparative law survey on the sub-
ject of "Names," with an understandably marked emphasis on common
139. See also sura AI-Baqarah 2:111, 170; see generally sura Al-Baqarah 2:256; sura
Aal'Imraan 3:20, 84; sura Al-Maa'idah 5:46, 49-51, 95, 102; sura AI-An'aam 6:108; sura
Al-A'raaf 7:199; sura Yunus 10:99; sura An-Nahl 16:22; sura Al-Ankabut 29:46; sura Ash-
Shuraa 42:48; sura Al-Ghaashiyah 88:2 1.
140. For a perceptive examination of the various authorities on the subject, see Mo-
hammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom of Religion in Islamic Law, 21 CAP. U.L. REV. 63, 70-
80 (1982); GEORGE MAKDISI, RELIGION, LAW AND LEARNING IN CLASSICAL ISLAM (1991).
141. Cf sura Al-Baqarah 2:217; sura An-Nisaa 4:137.
142. MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM 116 (1967).
143. In its relentless drive toward exterminating the Jewish populace, Nazi Germany
deliberately dehumanized its holocaust victims, first, by giving them a disagreeably bad
name and, then, assigning a number. Such a technique, though much deprecated, often
features in ordinary criminal trials as well, where prosecutors at times tend to portray
defendants in contumelious terms while defense attorneys strive to present their names
in honorable expressions. Arthur N. Bishop, Name Calling: Defendant Nomenclature in
Criminal Trials, 4 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 38 (1977).
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law and European legal orders - by far the best and amazingly thor-
ough - by Professors Walter Pintens and Michael R. Will,144 one needs
a composite and integrated study of Islamic practice, both traditional
and statutory, toward a better and richer understanding on the complex
subject of names and its allied aspects. 145 In particular, a sensitive
study of the subject of "names" and naming systems, onomastics, from a
relatively neglected perspective of law and religion, is long-overdue
from a specialist in Islamic law. After all, that "which we call a rose
[by] any other name" may not necessarily "smell as sweet"'146 as the fic-
tional Juliet - in her romantic naivet6 - would like us to believe, par-
ticularly, if a name is not in conformity with law and the expectations of
one's religion. Thus, a study of Islamic names, from the perspective of
law and religion, apart from promising to be a rewarding venture in it-
self, should also add a new dimension to that perennially anguished
question: "What's in a name?" 147 - which ought to be rephrased, "What
isn't in a name!" For the right to a name, a threshold requirement for
one's private and public existence, 148 has been correctly recognized by
the United Nations as a basic part of human identity and develop-
ment.1 49
144. Pintens & Will, supra note 31.
145. Unfortunately, the very valuable work, TAHIR MAHMOOD, STATUTES OF PERSONAL
LAW IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES (2d rev. ed. 1995), while giving easy access to various statutes
in English, omits most of the provisions relating to names; otherwise, the book would
have been an excellent source of research on the law of Islamic names.
146. ROMEO AND JULIET, supra note 1, at 11. 43-44; ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra
note 1, at 1627. Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 50, at 107:
A rose does not smell as sweet by another name. The result of much
research has shown that there is magic in having the right name
and that an unsuitable name can cause great pain and even harm a
person. Proper names can develop self-esteem, describe how one
feels about oneself, show heritage, be a magic protector, have
astrological or numerical importance; it can be the remembrance of
an occupation; it can occasionally tell the month of one's birth; it can
recall a rank; it can show geographical places of birth; if named for
movie stars or famous people, it can tell your age; it establishes a
relationship with your peers; it can be poetry or music, a blessing or
a curse.
147. ROMEO AND JULIET, supra note 1, at 1. 43; ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note
1, at 1627.
148. FRANK NUESSEL, THE STUDY OF NAMES: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND TOPICS
14-15 (1992).
149. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHT OF THE CHILD
117 (1995). Several international instruments recognize children's right to choose their
own name. See, e.g., The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, in DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, G.A. Res., U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 19, 20,
U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1954) (principal 3) (the "child shall be entitled from his birth to a name
and a nationality"); The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 24(2)
("[e]very child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name"); The
American Commission on Human Rights, 36 OAS Off. Rec. OEAISeries K/XVII1.1 Doc. 65,
Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970) (signed Nov. 22, 1969) ("[e]very person has the right to... the sur-
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APPENDIX I
The following sampling of William Shakespeare's references to
"Name" and "Names" is only illustrative and is in no way intended to be
exhaustive:
(1) I would to God thou and I knew where a commodity of good names
were to be bought
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE
FOURTH act 1, sc. 2,11. 93-94 (1597), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, su-
pra note 1, at 1159. Typically, Falstaff is more concerned with reputa-
tion than morality.
(2) Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, Is the immediate
jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
T was mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3, 11. 154-60 (1604), in
ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1841. lago is uttering the
proverbial notions of reputation and good name. His prevarication fuels
Othello's desire to be told lago's opinion of Cassio, while ironically it
heightens the audience's awareness of the damnable act Iago is about to
commit. lago is to defame both Cassio and Desdemona as lovers.
(3) Awake, thou coward majesty! thou sleepest.
Is not the king's name twenty thousand names?
Arm, arm, my name! A puny subject strikes
At thy glory.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING RICHARD II act 3, sc. 2, 11. 84-87
(1595), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1065. Through-
out the scene of his return from Ireland, Richard vacillates between de-
spair and vaunting rhetoric. This revival of courage is made in re-
sponse to Aumerle's encouragement that Richard remember his
names of his parents or that of one of them"); The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1460 (1989) (reproduced from G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/441736
(1989) art. 7 (the "child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the
right form birth to a name").
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position.
(4) 0 good Horatio, what a wounded name,
Things standing thus unknown, shall live behind me!
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 2, 11. 354-55 (1600-01), in
ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1802. Hamlet begs Horatio
to stay alive to explain what has happened; otherwise, his reputation
("name") would be damaged ("wounded") since the cause of the events
was still unknown to most people.
(5) Wherever the bright sun of heaven shall shine, His honour and the
greatness of his name Shall be, and make new nations...
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY VIII act 5, sc. 5, 11. 51-53
(1613), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1410. The refer-
ence is to James I. Henry VIII was written to celebrate the marriage of
James' daughter Elizabeth to the Elector Palatine.
(6) The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
Brutus and Caesar: what should be in that 'Caesar'?
Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
Write them together, yours is as fair a name;
Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;
Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with 'em,
Brutus will start a spirit as soon as Caesar.
Now, in the names of all the gods at once,
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2, 11. 140-48
(1599), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1681. Cassius is
maintaining to Brutus that there is nothing intrinsic to the name of
Caesar, and by extension to his merit, to justify the position he holds.
There is nothing magical or divine about the name of Caesar and that
the name of Brutus may inspire as much.
(7) I cannot tell what the dickens his name is...
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR act 3, sc. 2,
1998
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1. 19 (1599-1600), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 474.
When Ford inquires of Mrs. Page where had she "this pretty weather-
cock" she was unable to tell the name her "husband had him of." Id.
(8) JAQUES: Rosalind is your love's name?
ORLANDO: Yes, just.
JAQUES: I do not like her name.
ORLANDO: There was no thought of pleasing you when she was chris-
tened.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 3, sc. 2, 11. 280-84
(1598), in ANNOTATED SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 367. Jaques com-
plains about Rosalind's name, perhaps, because it leads to Orlando's
bad rhymes.
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APPENDIX II
"The most beautiful names belong to Allah. So call on him by
them." Sura Al-A'raaf 7:180. In listing the following names or attrib-
utes of Allah, an effort has been made, wherever possible, to indicate if
the relevant name is mentioned in the Qur'an, or in the hadith.
A1-Aalim The All-Knowing. "Allah is
Aleem All-Knowing, Most Forbearing."
Sura An-Nisaa 4:12. "Allah is the
knower of the Unseen." Sura Fa-
atir 35:38.
Al-'Adl The Just.
Al-'Afuw The Pardoner. "Allah is All
Pardoning, All Forgiving." Sura
Al-Mujadila 58:2.
A1-Ahad The One. "Say: He is Allah,
One." Sura Al-Ikhlaas 112:1.
"And may know that He is One
Allah: Let men of understanding
take heed." Sura Ibrahim 14:52.
A1-Akhir The Last. "He is the First
and the Last." Sura Al-Hadeed
57:3.
A1-Akram The Most Bountiful. "Pro-
claim! And thy Lord is the Most
Bounteous." Sura Al-Alaq 96:3.
AI-Ali The All-High. "Because Al-
lah, He is the High, The Great."
Sura Al-Hajj 22:62.
AI-Awwal The First. "He is the First
and the Last." Sura Al-Hadeed
57:3.
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AI-Azim The All-Glorious. "He is the
Most High, The Supreme (in
Glory)." Sura Al-Baqarah 2:255
(Ayat-ul-Kursi: Verse of the
Throne). "Allah is of infinite
bounty." Sura Al-Baqarah 2:105.
Al-'Aziz The All-Mighty. "Allah is
Full of Strength, Exalted in
Might." Sura Al-Hajj 22:40.
Al-Baari' The Originator. "He is Al-
lah, The Creator, The Originator,
The Fashioner." Sura Al-Hashr
59:24.
Al-Badi' The Originator. "The Origi-
nator of the heavens and the
earth." Sura Al-Baqarah 2:117.
"It is He Who created the heavens
and the earth with Truth." Sura
Al-Anaam 6:73.
Al-Baith The Resurrector.
Al-Baqi The Everlasting. 'What is
with you must vanish: What is
with Allah will endure." Sura Al-
Nahl 16:96.
Al-Barr The All-Benign. "He is The
Benign, The Merciful." Sura Al-
Tur 52:28.
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The Expander. "Allah...
enlarges the provision [suste-
nance] or restricts it, to any of His
servants He pleases." Sura Al-
Qasas 28:82.
The Inward. "He is The
First and The Last, and The Out-

















of the heavens and the earth and
all that is between them, the Ex-
alted in Might, Ever-Forgiving."
Sura Saad 38:66. "Allah is Oft-
Forgiving [and] Most Merciful."
Sura Al-Baqarah 2:173.
The Rich. "Allah is The
Rich, and you are the poor." Sura
Muhammad 47:83.
The Judge. "Is not Allah the
wisest of [all] Judges?" Sura Al-
Teen 95:8. "Shall I seek for Judge
other than Allah?" Sura Al-
An'aam 6:114.
The Guide. "But your Lord
is enough as a Guide and a
Helper." Sura Al-Furqaan 25:31.
The Guardian. "[A]nd thy
Lord (0 Muhammad) taketh note
of all things." Sura Sabaa 34:21.
"Worship your Guardian Lord,
who created you." Sura Al-
Baqarah 2:21-22. "There is no
human soul but has a guardian
over it." Sura Al-Taariq 86:4.

























is Forgiving, Clement." Sura Al-
Baqarah 2:225.
The All-Laudable. "And
Know that Allah is free of all
wants, and Worthy of all praise."
Sura Al-Baqarah 2:267.
The Truth. "Say 'It is Allah
Who gives guidance to Truth."'
Sura Yunus 10:35. Sura Al-
Haaqqah 69:1-52, meaning "the
Reality," extols the eschatological
argument: "The absolute Truth
cannot fail; it must prevail; there-
fore be not lured by false appear-
ances in this life; it is Revelation
that points to the sure and certain
Reality." ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
supra note 4, at 1803.
The Reckoner. "Allah keeps
a watchful account over every-
thing." Sura An-Nisaa 4:86.
The Living. "Allah! There is
no God save Him, The Alive, The
Eternal." Sura Al-Baqarah 2:255
(Aayat-ul-Kursi: Verse of the
Throne).
The All-Compeller. "He is
Allah, than whom there is no
other God, the Sovereign Lord, the
Holy One, Peace, the Keeper of
Faith, the Guardian, the Majestic,
the Compeller, the Superb." Sura
Al-Hashr 59:23.
Full of Majesty. "The Face
of thy Lord, Full of Majesty,
Bounty and Honor." Sura Al-
Rahmaan 55:27
The Exalted. "He is Exalted




















The All-Glorious. "Lord of
the Throne, full of all glory." Sura
Al-Buruj 85:15. "By the Glorious
Qur'an (Thou art Allah's Messen-
ger)." Sura Qaaf 50:1.
The Owner. "Say: 0 Allah!
Owner of Sovereignty!" Sura Aal
"Imraan 3:26. "Owner of the Day
of Judgment." Sura AI-Faatihah
1:4. "The King of mankind." Sura
Al-Naas 114:2.
The Preventer.
The Benevolent. "Allah is
the Beneficent, the Merciful."
Sura Al-Hashr 59:22.
The Strong. "For Allah is He
who is the All-Provider, the Pos-
sessor of Strength, the Strong."
The Beautiful.
The All-Great. "That is be-
cause Allah... is the Reality ....
Verily Allah is ... Most High,
Most Great." Sura Al-Hajj 22:62.
The All-Sufficient. "Is not
Allah sufficient for His servant?"
Sura Al-Zumar 39:36.
The Most Generous. "0
man! What hath made thee care-
less concerning thy Lord, the
Bountiful.. .?" Sura Al-Infitaar
82:6.
The Creator. "Say: 'Allah is
the Creator of all things: He is The
One, the Supreme and Irresisti-
ble."' Sura Al-Ra'd 13:16.
One Who is Aware. "Fear
Allah .... for Allah is well-






















The Lord Supreme. "You
(Allah) are our Lord Supreme, our
Protector, grant us victory over






Guardian of Faith, The Exalted in
Might, The Irresistible, the justly
Proud Glory to Allah!" Sura Al-
Hashr 59:23.
The Reckoner.
The Quickener. 'Verily, He
who brings it to life can surely




The Responsive. 'My Lord
is near and answers prayer." Sura
Hud 11:61.
The All-Faithful. "And Al-
lah is the Protector of those who
have faith." Sura Aal 'Imraan
3:68.
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The Creator of Death. "It is
Allah That gives Life and Death."










The Omnipotent. "Allah is
able to do all things...." Sura Al-
Kahf 18:45.
The Shaper. "He is Allah,
the Creator, the Shaper, the
Fashioner. To Him belong the
most beautiful names." Sura Al-
Hashr 59:24.
The Most High.
The Majestic. "He is Al-
lah... the Sovereign Lord, the
Holy one, Peace, the Keeper of
Faith, the Guardian, the Majestic,













The Helper. "(On the day of
judgment man) will have no
strength, nor helper." Sura Al-
Taariq 86:10. "You have no pro-
tector and helper instead of Al-
lah." Sura Al-Tawba 9:116.
The Propitious.
The Light. "Allah is the
Light of the heavens and the
earth." Sura A1-Nur 24:35.
"There hath come to you from Al-
lah a (new) light and a perspicu-
ous Book." Sura Al-Maaidah
5:15.
The Powerful. "Say: 'Allah
has certainly Power to send down
a Sign: But most of them under-
stand not?"' Sura A1-An'aam 6:37.
"Verily, over all things you have
power." Sura Aal 'Imraan 3:26.
The Constrictor.
The Omnipotent. "He is the
Omnipotent over His servants."
Sura Al-An'aam 6:18.
The Eternal. "Allah! There
is no God except Him, The Alive,

















The All-Holy. "He is Allah,
than whom there is no other God,
the Soverign Lord, the Holy
One..." Sura Al-Hashr 59:23.
The Lord. "Praise be to Al-
lah, The Cherisher and Sustainer
of the Worlds." Sura A1-Faatihah
1:2.
The Exalter. "Exalted is He
in His attributes. (He is) the Lord
of the Throne." Sura Al-Mu'min
40:15.
The Most Merciful. "Allah
is Forgiving, Merciful." Sura Al-
Baqarah 2:173.
The Most Gracious. "In the
name of Allah, Most Gracious,
Most Merciful. The Most Gra-
cious! It is He Who has taught the
Qur'an." Sura Al-Rahmaan 55:1-
2. In fact, all suras, except sura
Al-Tawba 9, begin with these
words.
The Watcher. "Allah is
watchful over everything." Sura
Al-Ahzaab 33:52.
The Right-Minded. "Lo!
thou are the mild, the guide to
right behavior." Sura Hud 11:87.
The Most Kind. "Our Lord!
Thou art indeed Full of Kindness,
Most Merciful." Sura Al-Hashr
59:10.
The All-Provider. "Allah!
He it is that giveth livelihood, the




they call to the inhabitants of
Paradise: Peace be upon you."
Sura Al-A'raaf 7:46.
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The Everlasting. "Say: He
is Allah, The One! Allah, The Ev-
erlasting." Sura Al-Ikhlaas 112:1-
2.
The All-Hearing.













The Veiler of Sin.
The All-Thankful. "Allah is
All-Thankful, All-Knowing." Sura
Al-Baqarah 2:158. "Allah is All-
Thankful, Most forbearing." Sura
Al-Taghaabun 64:17.
The Glory. "Glorified be Al-
lah above all that they attribute to
Him." Sura Al-Mu'minun 23:91.
The All-Compassionate. "I
am the Relenting, the Merciful."
Sura Al-Baqarah 2:160.
The One. The Unique. "He
is Allah, The One, The Overpow-
ering." Sura Al-Zumar 39:4.
The All-Loving. "And He is
the Oft-Forgiving, full of loving
kindness." Sura Al-Buruj 85:14.
The All-Giver. "He [Su-
laiman] said, '0 my Lord! Forgive
me, and grant me a Kingdom
which, will not belong to another
after me: For Thou art the Gran-
tor of Bounties (without meas-
ure)."' Sura Saad 38:35. "And
Allah is the Lord of bounties un-
bounded." Sura Aal 'Imraan
3:174.
The Finder.
The Trustee. "And Allah is
in charge of all things." Sura Hud
11:12.
The Protector. "And He is
the Protector, Worthy of all
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Al-Waris The Inheritor. "And (re-
member) Zakariya, when he cried
to his Lord: '0 My Lord! leave me
not childless, though You are the
best of inheritors."" Sura Al-
Anbiyaa' 21:89.
Al-Wasi The All-Embracing. "Allah
is All-Embracing, All-Knowing."
Sura Al-Baqarah 2:115.
Al-Zaahir The Evident. "He is the
First and the Last, the Evident





An Open Memorandum to Prime Minister
Netanyahu
LouIs RENE BERES'
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Shortly after coming to power, your predecessor, Shimon Peres,
took the unprecedented step of disclosing Israel's nuclear capability.
Responding to questions about the Oslo expectations and the extent of
Israeli concessions, Prime Minister Peres remarked that he would be
"delighted" to "give up the Atom" if the region would embrace a com-
prehensive and lasting peace. Although this remark was almost cer-
tainly not an expression of changed nuclear policy (i.e., the intent of the
remark was not to enhance Israeli nuclear power but to enhance the
"Peace Process"), it does point to an important national security ques-
tion: Should nuclear disclosure now become a conscious policy choice for
the State of Israel? This question, in turn, should be addressed together
with a comprehensive and informed consideration of another associated
question: What are the precise functions of Israeli nuclear weapons?
This Memorandum seeks to answer these vital and interrelated
questions. The question of disclosure is not a simple "yes" or "no" issue
(obviously the basic question was already answered by Peres's "offer"),
but rather, the extent of the subtlety and detail with which Israel
should now communicate its nuclear posture to minacious enemy
states. Regarding the question of nuclear function, the issue is not the
cost-effectiveness of a simple End of the Third Temple option, but
rather a much more complex investigation of doctrine, deployment, de-
1. Louis Rene Beres (Ph.D., Princeton, 1971) is the author of many books and arti-
cles dealing with Israel's nuclear strategy. He is a member of the Advisory Board of Nativ
and The Center for Policy Research, and has lectured at the Dayan Forum, Likud Secu-
rity Group, Likud Chamber, National Defense College, the Jaffee Center for Strategic
Studies and the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. His strategic analyses have appeared
in such publications as STRATEGIC REVIEW, MIDSTREAM, COMPARATIVE STRATEGY, WORLD
POLITICS, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE,
ISRAEL AFFAIRS, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND
TERRORISM, PARAMETERS (U.S. Army War College) and SPECIAL WARFARE (JFK Special
Warfare Center). Recent articles by Professor Beres have been co-authored with AMB.
Zalman Shoval (VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.) and Col.Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto (TEMP. J. INT'L
& COMP. L.). The June/July 1995 issue of MIDSTREAM featured what was to become a
widely reprinted debate on the Middle East Peace Process between Professor Beres and
Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit (Res.), former Chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch.
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terrence and defense.
Both of these overriding questions must be raised and explored
within the ongoing context of Oslo. The so-called "Peace Process" is now
the critical environment within which Israel's nuclear policy must be
fashioned and understood. Setting the parameters of Israeli military
power, this codified pattern of asymmetrical concessions presently ex-
hibits a principal imperative identified by Sun-Tzu in The Art of War:
"Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of
excellence." 2 Strengthened by Oslo, Israel's Arab/Islamic enemies are
rapidly reaching this pinnacle, while Israel is becoming ever more dis-
tant from it. With the Peace Process, the Palestinian Authority and its
allies are subjugating the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) with virtually no
risk to their own armies and terrorist operators.
During the middle-1980s, some students of Middle Eastern security
issues began to speak plainly of Israel's nuclear strategy with particular
reference to the question of disclosure. 3 Specifically, these scholars
asked whether this strategy should continue to be implicit, deliberately
ambiguous, and in the "basement," or whether it should be explicit,
clearly articulated, and out in the open.4 I entered the debate person-
ally with a series of lectures at the Israeli Strategic Studies Centers in
1984 and 1985 (the first two hosted by Maj. Gen. Res. Aharon Yariv at
Jaffee) and with the first edited book on the subject in 1986. 5 Today,
this debate no longer seems vital to Israeli strategists as it is perfectly
obvious that Israel has a significant number of nuclear weapons. That
being the case, they reason, there really is nothing further to disclose.
Israel is patently a member of the Nuclear Club and everyone already
knows it. Case closed!6
2. See SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR 177 (Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., Westview Press
1994).
3. At that time, and even today, disclosure was treated generally as a dichotomous
variable, i.e., only two options presented themselves: disclosure or nondisclosure. This
memorandum is premised on the assumption, inter alia, that disclosure should be treated
by Israeli defense planners as a continuous variable. This would allow planners to iden-
tify multiple disclosure options along a continuum of possibilities. They can also choose
that particular level of disclosure that is presumed most gainful to Israeli nuclear re-
quirements.
4. The principal scholarly publication in this genre is SHAI FELDMAN, ISRAELI
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (1982). My argument for disclosure is substantially different from
Feldman's, rejecting any implicit comparisons with superpower nuclear deterrence and
expanding the pertinent essential functions of Israeli nuclear forces.
5. See SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY (Louis Rene Beres
ed., 1986). This anthology is comprised of chapters by the following scholars: Alan Dowty;
Gerald M. Steinberg; Avner Yaniv; Efraim Inbar; Zeev Eytan; Robert Harkavy; Avi Beker;
Stephen J. Cimbala; Robert A. Friedlander; Burns H. Weston; and Avner Cohen.
6. A related argument suggests that disclosure could exacerbate the regional nuclear
arms race, to Israel's distinct detriment. For example, Roger Molander and Peter Wilson
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But there is a serious problem with such reasoning. The rationale
for disclosure, of taking the bomb out of the "basement,"7 would not lie
simply in expressing the obvious. Rather, it would lie in the informed
understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel's security in a
number of different ways. All of these ways could benefit the Jewish
State, more or less, to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons
and associated strategies were disclosed. Indeed, as we shall now see,
the pertinent form and extent of disclosure8 could soon be more critical
than ever before because of the current Peace Process. 9
For the foreseeable future, Israel's state enemies - especially Iran 0
maintain that:
"[o]vert acceptance of Israel as a nuclear-armed state would undoubtedly
further stimulate nuclear weapons programs among the Arab states and
Iran so that a predictable sequel would be the eventual demand to grant le-
gitimacy to, say, nuclear arsenals in Iraq and Iran."
See Roger Molander & Peter Wilson, On Dealing With the Prospect of Nuclear Chaos, THE
WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 19, 23-4. There is, however, no evidence to support this par-
ticular argument which could, by extrapolation, be used very erroneously and possibly
with very grave consequences against disclosure.
7. But see SHLOMO ARONSON, THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: OPACITY, THEORY AND REALITY 1960-1991, AN ISRAELI
PERSPECTIVE IX (1992). (indicating that an alternative image for nuclear ambiguity has
been "opacity" referring to "opaque nuclear cases"). This particular image is used to give
undeclared bombs a greater analytic subtlety. Id. "The adjective 'opaque' is derived from
physics. In this context, it can be used to describe what happens when one looks at an
object through a certain type of crystal. Depending upon how you hold the crystal, you
might not see the object clearly, it will be distorted. But if you hold the crystal 'properly,'
you will see the object very clearly indeed." Id.
8. Although not developed in this memorandum, the pertinent form and extent of
disclosure represent critical questions for future inquiry. What, precisely, should be the
optimal means of disclosure in different circumstances and in relation to different objec-
tives? What, exactly, should be the optimal levels of disclosure in these different circum-
stances and in relation to the seven different stated security functions of nuclear weap-
ons?
9. For an informed exploration of the Peace Process, see Louis Rene Beres, The
"Peace Process" and Israel's Nuclear Strategy, 23 STRATEGIC REV. 35 (1995). The juridical
core of this process is the Israel-PLO Agreement, known widely as the Declaration of
Principles, concluded and signed in Oslo on August 19, 1993 and resigned in Washington,
D.C. on September 13, 1993. Generating a codified exchange of Israeli-administered ter-
ritories for Arab diplomatic guarantees, this process, especially if it is now continued, will
assuredly increase Israel's overall dependence on nuclear weapons.
10. For a detailed consideration of the Iranian military threat to Israel, see Louis
Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, UCLA J. INT'L
& FOREIGN AFF. 65 (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Preemption: Choosing the
Least Unattractive Option Under International Law, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 187 (1996);
Louis Rene Beres, The Iranian Threat to Israel: Capabilities and Intentions, 9 INT'L J.
INTELL. & COUNTERINTELL. 51, (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Iran and Prospects for
Nuclear War in the Middle East, 21 STRATEGIC REV. 52, (1993); Louis Rene Beres, Israel,
Iran and Nuclear War: A Tactical Assessment, SURVEY OF ARAB AFF. (1993).
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and Syria1 ' (but not excluding Egypt and Jordan) - continue to enlarge
and improve their conventional and unconventional military capabili-
ties. Although no one can conclusively predict that such improvements
are underway with Israel especially in mind, it would be prudent for Je-
rusalem to assume the worst. Moreover, even if enemy state intentions
do not yet parallel capabilities, this could change very rapidly. Here,
for example, Iranian capabilities could determine intentions, occasion-
ing chemical, biological 12 or nuclear first-strikes against Israel because
of expected tactical advantages.
To protect itself against enemy strikes, especially those attacks
with potential existential costs, Israel must exploit every component
function of its nuclear arsenal. 13 In this regard, the success of Israel's
efforts will depend in large part upon not only its particular configura-
tion of counterforce and countervalue operations, but also upon the ex-
tent to which this configuration is made known in advance to enemy
states. Consequently, before such an enemy is appropriately deterred
from launching first-strike attacks against Israel, or before it is de-
terred from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemp-
tion, it may not be enough that it knows that Israel has nuclear weap-
ons. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli weapons are
sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks and that they are targeted at
the enemy's own pertinent military installations. To fully understand
the ambiguity or disclosure question,1 4 we must first recall the theo-
11. For a detailed consideration of Syria, Israel and the Golan Heights, see Louis
Rene Beres & Zalman Shoval, On Demilitarizing a Palestinian 'Entity' and the Golan
Heights: An International Law Perspective, 28 VAND. L. REV. 959, 959-71 (1995).
12. For Israel, biological weapons may be of somewhat less immediate concern than
chemical weapons. Although a growing number of states have or are now developing ca-
pabilities to employ living organisms (such as anthrax, lassa fever, or typhus, as opposed
to inert toxins), such capabilities would have limited military value. This is because their
dispersal mechanisms are difficult to manage. A change of wind could make them as le-
thal to the attacker as to the intended victim and it is difficult to sustain the living or-
ganism in biological weapons in hot climates. At the same time, precisely because biologi-
cal weapons are better suited for mass-destruction than for use as dedicated military
instruments, they could hold out greater appeal to Israel's irrational state enemies.
13. The seven essential functions that will be addressed herein are as follows: (1)
deterrence of large conventional attacks by enemy states; (2) deterrence of all levels of
unconventional attacks by enemy states; (3) preemption of enemy nuclear attacks; (4)
support of conventional preemptions against enemy state nuclear assets; (5) support of
conventional preemptions against enemy state non-nuclear assets; (6) nuclear war fight-
ing; and (7) the "Samson Option." For discussion of the "Samson Option", see Louis Rene
Beres, Israel and Samson: Some Tenuously Biblical Reflections on Strategy, JERUSALEM
LErrER/VIEWPOINTs, Feb. 1996, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr. for Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
Samson chose suicide by pushing apart the temple pillars. This is a misleading analogy
because for states, the issue between "life" or "death" is not the same standard as for indi-
vidual persons.
14. It is assumed throughout this piece that such an understanding requires an ap-
propriate "strategic dialectic." In contrast to the standard literature in this field, which is
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retical foundations of nuclear war and deterrence 15 as they pertain to
Israel. These foundations concern prospective attackers' perceptions of
both Israel's nuclear capability and Israel's willingness to utilize them.
Removing the bomb from Israel's "basement" could, therefore, enhance
Israel's nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting postures to the ex-
tent that it would heighten enemy state perceptions of Jerusalem's ca-
pable nuclear forces and its willingness to use these forces in reprisal
for certain first-strike and retaliatory attacks.
16
Mr. Prime Minister,
Let us look at these requirements more closely. To deter an enemy
attack or post-preemption retaliation, Israel must prevent an aggressor,
by threat of an unacceptably damaging reprisal or counter-retaliation,
from deciding to strike. Here, security is sought by convincing the po-
tential rational 17 attacker (irrational enemies are an altogether differ-
ent problem) that the costs of a considered attack will exceed the ex-
pected benefits. Assuming that Israel's state enemies: (1) value self-
preservation; and (2) always choose rationally between alternative op-
generally satisfied with fundamental reportorial forms of investigation, my method will be
to ask and answer questions, again and again, until core problems are confronted. Here,
we will approach our problem as an interrelated series of thoughts. Each thought pres-
ents a complication that moves inquiry onward to the next thought. Contained in this
strategic dialectic is an obligation to continue thinking, an obligation that, logically, can
never be fulfilled completely (because of what is called the "infinite regress problem", but
that must still be attempted as fully and as competently as possible. With such a dialecti-
cal form of investigation, we may focus upon appropriately dynamic and generic interac-
tions and synergies.
15. For discussion on the expected consequences of nuclear war fighting, see Louis
RENE BERES, APOCALYPSE: NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS (1980); LOUIS
RENE BERES, MIMICKING SISYPHUS: AMERICA'S COUNTERVAILING NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(1983); LOUIS RENE BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD
ORDER (1984); LOUIS RENE BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR
STRATEGY (1986).
16. Contrary to the prevailing conventional wisdom, nuclear deterrence and associ-
ated forms of Israel's nuclear posture, including preemption, can fully support the
authoritative expectations of international law. The adequacy of international law in
preventing nuclear war in the Middle East will depend upon far more than certain formal
treaties, customs, and general principles. It will depend, especially, upon the success or
failure of particular national strategies in the region. If Israel's nuclear strategy should
reduce the threat of nuclear war, either because of successful forms of nuclear deterrence
or because of essential preemptive strikes, possibly with the aid of some apt measure of
disclosure, this strategy should be considered as an authentic component of international
law enforcement.
17. Even if it could be assumed that enemy state leaders will always meet the expec-
tations of rational decision making, this would say nothing about the accuracy of informa-
tion used in making rational calculations. Rationality refers only to the intention of
maximizing specified values or preferences. It says nothing at all about whether the in-
formation used is correct or incorrect. Hence, rational leaders of enemy states may make
calculation errors that could lead their states to war against Israel.
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tions, they will always refrain from attacking an Israel that is believed
willing and able to deliver an appropriately destructive response.1 8
Two factors must communicate such a belief. First, in terms of
ability, there are two essential components: payload and delivery sys-
tem. It must be successfully communicated to the prospective attacker
that Israel's firepower and its means of delivering that firepower are
capable of wreaking unacceptable levels of destruction. This means
that Israel's retaliatory or counter-retaliatory forces must appear suffi-
ciently invulnerable and sufficiently elusive to penetrate the prospective
attacker's active and civil defenses. It need not be communicated to the
potential attacker that such firepower and the means of delivery are
superior. The capacity to deter need not be as great as the capacity to
"win."
With the bomb kept silently in the basement, enemy states could
conclude, rightly or wrongly, that a first-strike attack or post-
preemption reprisal would be cost-effective. Were it made more plainly
obvious to enemy states contemplating an attack that Israel's bombs
met both payload and delivery system objectives, Israel's nuclear forces
would likely better serve their overriding security functions.
The second factor of nuclear communication for Israel concerns
willingness. How may Israel convince potential attackers that it pos-
sesses the resolve to deliver an immense destructive retaliation and
counter-retaliation? The answer to this question lies, in part, in Israel's
demonstrated strength of commitment to carry out such an attack and
in the precise nuclear weapons that would be available. Here, too, con-
tinued nuclear ambiguity could create the impression of an unwilling
Israel. Conversely, movement toward some as-yet-undetermined level
of disclosure could heighten the impression of an Israel that is willing to
follow through on its nuclear threats.
What then, are the plausible connections between a more openly
declared nuclear capability and enemy state perceptions of Israel's nu-
clear deterrence? One such connection concerns the relation between
disclosure and perceived vulnerability of Israeli nuclear forces from
preemptive destruction. Another such connection concerns the relation
18. My analysis is consistent with standard definitions of rationality in world politics.
I assume a unitary, value-maximizing decision maker with (1) one set of specified goals,
(2) one set of perceived options; and (3) a single estimate of the consequences that ensue
from each alternative. Thus, the enemy-state decision maker is assumed to evaluate al-
ternatives in his strategic environment on the basis of his preferences among them; to op-
erate according to a preference-ordering that is consistent and transitive; and to always
choose the preferred alternative. An often ignored problem with rationality assumptions
is that they concern only preference-maximizing intentions. An enemy state may meet all
of the requirements of rationality, but still commit errors in calculation that undermine
deterrence.
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between disclosure and perceived capacity of Israel's nuclear forces to
penetrate the attacking state's active defenses. Disclosure could repre-
sent a rational and prudent option for Israel to the extent that enemy
states are made appropriately aware of Israel's nuclear capabilities.
The operational benefits of disclosure would accrue from deliberate
flows of doctrinal information about such matters as dispersion, multi-
plication and hardening of nuclear systems and about some other tech-
nical features of certain nuclear weapons systems. Above all else, such
carefully controlled flows would serve to remove enemy doubts about
Israel's nuclear force capabilities, doubts which-if unchallenged-
could undermine Israeli nuclear deterrence.
Removing the bomb from Israel's basement might also heighten en-
emy state perceptions of Jerusalem's willingness to make good on its
nuclear retaliatory threats. For example, by releasing information
about its nuclear weapons that distinctly identified "usable" forces, Is-
rael could remove enemy doubts about Jerusalem's nuclear resolve.
Here, a prospective attacker, aware that Israel could retaliate and gen-
erate intolerably high levels of civilian casualties (possibly because of
enhanced radiation 19 and/or sub-kiloton weapons) would be more likely,
because of Israel's disclosure, to believe Jerusalem's nuclear threats.
This brings us directly to the doctrinal question of counterforce and
countervalue. Counterforce strategies are those which target an en-
emy's strategic military facilities and supporting infrastructures. Such
strategies may be dangerous not only because of the collateral damage
they could produce, but also because they could heighten the likelihood
of enemy first-strikes. Should Israel be "going for counterforce" with its
nuclear weapons? If so, enemy knowledge of such movement could en-
courage preemption planning by certain enemy states, but it could also
enhance the power of Israel's nuclear deterrent (because counterforce-
targeted nuclear weapons are more likely judged as usable). Depending
upon Jerusalem's rank-ordering of nuclear strategy values and its ex-
pectations concerning enemy state reactions, disclosure, or taking the
bomb out of the basement, could be more or less purposeful for Israel.
In contrast, countervalue strategies refer to the targeting of an en-
emy's cities and industries; in effect, the targeting of civilian popula-
19. The neutron bomb is often regarded as an especially unwholesome form of nu-
clear weapon. Yet, because its lethality is projected largely via radiation rather than
through concussion and heat, the neutron bomb could prove to be especially usable, and
with all attendant deterrent benefits. These issues were raised years ago in the context of
U.S. and NATO nuclear doctrine. The classic defense of nuclear radiation weapons was
offered by Samuel T. Cohen, who developed the technical-military concept of the neutron
bomb in 1958. See Samuel T. Cohen, Whither the Neutron Bomb? A Moral Defense of Nu-
clear Radiation Weapons, PARAMETERS J. OF THE U.S. ARMY WAR C., June 1981, at 19-
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tions. Should Israel be content with developing the relatively inaccu-
rate apparatus of such an assured destruction posture, it could probably
limit the prospect of preemptive enemy first-strikes. This prospect could
even be limited further if the assured destruction posture were accom-
panied by open and fairly precise disclosure of Israel's non-threatening
nuclear stance. At the same time, should this posture fail to deter con-
certed enemy first-strikes, or enemy retaliations for Israeli preemp-
tions, its intrinsic damage-limiting inferiority to a counterforce capabil-
ity could produce much larger casualty figures. As we will soon see,
excessive countervalue targeting could impair Israel's nuclear war-
fighting needs. 20 If, on the other hand, Israel were to begin with a de-
clared nuclear counterforce posture, enemy state perceptions of inevita-
ble war with Israel could be enlarged. With such perceptions,
belligerent leaders would have to decide whether or not it would be
more gainful to await an Israeli preemption or whether to strike first
themselves. Aware of this, Israel's leaders must determine not only the
optimum configuration of countervalue and counterforce, but also the
most favorable means and levels of disclosure.
How should Israel choose in the aftermath of surrendering territo-
ries in exchange for "peace?" If Jerusalem should opt for nuclear deter-
rence based on mutually assured destruction, it would run the risk of
"losing" any nuclear war that might arise. If it should choose counter-
force measures, certain enemy states could feel especially threatened, a
condition that would likely heighten the actual prospects of nuclear
weapons use.
In making its nuclear choices, Israel will have to confront a para-
dox. Credible nuclear deterrence, essential to security and survival-
especially in a world made even more dangerous by the end of Israeli
strategic depth and by the incremental creation of Palestine 21-would
require recognizably usable nuclear weapons. If, after all, these weap-
ons were inappropriate for any reasonable objective, they would not de-
ter. Yet, the more usable the weapons become in order to enhance nu-
clear deterrence-a usability communicated more or less effectively by a
20. This is because weapons allocated to countervalue targeting functions would nec-
essarily take the place of counterforce targeted nuclear weapons.
21. For earlier writings by this author on the probable impact of a state of Palestine
upon Israeli strategies and security, see Louis Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Pal-
estine and the Risk of Nuclear War in the Middle East, 19 STRATEGIC REV. 48 (1991);
Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War, 22 BULL. PEACE
PROPOSALS 227 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The Oslo Accords and Israel's Nuclear Strategy,
5 GEO. COMPASS 74 (1995); Louis Rene Beres, A Palestinian State and Israel's Nuclear
Strategy, 31 CROSSROADS: INT'L SOCIO-POL. J. 97 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, A Palestinian
State: Implications for Israel's Security and the Probability of Nuclear War, 4 BULL.
JERUSALEM INST. W. DEF. 3 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, The Question of Palestine and Is-
rael's Nuclear Strategy, 62 POL. Q. 451 (1991).
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shift away from deliberate ambiguity-the more likely it is that they
will actually be utilized. Although this paradox would appear to rec-
ommend, inter alia, the deployment of the least-harmful forms of usable
nuclear weapons, the likely absence of coordinated agreements with en-
emy states on deployable nuclear weapons points toward a different
conclusion: Unless Israel were to calculate that the more harmful
weapons would produce greater hazards for its own population as well
as for target states, there would be no tactical benefit for Israel to opt
for the least injurious usable nuclear weapons.
Regarding issues of nuclear usability, an excellent study has been
offered by two target planners and theater force analysts at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. While interested exclusively in the improvement
of U.S. nuclear strategy, the arguments presented by Thomas W.
Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II pertain instructively to Israel. In their
analysis, Dowler and Howard evaluate nuclear weapons with very low
yields ranging from 10 to 1000 tons. Seeking nuclear weapons whose
power is "effective but not abhorrent," the authors detail the particular
benefits of "micronukes" (weapons with a yield on the order of 10 tons or
20,000 pounds of high explosive); "mininukes" (weapons with a yield of
about 100 tons); and "tinynukes" (weapons with a yield of about 1000
tons or one kiloton).
22
For Israel, a micronuke employed as an earth-penetrating warhead
[hereinafter EPW] could destroy all but the hardest command bunkers.
Deliverable by gravity bombs, tactical cruise missiles or tactical sur-
face-to-surface missiles, an EPW could also be used effectively to neu-
tralize airfields.
Should deterrence fail to prevent a launch of enemy missiles car-
rying nuclear or other mass-destruction warheads at Israeli forces, ei-
ther as a first-strike attack or as an enemy retaliation for Israeli pre-
emption, Israel would require an adequate defensive capability. To
acquire such a capability, Israel could benefit from an anti-tactical bal-
listic missile [hereinafter ATBM] 23 carrying a mininuke warhead.
Seeking to destroy incoming warheads in flight (simply knocking the
22. See Thomas W. Dowler & Joseph H. Howard II, Countering the Threat of the Well-
Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, 19 STRATEGIc REv. 34
(1991).
23. Presently the Arrow interceptor is the centerpiece of Israel's planned ballistic
missile defense system, part of a cooperative program with the United States Department
of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. The joint project began in May, 1986
when Israel and the U.S. signed a memorandum of understanding. However "successful"
Arrow might ultimately be in tests, it is altogether likely that offensive weapons technol-
ogy exploited by Israel's enemies would enjoy an overwhelming advantage, especially if
their incoming warheads were nuclear. Considered together with prospects of enemy irra-
tionality, this suggests a compelling argument for ongoing Israeli preparation for perti-
nent preemption options.
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missile off-target might not neutralize its capacity to inflict great harm
on Israeli forces), a mininuke fired by Israel could provide the needed
power. Such power could prove vital because an incoming nuclear,
chemical or biological warhead must be destroyed as far from its target
as possible.
Once an armed conflict had actually broken out between Israel and
certain enemy states, tinynuke warheads with yields of about 1000 tons
could prove effective against tank and troop units. True battlefield
weapons rather than agents of indiscriminate mass destruction, these
tinynukes-deliverable by tactical air-to-air surface missile, tactical
surface-to-surface cruise or ballistic missile, or artillery round -could
eliminate any company-sized unit. Intended for very precise operations
against known troop formations, these weapons would release lethal
radii on the order of 500 meters against tank crews and 600 meters
against infantry, artillery and support troops. As for the collateral
damage and safe standoff radii of these tinynukes, they would range
only to about 1500 meters. Moreover, utilized as airbursts, they should
produce no significant local fallout.
24
Mr. Prime Minister,
Returning to the original doctrinal question of countervalue versus
counterforce, Israeli planners must commence prior investigations of
enemy state inclinations to strike first and in retaliation, and of associ-
ated inclinations to strike all-at-once or in stages. Should these plan-
ners assume, for example, that certain enemy states in the process of
"going nuclear" are apt to strike in an unlimited mode-i.e., to fire all
nuclear warheads-Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear warheads,
used in retaliation or in counter-retaliation, would likely hit only empty
missile silos. In such circumstances, Israel's only rational application of
counterforce doctrine would be to strike first itself.
If, for whatever reason, Israel were to reject the preemption option,
given the above assumptions there would be no good reason to opt for
counterforce. From the standpoint of compelling intra-war nuclear de-
terrence, a countervalue strategy could prove substantially more pur-
poseful under such assumptions. Should Israeli planners assume that
enemy states "going nuclear" are apt to strike first and to strike in a
limited mode, holding some significant measure of nuclear firepower in
reserve for follow-on strikes, Israeli counterforce-targeted nuclear war-
heads, used in retaliation, could have meaningful damage-limitation ef-
fects. Here, counterforce operations could serve both an Israeli preemp-
tion or, should Israel decide, for whatever reason, not to preempt, an
Israeli retaliatory strike. Moreover, should an Israeli first-strike be in-
tentionally limited, perhaps because it would be coupled with a guaran-
24. See Dowler & Howard II, supra note 22.
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tee of no further destruction in exchange for an end to hostilities, such
operations could serve an Israeli counter-retaliatory strike. This is the
case because Israel's attempt at intra-war deterrence could fail, occa-
sioning the need for follow-on strikes to produce essential damage-
limitation.
In order to examine fully whether Israel would be better served by
continued ambiguity or by disclosure (and if the latter, by what degrees
of disclosure), students of Israeli nuclear strategy must first identify
and understand the reasons behind Israel's nuclear forces. What, then,
are these particular reasons? Why, exactly, does Israel need nuclear
weapons? Once we can answer these antecedent questions we will be
able to determine if Israel's bomb should remain in the basement or if it
should be brought, more or less, into the country's "upper floors." In es-
sence, therefore, future scholarship in this area should be directed by
the following hypothesis: If Israel moves beyond "deliberate ambiguity"
to certain apt forms of "disclosure," its nuclear forces will be better able
to fulfill their seven essential security functions.
This does not imply, however, that if these seven essential func-
tions were fulfilled, Israel would necessarily be secure. Although I have
hypothesized that various and incremental levels of disclosure could
enhance Israel's nuclear deterrent and associated nuclear functions, Is-
rael should never give up its territory on the assumption that it could
rely entirely upon its nuclear threat. Nuclear weapons, appropriately
configured and disclosed, are necessary to national survival, but they
are not sufficient. Even a nuclear armed state needs a broad range of
weapons that are purposeful to the entire foreseeable spectrum of pos-
sible harms. It follows that those Israelis who currently argue for a
withdrawal to the 1949 borders because Israel has nuclear forces are
altogether mistaken. Israel must not become the first and only case in
history of a state totally dependent upon nuclear threats.
Optimally, Israel will take steps to maintain its all-important con-
ventional deterrence while, at the same time, ensuring that its nuclear
deterrence is informed by doctrine. Should this doctrine be left implicit,
as has been the Israeli case of "deliberate ambiguity" for decades, en-
emy states would need to reconstruct expectations about Israeli capa-
bilities and intentions. Should this doctrine be made explicit, as would
be the case if the bomb were removed from the "basement," these en-
emy states could extrapolate expectations from this doctrine directly.
Of course, it is conceivable that more explicit articulations of Israeli nu-
clear strategy would be distrusted or even discounted, but disclosure
would at least provide Israel with an opportunity for some input into
enemy state calculations.
For Israel, the advantages of disclosure would likely be greater
with respect to the deterrence of unconventional attacks than with re-
spect to deterrence of large conventional attacks. This is because the
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presumed plausibility of Israeli nuclear reprisal is apt to be greater
when unconventional weapons are used for aggression. A different as-
sumption about disclosure's advantages vis-a-vis large conventional at-
tacks could be reasonable if Israel were to couple its nuclear retaliatory
threats with far-reaching conventional disarmament and/ or with fur-
ther territorial concessions. However, such coupling, would represent a
tragic and potentially irretrievable error for the Jewish State.
No less tragic for Israel would be a decision to accept internation-
ally-imposed limitations on its nuclear arsenal, limitations that had
been urged especially by Egypt 25 and the United States 26 with the ap-
proach of the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT) back in
April 1995. With such a decision, the question of disclosure would be-
come moot. After all, volitional denuclearization consistent with ex-
pected NPT commitments would leave Israel with nothing to disclose.
Consequently, Israel's deterrence requirements would all have to be
met with conventional threats and/or U.S. "extended deterrence." This
would not be possible!
27
Mr. Prime Minister,
Israel requires both conventional and nuclear weapons, comple-
mentary forces and doctrines to preserve the Third Temple into the
next millennium. Significantly, the Peace Process endangers both in-
terrelated requirements. Already, this Process, spawning shrinking
strategic depth, has curtailed the capacities of Israel's conventional
arms. For the very immediate future, it also threatens the capacities of
Israel's nuclear weapons, a situation that would not only leave the
bomb in the basement, but bury it there.
One last word about essential Israeli nuclear deterrence of enemy
unconventional attack, a need that could be served more or less effec-
25. See Abdel Monem Said Aly, In the Shadow of the Israeli Nuclear Bombs: Egyp-
tian Threat Perceptions, BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 151 (1996). Aly is Director of the Al-
Abram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. But cf. Louis Rene Beres,
Where the Shadow Really Falls: Why Israel Must Have Nuclear Weapons, BROWN J. OF
WORLD AFF. 127-38 (1997) (responding to Aly's article).
26. The U.S. pressure upon Israel to join the Nonproliferation Treaty brings to mind
the special foolishness of "extended nuclear deterrence" for Israel. Israeli planners should
understand that, for the United States, the central role of nuclear deterrence has de-
clined, and that extended deterrence is increasingly defined as conventional. This Ameri-
can view flows largely from President Bush's 1991 decision to eliminate ground-and sea-
based tactical nuclear weapons. See Charles T. Allan, Extended Conventional Deterrence:
In From the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?, THE WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 203 (dis-
cussing a comprehensive and insightful examination of extended conventional deter-
rence).
27. For an excellent assessment of these issues, see Gerald M. Steinberg, Israel, Egypt
and Nuclear Policy, JERUSALEM LETTERVIEWPOINTS, June 15, 1995, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr.
for Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
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tively by some apt measure of disclosure. Normally, strategic planners,
examining the requirements of nuclear deterrence, distinguish carefully
between conventional and unconventional attacks. For Israel today,
however, such a sharp distinction could be misleading and dangerous.
From now on, it is unlikely that enemy states would launch large con-
ventional attacks against Israel unless these states had backup uncon-
ventional (possibly, but not necessarily nuclear) forces. This means
that the capacity of Israeli nuclear deterrence will now always have to
be assessed vis-a-vis enemy state unconventional weapons. Hence, the
question of disclosure will now always have to be asked ultimately in
reference to nuclear deterrence of unconventional weapons.
It is conceivable, especially after Israel's ongoing surrender of terri-
tories, that some combination of enemy states, still effectively non-
nuclear, could conclude that a combined conventional attack against Is-
rael would be gainful. To prevent such a conclusion, thereby main-
taining successful nuclear deterrence, Jerusalem would need to con-
vince these enemy states that their prospective combined conventional
assault could elicit a full nuclear reprisal. This task could be made
easier by appropriate communications to enemy states concerning dis-
closure, including purposeful communications of Israel's awareness that
the conventional/unconventional threshold might still be breached first
by the conventional enemy state attackers. Although it is likely that
this task could also be made easier because of Israel's already-truncated
strategic depth, the net effect of such truncation for Israel would surely
be negative. Halting the misnamed "Peace Process" should therefore be
a clear and overriding strategic imperative.
Mr. Prime Minister,
Over the years, there has been surprisingly little open discussion in
Israel on the topic of the Jewish State's nuclear strategy and nuclear
program. Now, however, as the Oslo Process approaches a critical
stage, Israel's dependence upon nuclear weapons will certainly be en-
larged. Moreover, as the question of "deliberate ambiguity" versus dis-
closure represents an important component of Israel's nuclear strategy,
this question, too, will demand increased scrutiny. With this in mind,
let us now proceed to our second basic issue, the functions of Israeli nu-
clear weapons and policy.
Why Israel Needs Nuclear Weapons
Although much has been written about the alleged configuration of
Israel's nuclear arsenal, and about the rationale of such frightful weap-
ons, not a single systematic examination of this rationale has ever been
published. Hence, both supporters and opponents of Israel's presumed
nuclear force appear to share a naive view that the sole purpose of this
force is as a last resort operation, as an instrument of vengeance to be
activated only when the State of Israel is already beyond rescue. As the
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following analysis makes clear, however, this view is certainly wrong.
While the "Samson Option 28 has its proper place in Israel's nuclear
posture, it is a relatively minor place, one overshadowed by the far more
essential requirements of deterrence and preemption.
Why, then, does Israel need nuclear weapons? Here is a serious
and comprehensive answer:
1. Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter large conventional attacks
by enemy states. The effectiveness of such Israeli nuclear deterrence
will depend, among other things, upon: (a) perceived vulnerability of Is-
raeli nuclear forces; (b) perceived destructiveness of Israeli nuclear
forces; (c) perceived willingness of Israeli leadership to follow through
on nuclear threats; (d) perceived capacities of prospective attacker's ac-
tive defenses; (e) perceptions of Israeli targeting doctrine; (f) percep-
tions of Israel's probable retaliatory response when there is an expecta-
tion of non-nuclear but chemical and/or biological counter-retaliations;
(g) disclosure or continued nondisclosure of Israel's nuclear arsenal; and
(h) creation or non-creation of a Palestinian state.
2. Israel needs nuclear weapons to deter all levels of unconventional
chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks (CBN). The effectiveness of
these forms of Israeli nuclear deterrence will also depend, on the fac-
tors enumerated in paragraph 1. In this regard, Israel's nuclear weap-
ons are needed to deter enemy escalation of conventional warfare to un-
conventional warfare and of one form of unconventional warfare to
another (i.e., escalation of chemical warfare to biological warfare, bio-
logical warfare to chemical warfare, or biological/chemical warfare to
nuclear warfare).
3. Israel needs nuclear weapons to preempt enemy nuclear attacks.
This does not mean that Israeli preemptions of such attacks would nec-
essarily be nuclear (more than likely, they would, in fact, be non-
nuclear), but only that they could be nuclear. Of course, should Israel
ever need to use its nuclear forces for such a purpose, it would signify
the failure of these forces as a deterrent (as per number 2, above). Sig-
nificantly, such failure is increasingly plausible because of the problem-
atic nature of nuclear deterrence in general and in the particular cir-
cumstances present in the Middle East.
4. Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemp-
tions against enemy nuclear assets. With such weapons, Israel can
maintain, explicitly or implicitly, a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation.
Without such weapons, Israel, having to rely entirely on non-nuclear
forces, might not be able to deter enemy retaliations for the Israeli pre-
28. See Louis Rene Beres, Israel and Samson: Some Tenuously Biblical Reflections
on Strategy, JERUSALEM LETTERVIEWPOINTS, February 1996, at 6 (Jerusalem Ctr. for
Pub. Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel).
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emptive attack.
5. Israel needs nuclear weapons to support conventional preemp-
tions against enemy non-nuclear conventional, chemical, or biological
assets. With such weapons, Israel can maintain, explicitly or implicitly,
a threat of nuclear counter-retaliation. Without such weapons, Israel,
having to rely entirely on non-nuclear forces, might not be able to deter
enemy retaliations for the Israeli preemptive attack.
6. Israel needs nuclear weapons for nuclear warfighting. Although,
in the best of all possible worlds, this need will never have to arise, it
cannot be discounted. Rather, it must be taken seriously by Israeli
planners and decision-makers. Among the probable paths to nuclear
warfighting are the following: enemy nuclear first-strikes against Is-
rael; enemy non-nuclear first-strikes against Israel that elicit Israeli
nuclear reprisals, either immediately or via incremental escalation pro-
cesses; Israeli nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nuclear
assets; Israeli non-nuclear preemptions against enemy states with nu-
clear assets that elicit enemy nuclear reprisals, either immediately or
via incremental escalation processes. Other pertinent paths to nuclear
warfighting include accidental, unintentional, or inadvertent nuclear
attacks among Israel and regional enemy states and even the escalatory
consequences of nuclear terrorism against the Jewish State.29 As long
as it can be assumed that Israel is determined to endure, there are con-
ditions where Jerusalem could resort to nuclear warfighting. This holds
true if: (a) enemy first-strikes against Israel would not destroy Israel's
second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for Israeli con-
ventional preemption would not destroy Israel's nuclear counter-
retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear
weapons would not destroy enemy second-strike nuclear capabilities;
and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first-strikes would not
destroy enemy nuclear counter-retaliatory capabilities. It follows, from
the standpoint of Israel's nuclear requirements, that Jerusalem should
prepare to do what is needed to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b)
above, and avoid the possibility of (c) and (d).
7. Israel needs nuclear weapons for the "Samson Option." Although
such a use of nuclear weapons, by definition, would be profoundly cata-
strophic, Israel apparently understands that it would be better to "die
29. See Louis Rene Beres, Confronting Nuclear Terrorism, 14 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 129 (1990); Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear Terror-
ism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1994); LOUIS RENE BERES, ISRAEL, THE 'PEACE
PROCESS' AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 767 (1996); Louis Rene Beres, Preventing the 'Blood-Dimmed Tide:' How to
Avoid Nuclear Terrorism Against the United States, 24 STRATEGIC REV. 76 (1996); Louis
Rene Beres, The United States and Nuclear Terrorism in a Changing World: A Jurispru-
dential View, 12 DICK. J. INT'LL. 327 (1994).
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with the Philistines" than to die alone. This understanding is much
more than a matter of Jewish honor and of a refutation of the so-called
"Masada complex" (suicide without punishment of the aggressor). It
could, depending upon the awareness by enemy states, represent an in-
tegral and indispensable element of Israel's nuclear deterrent. Moreo-
ver, the biblical analogy is somewhat misleading. Samson chose suicide
by pushing apart the temple pillars, whereas Israel, using nuclear
weapons as a last resort, would not be choosing suicide or even neces-
sarily committing suicide. For states, the criteria of "life" and "death"
are hardly as clear-cut as they are for individual persons. Finally, it is
essential that Israel's leaders, in considering possible uses of nuclear
weapons, regard the Samson Option as one to be precluded by correct
resort to all other nuclear options. Stated differently, a resort to the
"Samson Option," by Israel, would imply the complete failure of all
other options and of the failure of its nuclear weapons to provide essen-
tial national security.
Let us examine the deterrence options.
We have seen that Israel needs nuclear weapons, among other pur-
poses, to deter large conventional attacks and all levels of unconven-
tional attack by enemy states. Yet, the effectiveness of nuclear weapons
in meeting these needs is limited and exceedingly problematic. Indeed,
even if Jerusalem should move toward partial or full disclosure of its
nuclear weapons, Israel cannot reasonably rely upon nuclear deter-
rence for survival.
Aware of these limitations, Israel must nonetheless seek to
strengthen nuclear deterrence such that an enemy state will always
calculate that a first-strike upon the Jewish State would be irrational.
This means taking steps to convince the enemy state that the cost of
such a strike will always exceed the benefits. To accomplish this impor-
tant objective, Israel must convince prospective attackers that it main-
tains both the willingness and the capacity to retaliate with nuclear
weapons. Where an enemy state considering an attack upon Israel
would be unconvinced about either one or both of these essential com-
ponents of nuclear deterrence, it might choose to strike first, depending
upon the particular value or utility it places upon the expected conse-
quence of such an attack.
Regarding willingness, even if Jerusalem were prepared to respond
to certain attacks with nuclear reprisals, enemy failure to recognize
such preparedness could provoke an attack upon Israel. Here, misper-
ception and/or errors in information could immobilize nuclear deter-
rence. It is also conceivable that Jerusalem would, in fact, lack willing-
ness to retaliate, and that this lack of willingness is perceived correctly
by enemy decision-makers. In this case, Israeli nuclear deterrence
would be immobilized not because of "confused signals," but because of
signals that had not been properly distorted.
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Regarding capacity, even if Jerusalem maintains a substantial ar-
senal of nuclear weapons, it is essential that enemy states believe these
weapons to be distinctly usable. This means that if a first-strike attack
is believed capable of destroying Israel's arsenal, the Jewish State's
nuclear deterrent will be immobilized. Moreover, even if Israel's nu-
clear weapons were configured such that they could not be destroyed by
an enemy first-strike, enemy misperceptions or misjudgments about
Israeli vulnerability could still occasion the failure of nuclear deter-
rence. A further complication here concerns enemy state deployment of
anti-tactical ballistic missile defenses, which might contribute to an at-
tack decision against Israel by lowering the attacker's expected costs.
The importance of "usable" nuclear weapons must also be examined
from the standpoint of probable harms. Should Israel's nuclear weap-
ons be perceived by a would-be attacker as very high yield, indiscrimi-
nate, "city busting" weapons, rather than minimal-yield, warfighting
weapons, they might not deter. Contrary to the uninformed conven-
tional wisdom on the subject, successful nuclear deterrence, to the ex-
tent possible, may actually vary inversely with perceived destructive-
ness. It follows that Israeli nuclear deterrence requires not only secure
second-strike forces, but also forces that could be used productively in
war.
All this brings to mind the crucial connections between disclosure,
doctrine and deterrence. To the extent that Israel's strategic doctrine
actually identifies nuanced and graduated forms of reprisal-forms
calibrating Israeli retaliations to particular levels of provocation-dis-
closure of such doctrine (at least in its broadest and most unspecific
contours) could contribute to Israel's nuclear deterrence. Without such
disclosure, Israel's enemies will be kept guessing about Jerusalem's
probable responses, a condition of protracted uncertainty that could
serve Israel's security for a while longer, but-at one time or another-
might fail altogether.
Mr. Prime Minister,
In looking over nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, Israeli
planners must also pay close attention to the assumption of rational-
ity.30 Assessments of Israeli nuclear deterrence always assume a ra-
tional state enemy. But the assumption of rationality is enormously
30. Israel's planners should be reminded of M. Unamuno's instructive remark about
the philosopher Hegel. "Hegel made famous his aphorism that all the rational is real and
all the real rational; but there are many of us who, unconvinced by Hegel, continue to be-
lieve that the real, the really real, is irrational, that reason builds upon irrationalities."
For Israel, faced with the prospect of unconventional aggression from enemy states, it
would be prudent to "build upon irrationalities," i.e., upon the expected irrationalities of
an increasingly formidable configuration of enemies. See MIGUEL DE UNNAMUNO, TRAGIC
SENSE OF LIFE 5 (1921).
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problematic. There is, in fact, absolutely no reason to assume that pro-
spective attackers of Israel will always choose among possible options
according to careful comparisons of expected costs and expected bene-
fits. As long as such enemies are increasingly capable of missile attacks
upon Israel and so long as Jerusalem is unable to intercept these at-
tacks with near-perfect or possibly even perfect reliability, this means
that Israeli dependence upon nuclear deterrence could have altogether
catastrophic consequences.
Where should Israel go from here? Recognizing the fatal limita-
tions of any Peace Process, the Jewish State must now seek security be-
yond the protections offered by nuclear deterrence. It must, as we shall
see, prepare for preemption against pertinent military targets. Al-
though many will find even such preparation "aggressive" or "uncivi-
lized," the alternative may well be to accept destruction of the Jewish
State as inevitable. Moreover, as I have written widely in professional
law journals,31 the right of preemption is well-established under inter-
national law.
Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine the preemption options.
We have seen that among other purposes, Israel needs nuclear
weapons to undertake and/or to support various forms of preemption.
In making its preemption decisions, Israel must determine whether
such essential defensive strikes, known jurisprudentially as expressions
of anticipatory self-defense,3 2 would be tactically cost-effective. This
would depend upon a number of critical variables, including: (a) ex-
pected probability of enemy first-strikes; (b) expected cost of enemy
first-strikes; (c) expected schedule of enemy unconventional weapons
deployment; (d) expected efficiency of enemy active defenses over time;
e) expected efficiency of Israeli active defenses over time; (f) expected
efficiency of Israeli hard-target counterforce operations over time; (g)
expected reactions of unaffected regional enemies; and (h) expected U.S.
31. See Louis Rene Beres & Col. Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Reconsidering Israel's De-
struction of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L COMP. L.J. 437 (1995).
32. For scholarly examination of anticipatory self-defense, with particular reference
to Israel, see Louis Rene Beres, Preserving the Third Temple: Israel's Right of Anticipa-
tory Self-Defense Under International Law, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111 (1993); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13
HOUS. J.INT'L L. 259 (1991); Louis Rene Beres, Striking 'First. Israel's Post Gulf War Op-
tions Under International Law, 14 LOY.L.A.INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1 (1991); Louis Rene
Beres, Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89 (1991); Louis
Rene Beres, After the Scud Attacks: Israel, 'Palestine,' and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 6
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 71 (1992); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Force and International Law:
Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense, 13 JERUSALEM J. INT'L RELATIONS 1 (1991). For an
examination of assassination as a permissible form of anticipatory self-defense by Israel,
see Louis Rene Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321 (1991).
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and world community reactions to Israeli preemptions.
Regarding preemption options, Israel's overall question is this: As
Jerusalem must plan for such forms of anticipatory self-defense, against
which particular configurations of hard targets should they be directed
and when should they be mounted? If it is assumed that enemy states
will only add to their chemical, biological, and nuclear arsenals, and
that these additions will make effective Israeli preemptions more and
more difficult, if not altogether impossible, rational Israeli strategy
would seem to compel Jerusalem to strike defensively as soon as possi-
ble. If, however, it is assumed that there will be no significant en-
largement or deployment of enemy unconventional weapons over time,
this may suggest a diminished rationale for Israel to strike first.
Israel's inclinations to strike preemptively in certain circumstances
could also be affected by the steps taken by prospective target states to
guard against Israeli preemption. Should Israel refrain too long from
striking first, enemy states could implement protective measures that
would pose additional hazards to Israel. These measures include the
attachment of certain launch mechanisms to nuclear weapon systems,
and/or the adoption of "launch-on-warning" policies. Such policies
would call for the retaliatory launch of bombers and/or missiles on mere
receipt of warning that a missile attack is underway. Requiring a
launch before the attacking warheads actually reached their intended
targets, "launch-on-warning" policies clearly carry grave risks of error.
Ideally, Israel would do everything possible to prevent such meas-
ures from being installed in the first place, especially because of the ex-
panded risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks against its arma-
ments and population centers. Yet, if such measures should become a
reality, Jerusalem might still calculate that a preemptive strike would
be cost-effective. This is because an expected enemy retaliation, how-
ever damaging, might still appear less unacceptable than the expected
consequences of enemy first-strikes.
Perhaps the single most important factor in Israeli judgments on
the preemption option will be the expected rationality of enemy decision-
makers. If, after all, these leaders could be expected to strike at Israel
with unconventional forces irrespective of anticipated Israeli counter-
strikes, deterrence, as we have already seen, would not work. This
means that enemy strikes could be expected even if enemy leaders un-
derstood that Israel had successfully deployed its own nuclear weapons
in survivable modes, that Israel's weapons were entirely capable of
penetrating enemy active defenses, and that Israel's leaders were alto-
gether willing to retaliate.
Faced with an irrational enemy bent upon unconventional aggres-
sion, Israel could have no effective choice but to abandon reliance on
traditional modes of nuclear deterrence. Even if it is not faced with an
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irrational enemy, however, Israel will have to plan carefully for pre-
emption options, planning that must take into account Jerusalem's nu-
clear weapons. In the course of such planning, it will be important to
recognize that enemy capabilities and intentions are not separate but
interpenetrating, interdependent and interactive. This means: (1) ca-
pabilities affect intentions and vice-versa; and (2) the combined effects
of capabilities and intentions may produce policy outcomes that are
greatly accelerated and/or are more than the simple sum of these ef-
fects.
Let us consider the particular dangers from Iran. For the moment,
those who would downplay the Iranian threat to Israel often argue that
Teheran's unconventional capabilities remain problematic and/or that
its willingness to attack Israel- fundamentalist ideologies notwith-
standing-is assuredly very low. Yet, over the next several years, that
country's development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
could be substantial, creating conditions whereby a first-strike against
Israel might be construed as altogether rational. Whether correct or in-
correct in its calculations, an Iranian leadership that believes it can
strike Israel with impunity, near-impunity or at least without incurring
what it defines as unacceptable costs, could be strongly motivated to
undertake such a strike. Such motivation would be heightened to the
extent that Iran remained uncertain about Israel's own preemption
plans. Here, Iranian capabilities would affect, and possibly even de-
termine, Iranian intentions.
The Iranian threat to Israel might, on the other hand, originate
from a different direction. In this scenario, Iran's intentions toward the
Israel, irremediably hostile and perhaps even genocidal,33 could ani-
mate Teheran's development of unconventional military capabilities.
Here, representing genuinely far-reaching international hatred rather
than mere bluster and propagandistic bravado, Iranian diatribes
against Israel would ensure the production and deployment of extraor-
dinarily destructive forces, weapons and postures that could threaten
33. For writings on the subject of genocide, see LOUIS RENE BERES, AMERICA OUTSIDE
THE WORLD: THE COLLAPSE OF US FOREIGN POLICY (1987); LOUIS RENE BERES,
PUNISHING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AFTER THE GULF WAR: IRAQI
CRIMES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (1992); LOUIs RENE BERES, REASON AND
REALPOLITIK: US FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER (1994); Louis Rene Beres, After the
Gulf War: Iraq, Genocide and International Law, 69 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 13 (1991);
Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, State and Self, 18 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL. 37 (1989); Louis
Rene Beres, International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide, 11 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 25 (1989); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide, Law and Power Politics, 10
WHITTIER L. REV. 329 (1988); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide and Power Politics: The Indi-
vidual and the State, 18 BULL. PEACE PROPOSALS 73 (1987); Louis Rene Beres, Genocide
and Genocide-Like Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 27 (M. Cherif Balliouni,
ed.,1986); Louis Rene Beres, Justice and Realpolitik: International Law and the Preven-
tion of Genocide, 30 CHITTY'S L.J. 223 (1982).
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the Third Temple. What I have been describing are circumstances
where Iranian intentions could affect, and possibly even determine,
Iranian capabilities--circumstances that now warrant careful attention
in Jerusalem.
But what if Iran's intention toward Israel were not irremediably
hostile or genocidal? What if its public bombast were not an expression
of genuinely belligerent motivations, but a position designed entirely for
intranational and international political consumption? The short and
obvious answer to these questions is that such shallow and contrived
intentions would not impact Iranian capabilities vis-a-vis Israel. Yet,
upon reflection, it is likely that even unauthentic expressions of intent
could, over time, become authentic, and that repeated over many years,
in the manner of an incantation, such expressions could become self-
fulfilling.
It follows that it would be premature for Israel to draw comfort
from the argument that Iranian intentions are effectively harmless.
Rather, such intentions could decisively impact capabilities over time.
Backed by appropriate nuclear weapons, preemption options, therefore,
must remain open and viable to Israel.
An important factor in our discussion of intentions, capabilities and
preemption options is the increasingly problematic Peace Process. Con-
ventional wisdom has been quick to suggest that this process, by dem-
onstrating and codifying Israel's commitment to peaceful settlement of
disputes, diminishes the enemy (Iranian) threat. After all, wouldn't
world public opinion uniformly condemn Iran for any act of aggression
directed against Israel? And wouldn't, therefore, Iranian aggressive in-
tentions be reduced or even removed, a change that could slow down
Teheran's pertinent unconventional militarization and consequently the
overall danger to Israel from that enemy state?
Probably not! The conventional wisdom may be wrong, or merely
partial. Following the Oslo Agreement, Israel's inclination to preempt
enemy aggression has likely been diminished. After all, the entire
global community would frown upon such preemption in the midst of an
ongoing, incremental search for "peace" in the region.
If Iran should recognize these effective inhibitions on Israeli pre-
emption options (and there is every reason to believe that they would
recognize these inhibitions), that enemy state could calculate as fol-
lows: "As our (Iranian) militarization will be less threatened by Israeli
preemptive attack during the Peace Process,' we (Iran) should increase
our capabilities-especially our unconventional weapons capabilities-
as quickly as practicable." Such a calculation, as we now know, could
enlarge Iranian intentions to attack Israel and could make cost-effective
hostile actions by Iran that would not otherwise even have been consid-
ered or even have been possible.
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If the Peace Process produces a Palestinian state, the effects on
enemy capabilities and intentions, and therefore on Israeli preemption
options, will be significant. Here, Israel's substantial loss of strategic
depth could be recognized by enemy states as a significant military li-
ability for Jerusalem. Such recognition, in turn, could worsen enemy
intentions against Israel, occasioning an accelerated search for capabili-
ties and consequently a heightened risk of war.
Israel could foresee such enemy calculations and seek to compen-
sate for the loss of territories in a number of different ways. Jerusalem
could decide that it was time to take its bomb out of the "basement" as a
deterrence-enhancing measure, 34 but this might not be enough of a
productive strategy. It could, therefore, accept a heightened willingness
to launch preemptive strikes against enemy hard targets, strikes
backed by Israeli nuclear weapons. Made aware of such Israeli inten-
tions, intentions that would derive from Israel's new territorial vulner-
abilities, enemy states could respond in a more or less parallel fashion,
preparing more openly and more quickly for nuclearization and/or for
first-strike attacks against the Jewish State.
Taken by itself, a Palestinian state would affect the capabilities
and intentions of both Israel and its enemies. But if such a state were
created at the same time that Israel reduced or abandoned its nuclear
weapons capabilities, the impact could be even more substantial. This
scenario should not be dismissed out of hand. Depending upon Israeli
government responses to Egyptian and other demands, it could become
very real.
What would happen if Israel were to relinquish its nuclear options
by acceding to enemy demands and by accepting a Palestinian state?
Under such circumstances, Israel would not only be vastly more vul-
nerable to enemy first-strikes, it would also be deprived of its essential
preemption options. This is the case because Israeli counter-retaliatory
deterrence would be immobilized by reduction or removal of its nuclear
weapons potential and because Israeli preemptions could not possibly
be one hundred percent effective against enemy unconventional forces.
A less than one hundred percent level of effectiveness could be tolerable
if Israel had an operational anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) capa-
bility, but such a capability is presently unavailable and is forseeably
doubtful. 35
34. See LOUIS RENE BERES, SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY
(1986); Louis Rene Beres, Israel's 'Bomb in the Basement:' A Second Look, 2 ISRAELI
AFFAIRS 112 (1995).
35. Israel's current anti-missile defense programs include the Arrow ATBM; the
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Boost Phase Intercept (a multi-layered
system designed to destroy enemy missiles in their initial flight phase); and the Nautilus
Program (a survivor of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative aimed to evaluate lasers as a
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Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine Israel's nuclear warfighting op-
tions.
However much scholars may wish to deny it, Israel needs nuclear
weapons, among several other essential purposes, for actual nuclear
warfighting. Should nuclear deterrence and/or preemption options fail,
Israel's "hard target" capabilities could be critical to national survival.
These capabilities, of course, would depend, in part, upon appropriate
nuclear weapons.
What, exactly, would be "appropriate?" Instead of Armageddon
type weapons, Israel needs to develop precision, low-yield nuclear war-
heads that could reduce collateral damage to acceptable levels and hy-
pervelocity nuclear warheads that could overcome enemy active de-
fenses. Israel would also benefii from the use of radio-frequency
weapons, nuclear warheads that are tailored to produce as much elec-
tromagnetic pulse as possible, destroying electronics and communica-
tions over wide areas.
Regarding the nuclear weapons needed by Israel for nuclear war-
fighting, Jerusalem requires an intermediate option between capitula-
tion on the one hand and resorting to inappropriately large nuclear
weapons on the other. To define and better understand this intermedi-
ate option, Israeli planners could extrapolate productively from an ex-
cellent study prepared by two well-informed target planners and thea-
ter force analysts at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Although
directed toward United States nuclear strategy only, the compelling ar-
guments cited earlier by Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II
pertain instructively to the problem at hand, i.e., Israeli security and
nuclear warfighting options.
36
Of course, all such discussion will be objectionable to people of
feeling and sensitivity. It would, after all, be far better (and certainly
more "correct") to speak of nuclear arms control or sustainable nuclear
deterrence than of nuclear warfighting. Yet, the Middle East remains a
particularly dangerous neighborhood, and failures to confront the most
terrible possibilities could bring the most horrific harms. For Israel, a
state that yearns for peace and security more than any other in this
neighborhood-a state born out of the ashes of humankind's most terri-
ble crime-genocide looms both as a memory and as an expectation.
37
tactical air defense against rockets, mortars and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles).
36. See Dowler & Howard II, supra note 22.
37. War and genocide need not be mutually exclusive. According to Articles II and III
of the Genocide Convention, which entered into force on January 12, 1951, genocide in-
cludes any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious group as such." Convention of the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
(1951). If Israel is recognized as the institutionalized expression of the Jewish People (an
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Resisting the short-term temptations of security regimes and confidence
building measures, its leaders must always plan accordingly.
Mr. Prime Minister, let us examine the Samson Option
We have seen that Israel needs nuclear weapons, additional to the
other essential rationales already discussed, for "last resort" purposes.
Although this is certainly the least important need-since, by defini-
tion, actual resort to the Samson Option would reveal failure and col-
lapse of all essential security functions-it is not unimportant. This is
because Israeli preparation for last resort operations could play a role in
enhancing Israeli nuclear deterrence, preemption and warfighting re-
quirements, and therefore-at least in part-reducing the risks of re-
gional nuclear exchanges.
Regarding prospective contributions to Israeli nuclear deterrence,
preparation for a Samson Option could help to convince would-be at-
tackers that aggression would not prove beneficial. This is especially
the case if Israeli preparation were coupled with some level of disclo-
sure, and if Israel's pertinent Samson weapons appeared to be suffi-
ciently invulnerable to enemy first-strikes. In view of what strategists
sometimes call the "rationality of pretended irrationality," Samson
could also aid Israeli nuclear deterrence by demonstrating a willingness
to take existential risks.
In relation to prospective contributions to preemption options,
preparation for a Samson Option could convince Israel that essential
defensive first-strikes could be undertaken with diminished expecta-
tions of unacceptably destructive enemy retaliations. This would de-
pend, of course, upon antecedent Israeli decisions on disclosure, on Is-
raeli perceptions of the effects of disclosure on enemy retaliatory
prospects, on Israeli judgments about enemy perceptions of Samson
weapons vulnerability, and on enemy awareness of Samson's counter-
value force posture. As in the case of Samson and Israeli nuclear deter-
rence, last-resort preparations could assist Israeli preemption options
by displaying a willingness to take certain existential risks. But Israeli
planners must be mindful here of pretended irrationality as a double-
edged sword. Brandished too irrationally, Israeli preparations for a
Samson Option could encourage enemy preemptions.
Regarding prospective contributions to Israel's nuclear warfighting
options, preparation for a Samson Option could convince enemy states
that a clear victory would be impossible to achieve. But here, it would
be important for Israel to communicate to potential aggressors the fol-
lowing understanding: Israel's countervalue-targeted Samson weapons
are additional to (not at the expense of) its counterforce-targeted war-
expression that would include national, ethnical, racial and religious components), acts of
war intended to destroy the Jewish State could certainly be genocidal.
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fighting weapons. In the absence of such communication, preparations
for a Samson Option could effectively impair, rather than reinforce Is-
rael's nuclear warfighting options.
Mr. Prime Minister,
Whether one likes it or not, Israel needs nuclear weapons. These
weapons are required to fulfill essential deterrence options, preemption
options, warfighting options, and even the Samson Option. It follows
that such weapons should not be negotiated away in formal interna-
tional agreements, especially in the midst of any so-called "Peace Proc-
ess." It follows as well that particular nuclear weapons policies should
now be made in cumulative conformance with: (a) the examined bene-
fits of disclosure; and (b) the seven pertinent options that have been
discussed and, more broadly, with the ever-changing strategic environ-
ment of regional and world power configurations. In the final analysis,
regrettable as it may appear, the ultimate structure of Israeli security
will be built largely upon the foundations of nuclear weapons, and not
on security regimes, confidence building measures, or illusory peace
processes. 38 Should these foundations be constructed carefully, with
due regard for underlying theoretical soundness, they could assure that
nuclear weapons will never be used in the Middle East.
In the best of all possible worlds, such reaffirmation of Realpolitik
would be vulgar and inappropriate. Yet, we do not live in an optimal
world order, and individual states-still operating within the self-help
seventeenth-century dynamics fashioned at Westphalia after the Thirty
Years War-have an overriding obligation to endure. To meet this obli-
gation, as indeed it must, the State of Israel must never lose sight of an
antecedent requirement: the obligation to understand, maintain and
use its essential military power.
38. For devout Muslims, "peace with Israel was and still remains nothing less than
a poison threatening the life-blood of Islam, a symptom of its profound malaise, weakness
and decadence." ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTI-SEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED 227 (1991).
The Prophet is said to have predicted a final war to annihilate the Jews, saying: "The
Hour [i.e. salvation] would not come until you fight against the Jews; and the stone would
say, '0 Muslim! There is a Jew behind me: come and kill him'." ARAB THEOLOGIANS ON
JEWS AND ISRAEL: EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH CONFERENCE OF




PEACE BY OTHER MEANS: USING REWARDS IN UN
EFFORTS TO END CONFLICTS*
EDWARD A. AMLEY, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
At the international level and in a variety of domestic contexts, in-
stitutions and processes such as judicial mechanisms, elections, and
legislatures that are designed to manage conflict have either never ex-
isted or fallen apart. Thus, the United Nations continues to face a vari-
ant of the following scenario: Electronic media outlets have begun to
broadcast reports of civil strife and mass violence in a given state. How
should the UN diplomats who meet to discuss the crisis respond? They
might impose economic sanctions on the parties to the potentially-
destabilizing conflict. Or, should the UN Secretary-General appoint a
special representative? This agent could then attempt to broker a set-
tlement through mediation. Finally, the Security Council might use
military muscle to generate a resolution to the crisis.
During the past decade, numerous observers have taken note of the
UN's enlarged role in managing both domestic and international con-
flicts.' Part II of this Article surveys the strategies that it has em-
ployed to bring disputes to an end. This discussion is intertwined with
an attempt to identify the strengths and limits of these conventional
* For reading and reacting to drafts of this Article, I thank W. Michael Reisman, Ruth
Wedgwood, Jeff Anton, Ash Bali, Christopher Coleman, Mary Eliza Kimball, Julian Ku,
and Kaoru Okuizumi.
** J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1998.
1. See Report of the Secretary General on an Agenda for Peace-Preventative Diplo-
macy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, P 3, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 953, 956 (1992) (asserting that "an opportunity has been regained to achieve the
great objectives of the Charter-a United Nations capable of maintaining international
peace and security .... "); Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement:
A Proposal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
287, 287 (1997) ("United Nations participation in the conduct of national elections has
become one of the most visible and concrete aspects of U.N. involvement in the domestic
affairs of independent countries today."); Anne Orford, Locating the International: Mili-
tary and Monetary Interventions After the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 443 (1997)
(referring to "the revitalization and expansion of the United Nations collective security
system"); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Global Leadership After the Cold War, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 86 (1996) (arguing that "the United Nations can help deal with the
challenges that globalization and fragmentation pose now and in the future"). However,
the ability of the UN to play a dominant role in international affairs may have been over-
estimated. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 1997, at 183 ("Many thought that the new world order proclaimed by George Bush
was the promise of 1945 fulfilled, a world in which international institutions, led by the
United Nations, guaranteed international peace and security with the active support of
the world's major powers. That world order is a chimera.").
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
conflict-resolution approaches.
Unlike military force or diplomatic persuasion, positive induce-
ments have not gained widespread currency in international affairs.
Accounting for the failure of rewards to become entrenched in world
politics is the concern of Part III. It also attempts to isolate such meas-
ures from other attempts to influence international actors.
Part IV identifies and discusses considerations that may drive UN
positive inducement strategies. If international organizations recom-
mend rewarding a party instead of relying upon military force, in which
kinds of conflicts are such measures likely to be most effective? What
form might these gestures take? At what point in the conflict-
resolution process should they be utilized? Finally, how would the UN
need to change institutionally to harness the full promise of reward-
based strategies? In confronting these questions, this Part of the Arti-
cle concludes that multiple considerations will drive the decision to in-
fluence disputants through positive inducements.
II. UN CONFLICT-SUPPRESSION STRATEGIES: THE CURRENT STATE OF
PLAY
The UN's current activism in the area of dispute-resolution repre-
sents a clear break from the past. Before the end of the Cold War, the
superpowers monopolized this activity. They attempted to ensure
global stability by brokering settlements to local and regional contests.2
During this period, the UN' sometimes played a peripheral role in the
resolution of conflicts, usually by coordinating deployments of small,
lightly-armed peace-keeping 3 forces that carried out tasks like cease-
fire monitoring.
Since 1989, the international community has handed the UN an
expanding conflict-resolution brief. First, states have called upon the
UN to preside over the settlement of various violent manifestations of
the Cold War that the superpowers had not been able to resolve by
2. See I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Di-
plomacy and Informal Peacemaking, in RESOLVING THIRD WORLD: CHALLENGES FOR A
NEW ERA 239, 241 (Sheryl J. Brown & Kimber M. Schraub eds., 1992) (finding that the
United States was involved as "a mediator on at least ninety occasions, and the Soviet
Union on at least twenty").
3. For the purposes of this Article, the term, "peace operation" functions as a generic
expression for the efforts involving a significant UN presence that have been undertaken
around the world to settle conflicts. It encompasses peacekeeping ventures, which usually
consist of small military contingents presiding over cease fire and force withdrawal
agreements. Meanwhile, peacebuilding efforts are multifaceted operations involving mili-
tary and civilian components that usually follow the successful negotiation of a compre-
hensive accord between warring factions. Finally, peace enforcement operations denote
UN attempts to use forcible measures to bring peace to a given context.
VOL. 26:2
1998 PEACE BY OTHER MEANS
1989. 4 The UN has also begun to respond to the strife that has become
a fixture of the current landscape in many areas of the world.5 To settle
conflicts, the UN has relied upon various options.
A. Mediation
In some situations, the UN has played the role of diplomatic
troubleshooter or mediator. 6 The considerable legitimacy and credibil-
ity the UN commands justifies these mediation efforts. 7 Usually, UN
mediation initiatives take the form of attempts by a representative of
the Secretary-General to open lines of communication between adver-
saries. This individual also facilitates negotiations and dialogue and
persuades the disputants to settle their differences.5
4. The UN has formulated and implemented settlements designed to end conflicts in
Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. See
Trevor Finallay, The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping, in CHALLENGES FOR
THE NEW PEACEKEEPERS 1, 31 (Trevor Finallay ed., 1996) (referring to "the largest and
most ambitious post-cold war missions .. . (notably those in Cambodia, El Salvador, Mo-
zambqiue)").
5. Illustrations of such conflicts are the ongoing hostilities in Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. See Adam Steinfeld, Note, Nuclear Objections: The Persistent Objector and
the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1635, 1636 n.4 (1996) ("The
recent UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina are indicative of
the expanded scope of UN peacekeeping.").
6. In 1980, the Secretary-General appointed a representative to resolve the conflict
in Afghanistan. This position continues to exist. See, e.g., Taliban Chief Ready for Talks
with Opposition, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13461887
("Meanwhile outgoing UN envoy for Afghanistan, Norbert Holl, expressed the hope that
peace initiatives including those by the so-called group of eight countries would reach
'tangible results in the foreseeable future."'). Prior to the entrance into force of the latest
peace agreement in Angola, a UN diplomat, Alioune Bloudin Beye, attempted to broker an
agreement between the factions involved in the conflict that has plagued this country.
See, e.g., U.S. Backs Extension Of U.N. Mission In Angola, Afr. News Serv., Jan. 29, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6607122 (reporting appreciation expressed "to the Secretary-
General's Special Representative, Maitre Blondin Beye, for his devotion to the cause of
peace in Angola."). A UN representative has worked to bring about a settlement to the
seemingly intractable conflict in Burundi. Before resigning, Ahmedou Ould Abdullah, one
previous UN representative in Burundi, was quoted as saying, "[tihis country [Burundi]
does not need soldiers, it needs psychiatrists." Bubbling Over, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996,
at 32.
7. As Saadia Touval has asserted, "[]everage is, of course, also a matter of legiti-
macy and credibility. This is the main U.N. asset: the aura of legitimacy its actions carry
as representing the consensus of the international community." Saadia Touval, Why the
U.N. Fails, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 52.
8. Touval, for example, has noted:
Mediators must offer their 'good offices' to help disputants communicate.
They try to persuade each party to change its image of the adversary or to
interpret the adversary's behavior in a manner that will facilitate a settle-
ment. Mediators can help a party understand its adversary's concerns and
constraints. They also suggest compromises and help parties save face in
making concessions. Disputants, for example, often believe that it is less
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 26:2
In the course of mediation efforts, the UN has encountered several
problems. First, the parties may simply refuse to enter into discussion.
Alternatively, they could deal in bad faith while hoping that the politi-
cal-military tide on the ground will turn or run more strongly in their
favor. 9 Even subtle shifts in the balance of power between two parties
may allow recalcitrant actors to negotiate from a position of strength.
Second, the fact that the UN is an international organization ham-
strings its ability to engage in diplomatic mediation efforts. According
to Saadia Touval, the necessity that UN initiatives enjoy the continuing
support of its members, especially those that hold permanent seats on
the Security Council, "saps the United Nations of necessary dynamism
and flexibility in pursuing mediation. Once the United Nations agrees
on a mediating proposal or framework, it cannot easily be modified in
response to changing circumstances." 10 Moreover, the effectiveness of
UN mediation may be undermined by individual states that could con-
ceivably withdraw their support from international peace efforts. For
example, the United States reversed its stance on the plan formulated
by Cyrus Vance and David Owen in the course of a joint UN-European
damaging to their reputations to accept a proposal made by a mediator than
an adversary.
Touval, supra note. 7, at 51. Touval's conception of mediation aligns with the one offered
by Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, who characterize this activity as "interven-
tions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working toward
a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of informa-
tion, the suggestion of alternatives and in some cases, the application of leverage."
Ronald J. Fisher & Loraleigh Keashly, The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and
Consultation Within a Contingency Model of a Third Party Intervention, 28 J. PEACE RES.
29, 30 (1991). Stephen R. Ratner identifies still other roles that mediators are called upon
to play. These include providing face-saving and escape routes, redefining issues, taking
steps to contain the dispute, and ensuring compliance in the event an agreement is
reached. STEPHEN R. RATNER, THE NEW UN PEACEKEEPING: BUILDING PEACE IN LANDS
OF CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR 47 (1995).
9. Larman C. Wilson and Raill Gonzilez Diaz have written on the talks between the
Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaci6n Nacional (FMLN) and the El Salvadoran govern-
ment that began in September 1989. Two months later, the guerrillas launched a violent
offensive in San Salvador "designed to silence the [Alfredo] Cristiani government's report
that the FMLN was finished, thus improving the insurgency's position at the negotiating
table." Larman C. Wilson & Rauil Gonzilez Diaz, UN Peacekeeping in Central America, in
A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 141, 146 (Ramesh Thakur &
Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995). At the same time, according to Touval:
[I]t is sometimes possible for mediators to induce ripeness and contribute to
the making of a 'hurting stalemate.' They help create a disposition among
the disputants to settle the conflict. Having an interest in a settlement, me-
diators sometimes bargain with the parties, offer them incentives, or subject
them to pressure in order to induce them to accept specific settlement terms.
Touval, supra note 7, at 51.
10. Touval, supra note 7, at 54. This is not to downplay the role that international
organizations can play in mediation. For examples of some of the services that such enti-
ties can provide, see Touval, supra note 7, at 55-56.
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Union effort to broker a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. '
B. Punitive Measures
The use of negative incentives, or sticks, as some commentators
may have mislabeled such inducements,12 has figured into UN efforts to
end conflicts. The Security Council has authorized economic sanctions,
threats to use military force, or its actual employment. Sometimes, it
has combined these measures with purely diplomatic mediation efforts.
Sanctions regimes played roles in the international community's
response to such events as the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 1991
coup in Haiti that overthrew the government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
and the civil strife in the former Yugoslavia. Imposed by the UN pur-
suant to Article 41 of its Charter, sanctions may represent a way to
force recalcitrant actors in these conflicts to change their ways while
minimizing military force. 13 The sanctions applied to Iraq before the
Persian Gulf War, however, were not given sufficient time to work. 14
Also, the package currently in force has not induced Baghdad to comply
with numerous Security Council decisions made in the wake of the Iraqi
military defeat in 1991.15 In contrast, sanctions may function as part of
the explanation for the Haitian junta's decision to go into exile and for
Serbia's move to distance itself from the Bosnian Serbs in 1994.16
11. For the text of this instrument, see Report of the Secretary General on the Activi-
ties of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Peace Talks on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, U.N. SCOR, 48th sess., U.N. Doc. S/25479 (1993)).
12. Opinions about the actual meaning and origins of the phrase, "carrots and sticks,"
abound. See WILLIAM SAFIRE, I STAND CORRECTED: MORE ON LANGUAGE FROM WILIAM
SAFIRE 65-66 (1984); WILLIAM & MARY MORRIS, MORRIS DICTIONARY OF WORD AND
PHRASE ORIGINS 114-15 (1971).
13. The UN has imposed sanctions and arms embargoes on Iraq, the then-Rhodesia,
South Africa, Libya, Somalia, Liberia, and Serbia. See, e.g., Economic Sanctions Are Criti-
cized from Inside, Outside the U.N., Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Dec. 22, 1997, available in
Westlaw, All News Plus Wires File ("The [Security] council in past years has imposed
sanctions against Libya, Liberia, Haiti, Angola, Serbia and Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Rwanda and Sudan."). On October 1, 1996, the Security Council lifted the
sanctions that had been imposed on Serbia as well as the Serb component of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. See S.C. Res. 1074, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3700th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1074 (1996).
14. See, e.g., As U.S., Japan Look Ahead, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 9, 1991, at B6 ("Japan
disagreed with the American choice of going to war rather than allow economic sanctions
to work against Iraq.").
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
16. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Himes, War by Other Means: Criteria for the Use of Eco-
nomic Sanctions, COMMONWEALTH, Feb. 28, 1997, at 13, available in 1997 WL 12635327
("As in South Africa and Haiti, sanctions work better if there is a substantial domestic
opposition to the government and if there are powerful classes or groups involved in in-
ternational business who will feel the impact quickly."); Keep Up Pressure on Serbia, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 5, 1994, at A22 ("If the split [between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs] is in-
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Like sanctions, military force has become an increasingly common
UN strategy during the post-Cold War era. Before the Persian Gulf
War and in Haiti, the UN authorized ad-hoc coalitions of states to use
military force pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 17 In the
wake of the breakdown of civil order in Somalia, the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF) tried a similar approach.18 However, decisionmakers did not
target military force at any one actor in this anarchy-plagued region.
Similarly, the UN integrated threats of North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina to gain leverage over
the disputants in this conflict after an attempt managed directly by the
UN to bring peace to this country faltered. 19 Finally, following the es-
tablishment of the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II), troops engaged in combat against parties that were seen
as hostile to the settlement process. 20
The UN's use of punitive measures has attracted controversy and
encountered problems. Generally, this strategy opens the UN up to
charges of partiality. As Henry Wiseman has argued, "the necessity for
[UN] 'impartiality' in word and deed continues to be imperative. Yet,
this will be all the more difficult to ensure in multifaceted civil con-
flicts." 21 Meanwhile, a problem specific to nonviolent economic sanc-
tions is the potentially significant amount of time that must elapse be-
fore they are likely to be effective. There are also the difficulties and
expense of mounting efforts to enforce them. Although the UN has suc-
cessfully sanctioned states involved in conflict that pitted them against
much of the rest of the international community, their effective use in
internal contexts seems less assured. 22 Sanctions also can cause a tre-
deed genuine, the so-called Contact Group-the U.S., Europe and Russia-can take sitis-
faction in the success of the economic sanctions on Serbia, which drove Milosevic's deci-
sion.").
17. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/678
(1990) (authorizing states, vis-A-vis Iraq, "to use all necessary means to uphold and im-
plement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore in-
ternational peace and security in the area;").
18. John L. Hirsch & Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflec-
tions on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping 45 (1995) (noting that UNITAF "would be not a
UN force, but one endorsed by the Security Council.").
19. See, e.g., Diane Bartz, NATO Airstrikes Aimed at Peace but Could Delay It,
Agence France-Presse, Aug. 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7850289 ("The airstrikes and
artillery fire that have hit Bosnian Serbs have been aimed at bringing peace to Sarajevo").
20. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 122-23 ("UNOSOM activities were al-
most entirely directed at the military struggle with the SNA [beginning in 1993]").
21. Henry Wiseman, Peacekeeping in the International Political Context: Historical
Analysis and Future Directions, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING: RESULTS,
LIMITATIONS AND PROSPECTS: THE LESSONS OF 40 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 32, 43 (Indar Jit
Rikhye & Kjell Skjelsbaek eds., 1990).
22. Sanctions were applied to the Bosnian Serbs and targeted at UNITA-held areas of
Angola. See, e.g., Michael Littlejohns, Security Council to Penalise Angola Rebels, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at 4 ("The United Nations Security Council last night unanimously
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mendous amount of collateral damage to innocent bystanders. They
can impoverish private citizens in the target area and bankrupt coun-
tries and firms that maintain trading 'relationships with the targets.
Sanctions, moreover, may cultivate the growth of a siege mentality
among members of the state or community at which they are directed. 23
Finally, some commentators have questioned the legality of economic
sanctions.
24
Employing military force presents the UN with numerous chal-
lenges. In some situtations, it has attempted to "subcontract" military
responsibilities out to a regional organization or to an ad-hoc coalition
of states. This has proven to be operationally effective. 25 For example,
the alliance that took part in Desert Storm successfully repelled Iraqi
aggression against Kuwait. In other contexts, international military ef-
forts have achieved more modest objectives. These include the Ameri-
can-dominated military involvement in Haiti, the UNITAF period of the
international community's efforts in Somalia, and the operations car-
ried out by the NATO Implementation Force and Stabilization Force.
The danger of allowing non-UN military forces to manage conflicts
should be apparent. The subcontracting entity may overstep its man-
date. However, if the UN vigorously monitors the activities of the sub-
contractor, this may be unlikely to happen. In a situation where serious
differences of opinion regarding the role of the outside military force
exist, the UN could withdraw its endorsement of the venture.
Second, it may be that the great powers will use subcontracting as
a way to regain or maintain hegemony in their traditional spheres of
adopted tougher sanctions against the Unita movement in Angola in an attempt to force it
to honour a commitment to a 1994 peace agreement with the Angolan central govern-
ment."). It is unclear what role they played in inducing these parties to become more re-
ceptive to international diplomatic efforts to achieve a settlement in the Balkans and An-
gola.
23. The Economist reported that due, in part, to the sanctions that were imposed on
them, "the Serbs passionately believe themselves to be the Bosnian conflict's victims. Far
from being weighed down by guilt, they consider themselves, if anything, the most ag-
grieved party in the Bosnian nightmare-indeed, one of the most aggrieved peoples in the
entire world." Serbia: Another Country, ECONOMIST, July 23, 1994, at 47. Similarly,
Richard Haass has noted that sanctions imposed on South Africa "tended to push whites
into the laager (a defensive posture similar to 'circling the wagons), thus reducing further
the chance for meaningful political dialogue." RICHARD N. HAAss, CONFLICTS UNENDING:
THE UNITED STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 117 (1990).
24. See Stephen C. Neff, Economic Warfare in Contemporary International Law:
Three Schools of Thought, Evaluated According to an Historical Method, 26 STAN. J.
INT'L. L. 67 (1989) (assessing the legality of economic sanctions).
25. See Kofi A. Annan, Sovereignty Challenged, An Interview with U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi A. Annan, 21 FLETCHER. FOR. WORLD AFF. 1, 4 (1997) C'Such cooperation
will continue, as the United Nations is incapable of taking on all of the world's problems
and often regional organizations are better-suited to addressing aspects of a conflict.").
But see John Quigley, The "Privatization" of Security Council Enforcement Action: A
Threat To Multilateralism, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 249 (1996).
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influence, and to legitimize it as well. US troops played a pivotal role in
the peace operation in Haiti. Russian troops loomed large in the UN
venture undertaken in Georgia, which has unfolded under the auspices
of the United Nations Observer Mission.
Third, subcontracting may wrongly assume that a capable military
instrument can always be located to carry out the requisite operational
objectives. However, the usual players, including NATO or a coalition
led by the US, may characterize the troublespot as strategically insig-
nificant and refuse to commit forces abroad. In the post-Cold War era,
broad swaths of Africa fall outside the security umbrellas of the great
powers. Thus, when order in this region breaks down, it may be diffi-
cult to find qualified candidates to restore it.
Finally, coordination problems have cropped up in situations where
non-UN military assets assume responsibility for the military aspects of
conflict-resolution strategies while the UN employs diplomacy and pro-
vides humanitarian assistance to noncombatants. For example, observ-
ers criticized the "dual key"26 system developed by NATO and the UN,
which provided that each organization sign off on punitive air strikes
before they could be undertaken against targets in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 27 The complicated and unwieldy chains of command that
this approach engendered hampered the effective utilization of military
might as an inducement strategy.
Rather than rely on an outside authority to use military force, the
Security Council could simply order troops operating under its direction
to compel recalcitrant disputants to settle their differences. Even be-
fore the failure of the military component of UNOSOM II, some ques-
tioned whether the UN lacked the capacity to manage a large operation
making liberal use of robust military force.28 Thus, in December 1992,
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali lobbied for the es-
tablishment of UNITAF led by the US even though he would have pre-
ferred the creation of a humanitarian enforcement operation under UN
26. See generally, Tom Post and Rod Nordland who characterized the "dual key" ap-
proach as "the cumbersome chain of command that relied on U.N. civilians to approve
NATO air power." Tom Post & Rod Nordland, For Shame, NEWSWEEK, July 31, 1995, at
20; see also Giandomenico Picco, The U.N. and the Use of Force: Leave the Secretary Gen-
eral Out of It, FOREIGN. AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 14 (contending that "the confused chain
of command that we have witnessed in the Balkans has helped neither the credibility of
the institution nor the effectiveness of the international effort.").
27. See, e.g., Susan R. Lamb, The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia, in A
CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 65, 78 (Ramesh Thakur &
Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
28. Proposals to strengthen the UN's ability to manage peace enforcement operations
have proliferated during the post-Cold War era. See, e.g., Jim Whitman & Ian Bartholo-
mew, UN Peace Support Operations: Political-Military Considerations, in BEYOND
TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 169 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes eds., 1995).
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command. 29 Boutros-Ghali also attempted to delay the transfer of
authority over military activities from this force to UNOSOM 11.30 In
the wake of what transpired during this phase of the Somali operation,
opposition to the utilization of force by UN military units has solidified.
Although the UN may ultimately develop a capacity to direct large-
scale military peace enforcement operations, it still must rely on states
to contribute troops. Governments may be hesitant to make these
committments, especially when the UN is involved in an area consid-
ered low on the contributing country's national security agenda.
31
Thus, until the UN establishes some sort of military structure that ex-
ists independently of domestic armed forces, the willingness of govern-
ments to contribute personnel to UN military efforts will constrain the
extent to which this approach can be used.
32
Members of the international community may allow the UN to
utilize military might quickly and with relative ease. However, it would
be shortsighted to regard military force and other punitive policies as
the only way by which settlements to conflicts can be achieved. As
David A. Baldwin has observed, "two of the most important weaknesses
in traditional theorizing about international politics have been the ten-
dency to exaggerate the effectiveness of military power resources and
the tendency to treat military power as the ultimate measuring rod to
which other forms of power should be compared."33 Indeed, "[iun some
situations, force works very well, but in others it is counterproduc-
tive."34 Even where military response is warranted, some weapons and
tactics will clearly be inappropriate.
29. Robert G. Patman, The UN Operation in Somalia, in A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS:
UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 85, 93 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
30. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 112 ("The military side of the transfer
[from UNITAF to UNOSOM II] was flawed in several respects.").
31. The sqeamishness displayed by many Western countries, whose troops play im-
portant roles in UN peace operations because they are most likely to possess the training
and equipment to carry out the complicated requirements that such missions demand, can
be attributed to several causes. These include 24-hour live television news and the
shrinking size of families in this region's countires. For example, Edward C. Luck has
recounted that "some graphic pictures on [Cable News Network] CNN and a score of
deaths in an ill-fated Ranger raid convinced US policymakers to beat a hasty retreat from
Somalia." Edward C. Luck, The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace
Operations, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 67, 77 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd
C. Hayes eds. 1995); see also Edward N. Luttwak, Toward Post-Heroic Warfare, FOREIGN
AFF., May-June 1995, at 115; Edward N. Luttwak, Where Are the Great Powers? At Home
with the Kids, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at 23.
32. See, e.g., Kai Bird, The New Case for a U.N. Army: Humanitarian Intervention,
NATION, Aug. 8, 1994, at 160; Brian Urquhart, For a UN Volunteer Military Force, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, June 10, 1993, at 3-4.
33. David Baldwin, Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Ten-
dencies, 31 WORLD POL. 161, 180 (1979).
34. Id. at 181.
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C. Judicial Management
Using law to mold the behavior of disputants has colored UN
peace-making strategies. It is possible to view the International Crimi-
nal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as components of
larger UN efforts to gain leverage over the parties to these two con-
flicts. 35 Unfortunately, the supervision over a party that a suprana-
tional judicial entity can achieve seems likely to be indirect. For exam-
ple, the existence of a court may propel a disputant to become less
receptive to a negotiated settlement to the conflict. If this party tri-
umphs militarily and manages to translate its victory into an advanta-
geous political settlement, the likelihood that it will be successfully
prosecuted recedes dramatically. On the other hand, closing down a
tribunal because the UN's political efforts to broker a settlement have
succeeded would hardly qualify as a principled course of action. The
rule of law at the international level would be undermined. Moreover,
individuals who have been indicted for violations of international hu-
manitarian law would not be able to respond to the allegations lodged
against them.
D. Isolation
The UN can attempt to ignore or isolate parties to conflicts. Before
what remained of Yugoslavia ended its overt military backing of the
Bosnian Serbs, David Gompert called for "an international cold war" in
conjunction with economic sanctions against this country.36 According
to him, "[a] sustained economic and information war against Serbia
should in time topple the Belgrade regime and permit a more principled
and lasting settlement in Yugoslavia than anything within reach to-
day."37 In Cambodia, meanwhile, the UN tried something akin to this
approach. When the Khmer Rouge failed to comply with the demobili-
zation and disarmament provisions of the settlement agreement that
emerged from the 1991 Paris Conference on Cambodia, 3.8 the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) attempted to
marginalize the Khmer Rouge. This posture worked due to the decision
of the Khmer Rouge to fall "de facto into a policy of passive boycott
during much of the [settlement] process." 39 If the Khmer Rouge had in-
35. See W. Michael Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintain-
ing Public Order, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 175, 181 (1995).
36. David Gompert, How to Defeat Serbia, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 1994, at 46.
37. Id. at 44.
38. For the texts of the Paris Accords, see Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the
Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations Addressed to
the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/461608-S/23177, Annex (1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
180 (1992).
39. James A. Schear, Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping: The Case of Cambodia, in
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stead used its considerable military strength to declare war on the UN,
the accomplishments of UNTAC may not have been attained. Thus, ef-
forts to bring an end to conflicts while neglecting parties that are openly
hostile to the settlement are likely to be effective in only a small uni-
verse of scenarios. 40
III. TOWARDS A THEORY OF UN REWARD STRATEGIES: ACCOUNTING FOR
THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF POSITIVE INDUCEMENTS IN CURRENT CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND DIFFERENTIATING REWARDS FROM OTHER INFLUENCE
ATTEMPTS
When relying on diplomacy, coercion, criminalization, marginaliza-
tion, or some mixture of these approaches to end conflicts, the UN has
encountered difficulties. Thus, it is surprising that there has been so
little sustained debate on rewards, positive inducement strategies, posi-
tive incentives, or positive sanctions 41 in attempts to manage destabi-
lizing strife.
A. The Neglected Subject of Positive Inducements
Only a small amount of discussion on rewards in the context of con-
flict-resolution efforts has taken place. Some observers simply assert
that this strategy represents an option for the UN to pursue. 42 It is
somewhat ironic that there should be such a shortage of comment on
UN rewards while discussion of its use of coercive measures has grown
exponentially. 43 Since its founding, the UN has accumulated a wealth
of experience and expertise in providing technical assistance and devel-
opment aid to states. This knowledge might serve as the basis for the
development of sophisticated positive inducement strategies. 44 Thus,
BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 248, 253 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C. Hayes
eds., 1995).
40. The success of this strategy may have stemmed from the fact that the Khmer
Rouge had earlier signed off on the Paris Accords. It seems doubtful whether UNTAC
could have attained the success it did in the event the Khmer Rouge had not acceded to
this agreement and the UN had attempted to isolate this faction nevertheless.
41. These terms will be used interchangeably.
42. Few have addressed this question. James A Schear, for example, has noted that
"[t]he financial instrument can offer powerful incentives for conflict termination, but it is
not always in synchronisation with the exigencies of peacekeeping operations." Schear,
supra note 39, at 263.
43. (The focus on this latter subject is understandable in light of the emphasis in the
UN Charter on using military force to respond to aggression. Article 42 of this instru-
ment, for example, provides that the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity." UN CHARTER, art. 42.
44. The UN, it can be argued, made such a sustained foray into areas like providing
development aid to states due to the superpower confrontation. The Cold War hamstrung
its ability to respond militarily to international instability. Unable to play the role of the
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until the UN relies more heavily on rewards, it will have effectively
turned its back on one of its comparative advantages.
The shortage of probative discussion on UN rewards mirrors the
extent to which general comment on positive sanctions has been margi-
nalized in the dominant discourse of such disciplines as law and politi-
cal science. This may be a consequence of the fact that important fig-
ures in these fields have rejected the notion that rewards, as an
inducement strategy, are as efficient and effective as punishments.
45
Louis Kriesberg, for example, has assumed that an imbalance in the at-
tention devoted to negative and positive incentives should exist.46 Oth-
ers vigorously question why so little study of positive inducements has
been attempted. According to Baldwin, one explanation flows from "an
implicit assumption that the distinction between positive and negative
sanctions is not worth making."47 Fred H. Lawson, meanwhile, attrib-
utes diplomatic practice:
The unfavorable connotations that have surrounded the notion of ap-
peasement since the negotiations at Munich... , along with the predi-
lection that statespeople have to think in terms of the 'security di-
lemma' when faced with a conflicted situation, seem to have had a
profound influence upon students of international affairs and their
writing about war.
48
Finally, Nancy Kanwisher has observed that "policy-makers...
world's policeman, the UN needed a compelling mission. See Major Louis A. Chiarella,
United Nations Operations: Problems Encountered by United States Forces when Subject
to a "Blue Purse," 154 MIL. L. REV. 53, 58 (1997) ("The UN became a victim of the Cold
War soon after its creation. The mutual mistrust between the United States and the So-
viet Union as military rivals only exacerbated the conflicting ideologies of the two na-
tions.").
45. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, reprinted in
JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 270 (W. Michael Reisman & Aaron
M. Schreiber eds., 1987). According to Austin:
The greater the eventual evil, and the greater the chance of incurring it, the
greater is the efficacy of the command, and the greater is the strength of the
obligation: Or (substituting expressions exactly equivalent), the greater is
the chance that the command will be obeyed, and that the duty will not be
broken.
Id. at 273-74. Meanwhile, Baldwin has noted that theorists like Max Weber, Talcott Par-
sons, and Peter M. Blau define power in terms of the threat to use or the actual employ-
ment of negative or coercive measures. David Baldwin, The Power of Positive Sanctions,
24 WORLD POL. 19, 20 (1971).
46. According to Kriesberg, "[t]hree basic types of inducements can be combined in
waging a struggle or ending it: coercion, positive sanctions, and persuasion. Coercion,
understandably, has received the most attention in the study of conflicts." LOUIS
KRIESBERG, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE U.S.-U.S.S.R. AND MIDDLE EAST
CASES 83 (1992).
47. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 21.
48. Fred H. Lawson, Using Positive Sanctions to End International Conflicts: Iran
and the Arab Gulf Countries, 20 J. PEACE RES. 311, 311 (1983).
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have mislabeled simple regression phenomena and incorrectly con-
cluded that negative sanctions are more effective than positive sanc-
tions."49 The predominance of punishments in the operation of domestic
political and legal spheres provides a final way to account for the dis-
parity in the amounts of attention directed at positive and negative
sanctions.5 0 However, as Baldwin has suggested:
Positive sanctions are more relevant to international than to domestic
politics, to the underworld than to the overworld [due to the greater
amount of political integration in domestic politics and the overworld].
Since the prospects for success are worse in the international and un-
derworld arenas, the invectives to use positive sanctions instead of
negative ones should be greater (assuming, of course, that other things
are equal). In a well-integrated domestic polity, however, negative
sanctions are more useful. It is only because of the high probability
that most people will obey the law that governments can afford to en-
force laws with threats. It is much cheaper to punish the few who dis-
obey than to reward the many who obey.
51
Although negative sanctions are a prominent part of the operation
of national political and legal structures, rewards play a key role in the
successful functioning of the market, which is increasingly seen by ju-
risdictions around the world as a desirable mechanism for allocating
scarce resources and achieving development.5 2 Meanwhile, arrange-
49. Nancy Kawisher, Cognitive Heuristics and American Security Policy, 33 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 652, 664 (1989).
50. As Arthur A. Leff has noted in his study of the legal system of the Usa, a thinly-
veiled reference to US society, "behind every US Judge stands ultimately the naked power
of the 101st Airborne Division of the US army." Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J.
989, 997 (1978).
51. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 29.
52. Negative inducements such as the fear of unemployment or poverty provide an
incomplete explanation of why most people decide to participate in the life of a market
economy, especially when government social welfare programs that exist in much of the
developed world guarantee individuals a minimum standard of living. Rather, their in-
volvement, which often implies extreme sacrifices in terms of time, effort, and incurring
other opportunity costs, is also likely to be motivated by the possibility of achieving pros-
perity, status, and other rewards. In fact, the attraction of these positive incentives is so
strong in many cases that negative measures and laws, which take the form of antitrust,
securities, and safety regulations, have had to be woven into the economic fabric of many
countries. Cf. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 628 F. Supp. 746, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1986) ("Allowing
Rothberg to recover would frustrate the purposes of the securities laws by rewarding well-
structured greed."); Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 353 (1988) ("The wave of major insider trading prosecutions has been
taken by many as a symptom of cancerous greed on Wall Street."); Eleanor M. Fox, The
End of Antitrust Isolationism: The Vision of One World 1992, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 221, 236
(1992) ("Many individuals in the Eastern European nations see antitrust law foremost as
a means to control the greed of and abuse by powerful firms and as a means to assure
that entrepreneurs are not foreclosed from markets."). But see David Mcgowan & Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First
Amendment 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 334 (1994) ("Under the normal conception of
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ments such as the command economy, strict quotas, and state-led mod-
els of development, which require the use of negative incentives by
those managing the system to function at all, have become thoroughly
discredited as a means for achieving sustained societal prosperity.
53
This Article does not take the view that using rewards as a strategy
to manage conflicts is always an appropriate option. In some contexts,
they may be out of place. Though, it does seem likely that positive
sanctions can be deployed as a force for shaping behavior in discrete
realms of human activity. In short, institutional actors that see positive
inducements as an option to pursue in some contexts may be more suc-
cessful when confronted with complex situations and emergencies than
those that instinctively scoff at the viability of this approach.
B. Distinguishing between Rewards and Other Strategies Designed to
Influence
For the UN to harness the full potential of positive inducements, it
must be able to differentiate them from activities that it would engage
in without the expectation of gaining leverage.5 4 Also, a capacity to rec-
ognize what sets positive sanctions apart from their negative counter-
parts must exist. Perceptions and subjective assesments are likely to
loom large as gestures are characterized and categorized. As Kriesberg
has observed, "[t]he criterion for distinguishing among coercive, persua-
sive, and rewarding actions may be based (1) on the intentions of the
sender (2) the interpretations of the receiver, (3) the judgment of the
observer, (4) the purported meaning which the sender wishes the action
to have for the receiver."55 The meanings ascribed to a given gesture
are likely to multiply in cases where the entity making use of it is the
UN. Numerous actors, including states, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and the media, play important roles in the functioning of
this structure. Each of these parties is in a position to scrutinize trans-
actions in which it is possible that inducements are being used. Also,
the intended recipient may be composed of numerous relatively
autonomous factions. These may attach different meanings to specific
UN policies. Moreover, the entity to be influenced could be relatively
new to the international stage and lack experience in engaging in the
processes by which actors at the international level relate to each other.
the goals of the antitrust laws, individual private greed is desirable; in fact it is precisely
the state of affairs the antitrust laws are designed to maintain.").
53. See, e.g., Overcoming the Asian Economic Crisis, BANGKOK POST, Feb., 20, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7888183 (reporting on the South Korean government's desire "to
realise economic development in harmony with the principles of democracy, a free market
economy and enhanced social justice.").
54. An example would be humanitarian gestures.
55. Louis Kriesberg, Noncoercive Inducements in U.S.-Soviet Conflicts: Ending the
Occupation of Austria and Nuclear Weapons Tests, 9 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 1, 2 (1981).
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Thus, in a given situation, it is possible that these disputants may not
appreciate that rewards are being used.
1. Perceptions Among Relevant Decision-makers
Officials responsible for managing the international community's
response to conflicts may interpret UN efforts to settle disputes differ-
ently. For example, in the case of Cambodia, humanitarian considera-
tions, an imperative that permeates much of the UN's work, would
seem to mandate that this country receive reconstruction funds.
56
However, some policymakers involved in the settlement process were
providing rehabilitation assistance to Cambodia for entirely different
reasons. Michael W. Doyle explains:
In July 1992, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon ex-
plained the strategy of the aid package in testimony before Congress:
'Let me say that the very resources that the international community
pledged in Tokyo provide a basis for strengthening, for hopefully, the
whole country if it opens up, but as Deputy Secretary [Lawrence] Ea-
gleburger said in Tokyo, those resources should go to those factions who
cooperate in the settlement plan, just as one form of influence.
57
2. Perceptions of the Recipient:
Interperative faultlines may divide recipients. Some may perceive
the action taken by the UN as an entitlement, thus warranting no ef-
56. Given the UN's heavy involvement in humanitarian work in the past, many
within it may be apt, due to a sort of organizational momentum, to see what really is a
reward as an extension of the UN humanitarian agenda, which means that no strings
would be attached to what is distributed. With the passage of time, however, this percep-
tion may change as the UN begins to make more use of military force to suppress conflict.
For the time being, however, the meaning of a given UN gesture is likely to be deter-
mined, in part, by the extent to which it has been traditionally undertaken for humani-
tarian reasons. Thus, deliveries of food, which if placed on a continuum of activities run-
ning from strictly humanitarian functions to more elective ones like democratization
funds, would exist at the humanitarian end. A.B. Fetherston, for example, has asserted
that "the most serious failures reported in Bosnia were accusations that the peacekeeping
force used humanitarian aid as a bargaining chip." A.B. FETHERSTON, TOWARDS A
THEORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 136 (1994). Historically, the provision of ba-
sic items like food has been used quite openly as an inducement strategy. For example,
John H. Herz notes that during the Allied occupation of Germany following World War II,
all individuals over 18 years of age were required to fill out forms detailing their activities
during the Nazi period. According to him, "[t]here were about 13 million people involved
and few could avoid submitting questionnaires because the receipt of food-ration coupons
was made dependent on handing them in." John H. Herz, Denazificiation and Related
Policies, reprinted in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES 21-22 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
57. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CAMBODIA: UNTAC'S CIVIL MANDATE
65 (1995).
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forts to respond by cooperating with it or other disputants. For exam-
ple, some Somalis felt that "the international community responded
to... [the] apocalypse slowly, and when it did, it did so only in a frag-
mented manner... [This reading of the situation] alienated Somalis
and turned them against the UN even before its arrival. They felt the
international community had abandoned them."5 8 Meanwhile, similar
gestures, perhaps due to the cultural background of the recipient, will
propel it to feel obligated to take actions that materially advance the
cause of peace.
3. Perceptions among Observers
Entities observing the UN's work may view UN actions through dif-
ferent lenses. These views are likely to dovetail with their larger politi-
cal agendas or organizational raisons d'6tre. Thus, during the UN con-
flict-resolution process in Cambodia, a human rights NGO that had
earlier decried the efforts of various states to destabilize that country
might regard UN gestures toward Cambodia as a form of corrective 59 or
distributive 6o justice. Meanwhile, realist foreign policy analysts could
stress the enhanced bargaining power over the disputants that a given
strategy confers upon UN decisionmakers.
There has been little systematic examination of the conditions un-
der which the UN and spectators to UN gestures are most likely to view
conflict-resolution strategies as rewards. However, Baldwin has noted
that a recipient's response to an influence attempt will flow from its
"baseline of expectations."6 1 A reward conveyed to a party in times of
peace might elicit a totally different response if made in the midst of
war. Similarly, a pledge to suspend hostilities, if certain conditions are
first satisfied, may function as a powerful positive inducement were it
to be made while the promisee is being subjected to withering military
attacks. Moreover, it is important to recognize that a party's baseline
expectations may shift over time. Baldwin remarks:
A's offer to stop tipping the boat if B will row is unlikely to be perceived
by B as a carrot unless A actually is tipping the boat at the time the of-
fer is made. A tips the boat in order to shift B's expectation baseline,
so that B will perceive the offer to stop tipping the boat as a reward. 62
For Baldwin, "conditional influence attempts," or promises to re-
58. JARAT CHOPRA ET AL., FIGHTING FOR HOPE IN SOMALIA 30 (1995).
59. JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 355 (1992) (arguing that "an actor has a
duty in corrective justice to repair a loss only if that loss is his responsibility").
60. For a discussion of distributive justice, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
253-332 (1971).
61. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 24.
62. Id. at 25.
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ward, can be included in the range of positive sanctions that may be
utilized to modify the behavior of another party. However, the "possi-
bility that withholding a reward may be regarded by B as a punishment
tempts one to regard threats and promises as two sides of one coin."
63
Baldwin argues:
The fallacy of this line of reasoning lies in the assumption that with-
holding a reward is always a punishment... If rewards and punish-
ments (and, correspondingly, promises and threats) are defined in
terms of B's expectations at the moment A begins his influence at-
tempt, it is clear that a conditional commitment not to reward if B fails
to comply is not necessarily a threat. 'If you do not do X, I shall not
reward you' is a threat to punish if-and only if-B had a prior expec-
tation of receiving the reward.
64
By assuring B that its noncompliance will go unpunished while its
compliance will be rewarded, threats can be conceptually isolated from
promises.
Theorizing about positive sanctions may provide the beginnings of
an explanation of how these gestures can be distinguished from other
UN policies. Examination of previous UN attempts to end conflicts rep-
resents another path to pursue. Reconstruction aid,65 quick impact
projects, 66 human rights technical assistance,6 7 side-payments, 68 elec-
tion monitoring support,6 9 trust funds designed to spur democratiza-
tion, 70 demobilization services, 71 demining efforts,72 the carrying out of
civil functions like policing and issuing passports 73 as well as help with
repatriation 74 have figured into UN work to address internal and inter-
national disputes. It is possible that all, or none, were conceived as a
way to influence the actions of parties.
These efforts have encountered varying degrees of success. For ex-
ample, UNITAF decisionmakers established a weapons incentive pro-
gram. F.M. Lorenz has noted:
Planners considered several incentive concepts, variations of 'food for
guns' or 'cash for guns' and evaluated the US experience with disarm-
ing the civil populace in Panama. However, Somali social and political
63. Id.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Mozambique and Cambodia
66. Cambodia
67. Cambodia and El Salvador
68. Haiti
69. Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Cambodia
70. Mozambique
71. Cambodia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua
72. Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Cambodia
73. Cambodia
74. Namibia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Canbodia
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
dynamics were considerably different from those encountered in Pan-
ama.... The large quantity of weapons in the region created another
challenge. There would be little incentive for the bandits to turn in
their best weapons, and the program potentially would have disarmed
the hungry people who needed protection from the bandits. A cash-for-
weapons program also would have run the risk of creating more crime
by encouraging bandits to steal weapons to turn in, or providing incen-
tives for arms dealers to import more weapons from other parts of East
Africa. An informal, small-scale weapons incentive program was used
during the third week in January when UNITAF Marine forces began
giving a receipt for the turn-in of weapons or for information on where
to find weapons. These receipts were then exchanged for bags of wheat
provided by the humanitarian relief organizations. This informal pro-
gram was never expanded beyond a single sector of Mogadishu, how-
ever, and it had [a] limited effect on the number of weapons in circula-
tion. In late January, a decision was made by the UNITAF
Commander not to implement a nationwide weapons incentive pro-
gram.
75
This tack, formulated and implemented by a subcontracting
authority, was ad-hoc. Its framers hoped to push forward one aspect of
the process that was designed to pacify Somalia, namely disarma-
ment. 76 The designers of the weapons incentive scheme attempted to
influence a relatively large cohort of players.
7
Several months before the inauguration of the UNITAF disarma-
ment program, the sides in the war in Mozambique were concluding the
Rome Accords, an agreement that was designed to serve as the basis for
this country's transition from war to peace.7 8 One of the components of
this instrument certified that the Mozambican National Resistance
(RENAMO):
as a partner in the peace process, was entitled to financial assistance
for the process of transforming itself from a military organization into
75. F. M. Lorenz, Law and Anarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993, at 27, 31.
76. See, e.g., Robert G. Patman, Disarming Somalia: the Contrasting Fortunes of
United States and Australian Peacekeepers During United Nations Intervention, 1992-
1993, 96 AFR. AFF. 509 (1997), ("The initial American focus on voluntary disarmament in
Mogadishu brought several small-scale weapons incentive programs to the fore. Varia-
tions of the 'food for guns' and 'cash for guns' concepts were considered.").
77. Patman, for example, implies that this was the case when he notes that "[g]iven
the large quantity of weapons, any 'weapons for cash' plan in Mogadishu faced enormous
difficulties. For one thing, it would have been prohibitively expensive." Patman, supra
note 76, at 509.
78. See General Peace Agreement for Mozambique. Letter Dated 6 October 1992
from Mozambique to the Secretary-General, Transmitting a Letter from President Joa-
quin Chissano of Mozambique Requesting the Participation of the United Nations in
Monitoring the General Peace Agreement, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE:
1992-1995 at 111 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995) [hereinafter' General Peace
Agreement].
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a political party.... The Peace Agreement stipulated that the Mozam-
bique Government would provide the financing and, if lacking the nec-
essary means, could appeal to the international community, in par-
ticular to Italy. The United Nations Trust Fund for the
Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Mozambique, established in
1993, was the main instrument for this critical task. Its creation was
one of the most innovative feature of the Mozambique operation and
was a pivotal factor in maintaining the momentum of the peace process
at this stage.
79
Unlike the Somali weapons incentive strategy, the trust fund
emerged from a comprehensive political settlement. The UN played a
direct role in its creation although a separate authority implemented
this initiative. Moreover, the targets of this program were a small
group of actors, the leadership of RENAMO. Decisionmakers tied this
reward, if it indeed can be called that, to progress by this group on the
realization of all of the objectives codified in the Mozambique settle-
ment, not just a particular subset of the process to normalize conditions
in this country.8 0
Although stark, the differences between the Somali and Mozam-
bique programs do not, by themselves, prove anything definitive about
the inherent superiority of the latter strategy over the former. Addi-
tionally, the UN's activities in Mozambique, which were carried out un-
der the auspices of the UN Operation in Mozambique nearly ended in
disaster.8 1 Thus, it would be foolish to argue that the employment of
positive inducements always represents a viable overall strategy for the
UN to pursue in its attempts to end conflicts. Rather, in many cases,
decisionmakers may opt for a more multifaceted approach; one that
synthesizes positive and negative approaches could be used. A host of
considerations should provide answers to questions such as who ought
to be rewarded, when positive sanctions can be used and what form the
inducements should assume. Part III attempts to identify and discuss
the range of concerns that might arise as reward-based strategies are
pursued.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN REWARDS: CONSIDERATIONS THAT
79. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE:
1992-1995 at 1, 58-59 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995).
80. See Letter Dated 14 January 1994 from the Secretary-General to Carlo Azeglio
Ciampi, President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, Requesting a Contribution to the
United Nations Trust Fund for Assistance to RENAMO, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
MOZAMBIQUE: 1992-1995, at 216 (Dep't of Public Information ed., 1995) (declaring that the
"monthly allowance [received by RENAMO] would be tied to scrupulous implementation
of the [the Mozambican] peace agreement .. ") [hereinafter Letter Dated].
81. See Bill Keller, Mozambique Vote Thrown Into Doubt, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28, 1994,
at B7 (reporting that "main opposition leader cast the entire exercise into doubt with a
last-minute announcement that he will reject the outcome").
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A. Institutional Sophistication and Coordination Needed to Utilize
Positive Inducements:
To tap into the power of rewards, the UN may need to reinvent it-
self institutionally. It has been argued that organizations with rela-
tively simple institutional arrangements can make effective use of posi-
tive sanctions. Baldwin, for example, has asserted that "when A's
influence attempt is based on a promise, B's compliance obligates A to
respond with a reward, whereas B's failure to comply call for no further
response from A."s2 Similarly, Lawson attempts to account for the use
of positive sanctions by the Gulf Cooperation Council to end the Iran-
Iraq War in 1982. He has observed:
Positive sanctions are especially well-suited to those countries that
have poorly developed foreign policy-making institutions or that have
difficulty carrying out sustained foreign policy programs.... There is
thus little that can be carried out in the way of long-range contingency
planning and international developments can for the most part be
monitored only sporadically. States such as these have a strong incen-
tive to find ways to carry out their interests that do not require the
adoption of complex or high-risk policies. Offering rewards for acqui-
escing in one's demands provides a way of using a minimal degree of
state organizational resources most efficiently in dealing with other
countries. 83
Lawson also contends that international organizations, in particu-
lar, are apt to make ample use of rewards to influence the actions of
disputants. He argues:
To the extent that an actor is predisposed to deal with co-operation
rather than with conflict as a general rule, using rewards to achieve
policy objectives will be an obvious diplomatic maneuver. Thus institu-
tional arrangements designed to facilitate co-operation among coun-
tries should also be more likely to develop plans that involve positive
sanctions. In other words, international organizations should make
more use of reward-based foreign policy programs than individual
countries do.8 4
Surprisingly, with the UN's emergence as a more active participant
in the settlement of conflicts following the end of the Cold War, coercive
measures emerged as one of the first strategies this organization em-
82. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 28.
83. Lawson, supra note 48, at 315.
84. Id. at 317.
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braced to deal with recalcitrant disputants.8 5 It has also become appar-
ent that for the UN to construct a package of rewards to gain leverage
over the parties to a conflict, interaction among several facets of the UN
may be required. In some contexts, it may be important to ensure the
harmonization of the activities of a varied cast of characters. These in-
clude Secretariat departments, 86 specialized agencies and UN pro-
grammes,8 7 and international financial institutions (IFIs).88 Touval has
highlighted the importance of UN collaboration transcending burea-
cratic boundaries:
Part of the U.N. problem is that it has no readily accessible military
[for the utilization of coercive measures] or economic resources [for
positive inducements] of its own. It is entirely dependent on member
states or at least some of them, to provide the resources necessary for a
successful mediation. The United Nations cannot even harness the as-
sets of financial and trading institutions. Doing so depends yet again
on the decisions of member states. A U.N. mediator cannot commit the
International Monetary Fund or World Bank to provide credit to reluc-
tant disputants. While U.N. member states might theoretically be able
to pool their resources and enhance the organization's bargaining
power, that type of cooperation seldom comes about. Governments are
usually reluctant to commit resources to such a venture, negotiations
for such commitments are slow and cumbersome, and the resources
states do make available are often inadequate. 89
Coordination difficulties plague the work of the UN. Alvaro de Soto
and Graciana del Castillo have described the communication break-
down that occurred between the UN and IFIs as each devised a recon-
struction and rehabilitation strategy for El Salvador, which was
emerging from years of civil war:
El Salvador's case illustrated the lack of transparency and coordination
within the U.N. system as the [International Monetary Fund] IMF and
the [World] Bank did not keep the U.N. abreast of the economic pro-
gram they sponsor, and the U.N. neglected to inform the Bretton
Woods institutions of the peace accords. It was as if a patient lay on
85. During one of the first major UN peace operations, the Namibian venture, deci-
sionmakers confronted this problem. See, e.g., Adrien Wing et al., Southern Africa: Pros-
pects for Peace?, 83 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 350, 351 (1989) ("UNTAG arrived at an un-
precedented decision. Before even dispatching its own investigative team or acquiring any
independent verification of the facts, UNTAG's head, Mr. Ahtisaari, authorized the re-
lease of certain units of the South African military from their restriction to base in order
to engage the SWAPO combatants").
86. Examples would include the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO)
and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).
87. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Program
(WFP) function as illustrations.
88. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are both examples.
89. Touval, supra note 7, at 52.
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the operating table with the left and right sides of his body separated
by a curtain and unrelated surgery being performed on each side.90
However, UNTAC's experience suggests that limited UN/IFI coop-
eration is possible. 9 1 Similarly, at the regional level, there is a prece-
dent for collaboration between the Organization of American States
(OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank.92
Lack of coordination sometimes even characterizes the interaction
of various agencies within the Secretariat. Erskine Childers noted that
"[t]here is no intergovernmental assembly or council of the UN system
as a whole. Its main linkage, therefore, is through its senior civil ser-
vants in the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination [ACC], chaired
by the Secretary-General. This is a very weak link."93 Several years
ago, the ACC was meeting only twice a year and key members of it were
not required to attend. Rather, "all agency heads, having been elected
in a different governing body, have the legal right to claim that their
agencies' policies are 'sovereign."' 94 This fragmentation could deprive
the UN of the ability to take advantage of the promise of positive sanc-
tions. Kriesberg, has emphasized the importance of undertaking efforts
to lay the political groundwork for an influence attempt. According to
him, "[iln initiating de-escalation, positive sanctions are more likely to
be effective if preceded by communications about the desirability of con-
ciliatory gestures and de-escalating negotiations than if there are no
such communications."95 Thus, for positive inducement to be effective,
90. Alvaro de Soto & Graciana del Castillo, Obstacles to Peacebuilding, FOREIGN
POL'Y, Spring 1994, at 74.
91. For example, James A. Schear has noted that "UNTAC benefited greatly from
having World Bank personnel involved in the management of its financial oversight and
rehabilitative programmes. Still, it proved difficult to obtain swift action by the IFIs."
Schear, supra note 39, at 263.
92. L. Ronald Scheman and John W. Ford cite the way a dispute between Brazil,
Paraguay, and Argentina over the use of the Parana and de la Plata rivers during the late
1960s was handled by these two institutions. According to them, "they helped lay the
groundwork for large hydroelectric installations, but the bank would not finance them
unless the countries resolved the disputes capable of disrupting the venture." Ronald
Scheman & John W. Ford, The Organization of American States as Mediator, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 197, 199 (Saadia Touval & I. Wil-
liam Zartman eds., 1985).
93. ERSKINE CHILDERS, RENEWING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM 31 (1994).
94. Id. Boutros-Ghali's successor, Kofi A. Annan, established a Policy Coordination
Group during the first year of his tenure as UN Secretary-General. This body consists of
"department heads and senior officials [and was] created to improve communication, co-
operation and coordination among the Secretariat, the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA)." Kofi A. Annan, Strengthening United Nations Action .in the
Field of Human Rights: Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS J. 1, 6 (1997). It is
unclear whether this body has enhanced the UN's ability to react to a given situation in
an orchestrated manner.
95. Louis Kriesberg, Carrots, Sticks, De-escalation: U.S.-Soviet and Arab-Israeli Rela-
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minimal synchronization between the UN's political or public affairs
components and the agency or agencies actually delivering the reward
may be needed.
Coordination concerns may arise as peace operations attempt to
use positive inducements. To reward a given party, several UN agencies
might need to act in concert while maintaining close contacts with the
political arm of the operation. At best, peace ventures have a mixed re-
cord of integrating their activities. US Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright has criticized the failure of UN humanitarian relief organiza-
tions to mount coordinated efforts. Anecdotal evidence from different
operations supports her gloomy assessment.96 Although the Depart-
ment of Humanitarian Affairs was established to function as a mecha-
nism to coordinate aid efforts, its writ does not run long enough to actu-
ally bring this about, Albright has charged.
97
Effective collaboration between humanitarian, political, and mili-
tary activities has eluded some peace operations. Although the political
and military components of UNITAF were able to operationalize excel-
lent cooperation, this came to an abrupt halt when the hand-off to
UNOSOM II was complete.98 According to one commentary on the UN's
involvement in Somalia, the "Political Division was completely in the
dark. Between 7 May and 9 October 1993 there were no relations be-
tween the political and military side of UNOSOM."99 Similarly, during
the Cambodian UN venture:
tions, 13 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 403, 420 (1987).
96. Albright Accuses UN Aid Agencies of Turf Wars, Reuters News Serv., Nov. 2,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. At the same time, examples of lim-
ited coordination exist. As Fetherston has asserted, "in Cyprus and Cambodia, [the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] UNHCR worked closely with the
peacekeeping force. In Namibia, one of the designated tasks of the peacekeepers who re-
mained until independence was to write detailed situation reports for the incoming
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)." FETHERSTON, supra note 56, at 135.
97. In Mozambique:
All U.N., government, and non-governmental relief efforts operate under the
umbrella of the U.N. Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
(UNOHAC), providing the coordination and balance that earlier missions
have lacked .... In Mozambique, even programs that seem military have
been handled as humanitarian issues. If UNOHAC succeeds, it could lead to
increasing emphasis on humanitarian work, ending the recent dominance of
the military component of U.N. missions.
Jim Wurst, Mozambique Disarms. BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 36.
98. Susan R. Lamb has noted:
complex problems of coordination has arisen within [the United Nations Pro-
tection Force] UNPROFOR due to its mix of military and civilian functions.
The military-civilian interface in Bosnia, whereby the UNHCR has acted as
the 'lead agency,' has highlighted the need for strengthened coordination and
planning between the military and humanitarian components of the mission.
Lamb, supra note 27, at 78.
99. CHOPRA, supra note 58, at 91.
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Most decision making was organized on a component-by-component ba-
sis, without sufficient procedures for sharing of information and coor-
dination of response. Aside from thrice-weekly staff meetings and the
later 'action cell' (composed of [Deputy Special Representative Behrooz)
Sadry and the heads of components) to make recommendations on
measures against the SOC [State of Cambodia], UNTAC lacked a
transparent intercomponent coordination process, and component
heads acted very independently.100
Enhancing overall UN coordination is an item that should top any
reform agenda for this organization. In fact, until decisionmakers re-
alize this goal, the UN's ability to design and deliver rewards will be de-
termined, in part, by the number of agencies whose participation in the
strategy is required. Its capacity to utilize positive inducement strate-
gies will also depend on how closely the different aspects of the UN will
have to work together. Thus, for the present, it would appear that ges-
tures relying on measures that are relatively simple to execute are more
viable than positive sanctions requiring the cooperation of a large num-
ber of actors in the Secretariat, among IFIs, and agencies working at
the field level.
B. The Politics of UN Rewards
1. Debate over Inducements at the Domestic Level
In some situations, popular opinion may make the use of rewards
difficult. Thus, the UN would do well to be sensitive to how pressure
groups in various national jurisdictions are likely to regard using posi-
tive sanctions. As Kriesberg has noted:
Government leaders generally avoid making a bold conciliatory move
toward an adversary. It is likely they believe they are susceptible to
charges of having yielded to the enemy, of appeasement, and of cow-
ardliness. This could have greater effect in societies where the public
plays a significant role in the selection of heads of government. If so,
leaders of nondemocratic countries may be in a better position than
leaders of democratic ones to proffer major conciliatory gestures ....
This helps explain the use of major conciliatory gestures by [Egyptian
leader Anwar] Sadat in 1977 and [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev
in the mid-1950's.10 1
Compared to an institution like the US Congress or the European
Parliament, the UN is relatively insulated from popular pressures.
Many of its members, including two permanent members of the Secu-
100. RATNER, supra note 8, at 196.
101. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 412.
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rity Council, are either not democracies or occupy some twilight zone
between authoritarianism and the maintenance of popularly-elected
governing institutions. Since public opinion in these countries counts
for relatively little, it would appear that the UN must be mainly con-
cerned that its approaches to settling conflicts enjoy the support of im-
portant constituencies in the democratic members of the Security Coun-
cil.
Among many advanced democratic nations, it is relatively impor-
tant that UN policies are supported at the grassroots as well as the
government level.102 Popular perceptions of the UN's work matter more
in these countries, from which the lion's share of this organization's
funding originates. These states also supply the UN with much of its
capacity to carry out complicated peace operations and robust enforce-
ment efforts. If popular opinion in these countries takes issue with UN
strategies, politicians may attempt to score points with their constitu-
ents by providing as little cooperation with the UN as possible. 103 Nev-
ertheless, the electorates of many democracies have generally been
willing to defer to the expert judgments of those who inhabit their gov-
ernment's foreign policy-making arm. The US polity keeps its represen-
tatives on a relatively short foreign policy leash. However, few elections
hinge on a particular international affairs issue or function solely as a
referendum on an administration's handling of international rela-
tions. 1 04
Given the deference normally accorded foreign policy determina-
tions, the UN might use a wide array of positive inducements without
incurring serious political risks. However, meaningful predictions about
the popularity of many UN policies may be hard to generate. It is even
possible that a given undertaking will fail to register on the radar
screens of influential domestic groups. The American electorate, 105 for
example, continues to be relatively receptive to the idea of a major UN
102. See Kofi Annan, Peace-Keeping in Situations of Civil War, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 623, 625 (1994) ("Without sustained political and popular support, it is not possible
to give a mission the sense of strength and continuity that it needs to attain its goals.").
103. This is the stance that many members of the US Congress have adopted toward
the United Nations. For more on this subject, see Carolyn J. Logan, U.S. Public Opinion
and the Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Future of Military-Humanitarian Inter-
ventions 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 155 (1996).
104. Even Ted Koppel, an American journalist, may have overestimated the role that
international relations plays in the US political equation when he noted that "[s]ome
shrewd political observer once noted that snow removal is to local politics what foreign
policy is to the president. It won't get you elected, but it can get you fired." Nightline
(ABC television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1996).
105. Because the US is the world's sole economic and military superpower, it is crucial
that UN undertakings enjoy American support. The discussion in this Article on how
positive sanctions might be received by important political constituencies is limited to the
US.
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role in conflict-resolution.1o 6 However, vocal portions of the same elec-
torate are convinced that the UN lies at the heart of a giant conspiracy
to strip the US of its sovereignty. 107 In light of the military debacle in
Somalia, some Americans have rejected the idea of US military person-
nel serving under foreign commanders in UN peace operations. 0 8 How-
ever, for strategies relying exclusively on positive sanctions, states
would not need to contribute military assets to make them operational.
Some US observers characterizes the UN as an inefficient, bloated
bureaucracy that is unable to mobilize or utilize resources efficiently.
Making use of positive inducements will, of course, require funds. The
rewards themselves will come at a price. Moreover, the task of distrib-
uting them, especially if they must be dispersed among a relatively
large number of actors, might carry a hefty price tag. Ensuring that the
recipients of UN rewards use these appropriately will also consume re-
sources. In keeping with public skepticism regarding UN efficiency, the
cost of implementing positive sanctions might cause some to question
their use. 10 9
The popularity of UN inducement strategies may be linked to per-
ceptions of the actor to be influenced. For example, some commentators
questioned the US decision to allow military leaders of Haiti during the
early 1990s to escape punishment and gracefully exit the country.
Washington employed this strategy after President Bill Clinton, in an
attempt to build up popular support for an American invasion of that
country, "evoked human rights in Haiti, speaking of a 'campaign of
rape, torture, and mutilation,' under Mr. Cedras." 11° Similarly, a
106. In an article on the results of a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) poll
on American attitudes toward foreign affairs, Kermit Lanser has noted:
Only 19% of the American people feel that the U.S. should refuse to join a
United Nations peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world; they are
evenly split (44% to 45%) on whether U.S. troops should serve under a U.N.-
appointed commander; and 65% think it would be best for the country if 'we
take an active part in world affairs.'
Kermit Lanser, Taking an Attitude on Foreign Affairs, FIN. WORLD, Apr. 25, 1995, at 80.
John E. Rielly, meanwhile, reported that 51% of Americans favor a strengthened United
Nations according to the CFR poll. John E. Rielly, The Public Mood at Mid-Decade,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1995, at 76, 82.
107. See, e.g., Tom Bethell, Patterns of Conspiracy: Intricate Yarns of Secret Meetings
and Insidious Plots Unravel when the Right Thread is Pulled, NAT'L REV., Aug. 28, 1995,
at 33.
108. See, e.g., Zaire Proceed with Caution, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville), NOV. 15,
1996, at A14 ("Also the [planned Zaire] mission will be headed by a Canadian general,
and that could cause some dissension-particularly if some U.S. soldiers are killed-be-
cause many Americans are queasy about having their troops under foreign command.").
109. See, e.g., Rob Lever, As UN Role Expands, US Grows More Reluctant to Pay Bills,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7819605 ("The United
States withdrew a decade ago from the UN educational and cultural organization
UNESCO because of concerns over waste and anti-Americanism.").
110. The Nightmare Next Door: America Hopes to Give Haiti a New Stable, Demo-
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promise of rewards to the United Somali Congress (USC), even if it had
taken confidence-building measures in the wake of the October 1993
raid that spawned numerous American casualties, would probably have
provoked howls of protest in the US. After all, it was USC followers
who dragged bodies of American servicemen through the streets of
Mogadishu."'
Because disputants like Cedras and the USC became part of the US
mainstream political debate, limits were imposed on how the UN could
deal with them. Once this occurred, Washington's blessing would be
needed before the UN could have embarked on any new initiative to
bring about a resolution in either conflict. These constraints simply do
not exist when the US is not deeply involved in a dispute. Neither are
they tangible when the UN has not become embroiled in a bitter, per-
sonalized conflict with one of the disputants. Of course, both of these
conditions, which tend to attract intense media scrutiny, existed in So-
malia during 1993.
In some situations, it seems likely that the public will be indifferent
about the substance of UN technqiues to end disputes. For example, key
US decisionmakers had adopted a posture of benign neglect with regard
to the conflict in Mozambique. Also, the UN chose not to become in-
volved in a heated dispute with RENAMO. These dynamics may explain
the lack of public controversy surrounding the decision to provide posi-
tive inducements to RENAMO even though it bears responsibility for
particularly flagrant violations of international humanitarian law.112
Given the relative novelty of peace operations, the UN's impulse to
assess various ways of carrying out conflict-resolution ventures is un-
derstandable. One observer has even characterized Somalia as a "labo-
ratory for new theories of U.N. peace-keeping."" 3 Such experimenta-
cratic Government. Two Centuries of History Are Ranged Against It, ECONOMIST, Sept.
24, 1994, at 19. This periodical characterized the deal as "perplexing to many by virtue of
the generous treatment it promised to Mr. Cedras." Id.
111. See HIRSCH & OAKLEY, supra note 18, at 127 (noting that "the degrading treat-
ment of a U.S. soldier's body, dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, shown repeat-
edly on American televisions, fueled public outrage and revulsion").
112. What these funds are used to buy may also prove controversial to taxpayers,
many of them Italian, due to the extent to which Rome contributed funds that went to as-
sist RENAMO. Christina Lamb has noted that "fa]ny self-respecting guerrilla leader
turned politician needs a wardrobe of Italian suits, a state-of-the-art bullet-proof Mer-
cedes, a multi-million dollar allowance and a whitewashed villa overlooking a palm-
fringed bay." Christina Lamb, UN Pays Pounds 390m for Mozambique poll, SUNDAY
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File.
113. Chester A. Crocker, The Lessons of Somalia, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995, at 2,
4. Ultimately, the heavy American involvement in this country cut both ways. On one
hand, the US forces brought with them some of the finest weaponry, logistical support,
and training in the world. From a purely military standpoint, UNITAF and the American
forces pledged to support UNOSOM II had the capacity to pursue a more dynamic ap-
proach to the conflict than any other peace operation force ever constituted with the pos-
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tion, however, may be dangerous if the UN has become involved in a
war of words with one of the disputants or if one of the great powers,
particularly the US, has become actively engaged in the management of
the conflict.
2. UN Pressure Groups
NGOs may oppose efforts to reward disputants. Since the early
1990s, these groups have begun to play a more influential role in UN
affairs."1 4 NGO support has helped push through a number of UN re-
forms. However, many of these same organizations, especially human
rights NGOs, have condemned the UN for its response to various con-
flict situations.115 These groups fault the UN for not being tough
enough with uncooperative parties or those responsible for egregious
human rights violations. For example, an Asia Watch report assessing
the progress of UNTAC concluded:
Standing up to the Khmer Rouge and the Phonn Penh government
early on, in particular, might have prevented the escalation of violence
that came later. A clear determination to act firmly, decisively, pub-
licly and quickly against abusive officials and party cadres might have
sible exception of the NATO Implementation (IFOR) and Stabilization (SFOR) Forces cur-
rently in the Balkans. On the other, the very presence of American troops in that country
precipitated heavy press coverage of the conflict and meant it would receive intense con-
gressional scrutiny. This meant that certain options that might have been utilized were
foreclosed at the outset due to domestic political constraints.
114. Their representatives routinely attend and even address intergovernmental con-
ferences. NGO forums held parallel to UN gatherings have become events in themselves
and the sources of important proposals for restructuring and reinventing the UN. See Pe-
ter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International
Decision-Making Institutions, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 45.
115. The impetus for some of this criticism has been the actions of UN personnel, espe-
cially troops attached to peace operations, who are alleged to have committed human
rights or other criminal offenses. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PEACE-KEEPING AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOST AGENDA AND U.N. FIELD
OPERATIONS (1993). At the same time, NGOs have condemned the posture that the UN
has adopted toward various disputants. See AMERICA'S WATCH, PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: SUCCESSES AND FAILINGS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL
SALVADOR (1992); ASIA WATCH, AN EXCHANGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE-KEEPING IN
CAMBODIA (1993); ASIA WATCH, CAMBODIA: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ELECTIONS (1993); see also Brian D. Tittemor, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying In-
ternational Humanitarian Law to United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L.
61 (1997). Meanwhile, in Mozambique, human rights NGOs criticized the UN for hiring
mine manufacturers whose products litter this country to carry out demining activities.
Overmined: Mozambique, ECONOMIST, June 11, 1994, at 40. For articles stressing the
need for vigorous human rights monitoring efforts to be built into the efforts that the UN
undertakes to end conflicts, especially those where massive denials of human rights were
previously the norm, see IAN JOHNSTONE, RIGHTS AND RECONCILIATION: UN STRATEGIES
IN EL SALVADOR 21 (1995); Ian Martin, Haiti: Mangled Multilateralism, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Summer 1994, at 72, 87.
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acted as a deterrent to further killings, disappearances, arbitrary ar-
rests, abusive detention practices, intimidation and harassment.
116
Additionally, many NGOs have lobbied for the establishment of in-
ternational criminal tribunals to prosecute individuals violating inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights norms. 117 They also have
been consistent backers of the establishment of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court.11
8
Humanitarian NGOs may be particularly sensitive about the way
in which the UN interacts with the parties to a conflict. In Somalia,
UNOSOM II decisionmakers rejected a weapons incentive program be-
cause of the opposition by NGOs that it was likely to engender. Clem-
ent Adibe has noted:
mhe Director of Humanitarian Relief in Somalia had notified the
Force Command that the concept of providing factional militia with
cash and other incentives was not 'supportable.' The apparent reason
for the disapproval was that many donor agencies believed that the
original UNITAF idea was morally repugnant because it amounted to
rewarding the militias and the warlords for their brutality toward So-
malis.'19
Thus, UN reward strategies may encounter stiff opposition from
the NGO community.
C. Monitoring the Activities of the Disputant(s) to be Influenced
Positive sanctions may allow the UN to cut down on its monitoring
responsibilities. Baldwin has observed:
Influence attempts based solely on negative sanctions provide B with
no incentive to comply with A's demands if B can find a way to avoid
detection. This fact, together with the relative difficulty of legitimizing
influence attempts based on negative sanctions, means that A must
spend more on specialized machinery for monitoring B's activities when
he uses negative instead of positive sanctions.
120
116. ASIA WATCH, CAMBODIA: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS 37
(1993).
117. The parties to be prosecuted included the Khmer Rouge, the Bosnian Serbs, the
Haitian junta that came to power following its 1991 coup, and the Rwandans responsible
for the 1994 civil strife in that country.
118. See Amnesty International, The Quest for Justice: Time for a Permanent Interna-
tional Criminal Court, FOCUS, Sept. 1995, at 1.
119. Clement Adibe, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Managing
Arms in Peace Processes, at 87-88, U.N. Doc. UNIDIR/95/30, U.N. Sales No. GV.E.95.0.20
(1995).
120. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 35.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Monitoring, as an activity, forms part of the core functions that the
UN often carries out when attempting to reconstruct shattered socie-
ties. For example, military personnel taking part in a peacekeeping op-
eration could report cease fire violations. Meanwhile, multidimensional
peacebuilding ventures may address such issues as repatriation, demo-
bilization, and the organization of elections. In this context, the UN
will need to evaluate the extent to which steps are being taken by each
of the parties to make progress on multiple fronts.121 Even in those rare
situations where all of the disputants realize that it is in their long-
term interests to comply, monitoring is imperative. Each party will
need reassurances that the others are actually upholding their ends of
the bargain. Where efforts to evade the UN's scrutiny are rife, even
more individuals will be required. Past operations have suffered from a
shortage of personnel to evaluate compliance. As Paul F. Diehl has con-
tended:
The enormous area that [the United Nations Transitional Assistance
Group] UNTAG had to cover proved problematical. UNTAG was often
unable to verify that South African forces had been confined to their
bases, relinquished their weapons or released political prisoners. In
some cases, the South African forces moved troops, weapons and pris-
oners from location to location several steps ahead of the peacekeeping
forces which could not monitor the whole country. The UN Transi-
tional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had similar difficulties in
monitoring the military activities of the Khmer Rouge. 122
Unfortunately, tight budgets continue to constrain the ability of the
UN to engage personnel in monitoring capacities. 123 Positive sanctions,
it can be argued, actually lessen the need for monitoring efforts to be
undertaken. After all, rewards may induce parties to cooperate more
readily with UN efforts. Thus, their employment would seem to emerge
as a particularly effective way for the UN to carry out its peace opera-
tions while making efficient use of scarce resources. However, these
savings might be offset by the cost of ensuring that the rewards distrib-
uted to the parties are used appropriately by them. It would also ap-
pear that these efforts may be relatively costly in situations where the
121. See, e.g., Stephen Baranyi & Sean Loughna, Guatemala at the Crossroads, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV. Oct. 1, 1995, at 472, available in 1995 WL 14357421 ("Finally, the
parties requested the establishment of an on-site UN Verification Mission to ensure im-
mediate compliance with these [human rights] commitments.").
122. Paul F. Diehl, Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, in A CRISIS OF EXPECTATIONS: UN
PEACEKEEPING IN THE 1990S 223, 229 (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Thayer eds., 1995).
123. See IraqKuwait-UN to Reduce Border Monitoring Force, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF.
NEWS CAPSULES, Aug. 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7601585 ("The United Nations will
cut its military observer force on the Iraq-Kuwait border by 20 percent by April 1997 due
to financial problems, the commander of the force said in remarks published on Tues-
day.").
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inducement being distributed takes the form of monetary payments. 124
D. Propriety of the Influence Attempt
An important aspect of using reward-based strategies is ensuring
that these measures comply with all relevant regulations and norms.
However, due to the relatively small number of attempts by interna-
tional actors to use inducements, there are few rules or customs gov-
erning their employment. Meanwhile, an entire legal regime has grown
up around the conduct of war, a staple of conventional statecraft.
125
Still, it can be argued that some standards regulating the use of re-
wards exist. At a minimum, the use of such inducement strategies
should be consistent with UN rules, UN values, and its operational ob-
jectives.
1. UN Rules
Some attempts to use rewards have violated, or, had they not been
implemented by another entity, would have contravened UN regula-
tions. For example, Virginia Page Fortna has noted that during the
Second United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II),
"[t]he UN World Food Program [WFP] made an exception to its rule of
not supplying military forces, and agreed to take over the job of feeding
Angolan troops."'126 This measure was taken to spur demobilization.
Similarly, the UN asked Italy to finance aspects of RENAMO's electoral
preparations. A UN-administered fund could not be set up because "the
United Nations rules under which Trust Funds are administered are
124. For example, the formulation of accounting procedures would be a transaction
cost associated with such an endeavor. Actually implementing them would consume more
resources. The accounting issue has been raised in the contect of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. See UN: Streamlined Peace-keeping, Rapid Liquidation of Missions Called for in
Admin & Budgetary Commitee Part 2, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL
14652859 ("With the Brindisi Base playing a pivotal role in receiving and deploying assets
to and from field missions, the maintenance of a comprehensive central inventory for all
operations will be critical, the Secretary-General states in his report on the management
of peace-keeping assets: policy, technique and accounting issues.").
125. See generally United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, U.N. Doc. AICONF./95/15, reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. For other instru-
ments regulating the conduct of armed hostilities, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN & CHRIS T.
ANTANIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR (1994).
126. Virginia Page Fortna, United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, in THE
EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: CASE STUDIES AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 388, 399
(William J. Durch ed., 1993).
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too rigid to meet the needs which stem from the transformation of a
military organization into a political party, all the more so in the social
and economic context of an African country."127 Rome later agreed to
comply with this request. 128 Because countries like Italy will sometimes
be unwilling to carry out such tasks, the rules governing some UN ac-
tivities may need to be changed. Greater flexibility may maximize the
possibility that rewards will induce the disputants in a given conflict to
make peace.
2. UN Values
With the UN's emergence on to the world political stage as an in-
fluential actor, how it intervenes in a given context has become an issue
of greater importance. For example, many believe that UN agents, in-
cluding mediators and peace operations personnel, ought to "maintain
their neutrality and perform their mission in an impartial manner."'129
Similarly, UN military commanders speak of resisting the urge to cross
the "Mogadishu line."' 3 0 However, it has become increasingly difficult
for this organization to be perceived as impartial as its involvement
with the parties to a conflict expands and deepens.' 3' As Steven R.
Ratner has noted, "[b]ecause the UN acts as administrator, mediator,
127. See Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
128. Letter Dated 4 March 1994 from the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy
to the Secretary-General on Italy's Further Contribution in the United Nations Trust
Fund, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE: 1992-1995, at 230 (Dep't of Public In-
formation ed., 1995).
129. Diehl, supra note 122, at 224. But see Richard K. Betts, The Delusion of Impar-
tial Intervention, FOREIGN AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 20 (arguing that impartiality "becomes
a destructive misconception when carried over to the messier realm of 'peace enforce-
ment,' where the belligerents have yet to decide that they have nothing more to gain by
fighting").
130. This term was coined by Sir Michael Rose, a British military officer who served as
commander of UNPROFOR. He insisted that UN forces never become involved in the
hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a combatant. See, e.g., Louis Meixler, U.N. in Soma-
lia: Humanitarian Success, Military Failure, AP, Feb. 24, 1995, available in 1995 WL
4364135 (reporting that "the former commander of U.N. forces, Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose,
has often cautioned against taking aggressive action there, warning that peacekeepers
must not cross what he has calls 'the Mogadishu line,' separating peacekeeping and war-
fare.").
131. Sometimes, events seemingly outside the UN's control thwart its intentions to act
as an impartial participant in the conflict-resolution process. As Robert G. Patman has
noted:
In mid-June 1992, a Russian Antonov plane with UN markings delivered
military hardware and newly printed Somali currency to [United Somali
Congress (USC) leader] Ali Mahidi's airfield in north Mogadishu. The UN
had no ready explanation for this highly-disruptive blunder which prompted
an already suspicious [Somali National Alliance (SNA) leader General Mo-
hamed Farah] Aideed to accuse the UN of favoring his arch-rival.
Patman, supra note 29, at 90. Apparently, this aircraft had been previously leased to the
WFP and its UN markings were not removed after this agency no longer needed it.
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and guarantor, it is pulled by forces not present in the earlier opera-
tions."1
32
If the UN managed a conflict in a way that consistently tended to
support one of the parties, its impartiality would be seriously under-
mined. 133 However, taking "a stance vis-a-vis one party in response to a
specific action, rather than through any predisposition" is justifiable.
134
Thus, the UN could target positive inducements at only one or a small
number of the disputants involved in a conflict without operating in a
partial manner. 3 5 If the UN chose to pursue this course of action, it
would need to be clear that the party was being rewarded because it
had taken an action that advanced the settlement process. Impartiality
concerns may explain the premium Kriesberg has placed on ensuring
that messages about the desirability of rewards are communicated be-
fore they are actually utilized.
36
In theory, the case for UN impartiality seems unassailable. How-
ever, some observers of the conflict-resolution process have questioned
whether such a posture is a precondition for, or even consistent with,
effective mediation and the successful employment of positive sanctions.
For example, I. William Zartman and Touval have argued:
Impartiality is not necessary for successful mediation. This is borne
out by the success of mediators perceived to have been close to or allied
with one of the parties. Witness American mediation in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Anglo-American mediation between Italy and Yugosla-
via on the Trieste issue, Soviet mediation between India and Pakistan
at Tashkent, and Algerian mediation between Iran and the United
States.
137
132. RATNER, supra note 8, at 52.
133. Tom Farer, Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the
First Phase, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 3-4 (1996) ("UN officials generally construe impartiality
to require that they refrain from two things: One is publicly judging or even implying any
judgment concerning the merits of a dispute or conflict; the other is acting in any way
which affects the balance of power among contending groups.").
134. RATNER, supra note 8, at 52.
135. The parties to a conflict are likely to jump at every chance to take the UN to task
for its alleged partiality. If the UN is attacked from various quarters, the overall impar-
tiality of the UN will be underscored. Referring to Cambodian views of UNTAC, Janet
Heninger has remarked that:
[s]ome thought that the mission leaders were biased in favor of the State of
Cambodia, while others thought that UNTAC was insufficiently tough with
the Khmer Rouge. If all parties believe the United Nations is biased in favor
of their opponents, that may be an indicator of a balanced approach.
JANET E. HENINGER, PEACE-KEEPING IN TRANSITION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN CAMBODIA
137 (1994).
136. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 420.
137. Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman, Introduction: Mediation in Theory, in
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7, 15 (Saadia Touval & I. William
Zartman eds., 1985).
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It is unclear whether positive sanctions will accomplish more if
they are employed by a fellow disputant or a mediator. Lawson's work
on the use of rewards, for example, deals with influence attempts by ac-
tors that fall into both categories. Kriesberg distinguishes between re-
wards given by mediators and those conveyed by parties to a dispute.
According to him, "particularly in the Israeli-Arab continuing conflict,
intermediaries have initiated de-escalating efforts. UN representatives,
U.S. officials, journalists, and others have made or transmitted propos-
als from one of the adversary parties. These usually did not include any
coercive or conciliatory actions, and they did not result in de-escalating
negotiations."13 8 Meanwhile, Zartman and Touval have contended:
[US Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger offered economic aid to the
white Rhodesian settlers. [US President Ronald] Reagan offered eco-
nomic aid to an Angola free of Cubans, and the OAS and IDB have told
conflicting [Latin] American states that no development funds would
be available until their conflict was settled.
139
They also state:
Through the diplomatic intervention of mediation, the mediator trans-
forms the bargaining structure from a dyad into a triangle.... [1]f the
mediator is to mediate-that is, intervene to diminish or resolve the
conflict-it must use the triangular structure to move the parties to
agreement rather than creating a victory for one side. Paradoxically,
this may mean temporarily reinforcing one side to keep it in the con-
flict, maintain the stalemate, and preserve the triangular relation-
ship.14
0
Thus, positive sanctions might enhance the mediation and conflict-
resolution efforts that third parties undertake, especially if maintaining
the triangular relationship identified by Zartman and Touval facilitates
dispute-settlement initiatives. Rewards may act as an effective vehicle
to keep disputants, who would otherwise drop out, engaged in the peace
process.141
The UN has sought to operate in a transparent manner. 42 Thus,
138. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 411.
139. I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Prac-
tice, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 251, 264 (Saadia Touval &
I. William Zartman eds., 1985).
140. Touval & Zartman, supra note 137, at 10-11.
141. In an age where the UN is increasingly called upon to undertake peace enforce-
ment operations, its involvement in disputes will not always be as a third party. Rather,
as were the cases in Somalia and Iraq, it may become involved in a direct armed confron-
tation with another actor. This posture would seem to complicate the work of the UN.
One advantage of the UN's becoming directly involved in a dispute as a party to it may be
that it might make more effective use of positive sanctions than if it had continued to
function as a third party mediator.
142. Transparency denotes the extent to which the operation of public institutions is
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covert reward-based strategies might be difficult to justify. However,
demand for such measures might be minimal. After all, most dispu-
tants are likely to desire basking in the legitimacy and favorable pub-
licity that the UN rewards are likely to confer upon them. In some set-
tings, personalities might wish to downplay the fact that they are the
beneficiaries of positive sanctions. 143 For example, if evidence of coop-
eration between the UN and the disputant surfaced, it might be charac-
terized as the puppet of foreign influences.44
3. Operational Objectives
Positive sanctions may be configured to achieve important opera-
tional outcomes. Just as important as how the UN goes about its work
is the results that its efforts achieve. For example, a UN-endorsed set-
tlement codifying blatant international aggression or serious violations
of international humanitarian law would likely be rejected outright.
145
Similarly, UN rewards should be compatible with its larger mission. At
a minimum, inducement strategies might vindicate international legal
principles and safeguard the long-term welfare of the population in the
conflict area. 146 Baldwin has addressed the importance of this latter
open to outside scrutiny. See, e.g., UN: Secretary-General Calls Education One of Most
Effective Forms of Defence Spending, M2 Presswire, Dec. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
16296321 ("United Nations legal officers are helping nations erect sound and transparent
legal frameworks, and fair and reliable judicial systems.").
143. For example, by functioning as the recipient of NATO support, BilIjana Plavsic
has risked losing her credibility with indigenous constituencies. See Howard Feinstein,
Shellshock in Sarajevo, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 7, 1997, at T004 ("Now she [Plavsic] has
become the West's puppet in the effort to eradicate Radovan Karadzic's power base in the
town of Pale.").
144. Interestingly, Ali Mahidi did not attempt to try to hide the fact that he main-
tained friendly relations with outsiders. His opponents, meanwhile, made much of this
interaction, using it to depict "Ali Mahdi [as] a stooge of foreign interests-in this case
Italian and Egyptian-bent on reestablishing dominance over Somalia. Ali Mahdi denies
he gets any such foreign backing, although he says he enjoys good relations with Italy, the
former colonial power." Keith B. Richburg, It Makes A Warlord Smile Somali Watches
U.N. Batter His Rival, WASH. POST, June 24, 1993, at A32.
145. As I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval have noted:
[an interest in specific outcomes occurs quite often in mediation sponsored
by international organizations. The [International Committee for the Red
Cross] ICRC, [the Organization of African Unity] OAU, and OAS all seek
specific solutions to disputes, not just agreements. They try to promote solu-
tions that can be interpreted as compatible with the standards of the Geneva
Conventions and of their charters, respectively, and that protect their image
as a guardian of these standards.
Zartman & Touval, supra note 139, at 257.
146. Given this, a proposal to reward a disputant for its cooperation by providing it
with arms would be summarily rejected unless such transfers were needed to stabilize a
skewed balance of power. The propriety of other packages of positive sanctions might be
less clear-cut. This is an area where NGOs, particularly those operating in the fields of
human rights and humanitarian assistance, might be able to offer the UN guidance on
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concern, arguing:
It seems unwise to assume that B [the actor to be influenced] always
knows what is best for him. It is not necessarily harmful to restrict the
choices available to children, drug addicts, or nation-states. Children
can be rewarded with too much candy; drug addicts can be rewarded
with too much heroin; and countries can be given more foreign aid than
is good for them.'
47
Some disputants, especially those born and bred on the battlefield,
might be particularly apt to lack an appreciation of the rewards likely
to contribute to their country's sustainable development.
Rewards might act as a vehicle to increase the amount of coopera-
tion and interaction between the disputant and the UN. As Baldwin
has noted, "[a]n important side effect [of an influence attempt utilizing
positive sanctions] is the 'spill over effect' on B's relations with A with
respect to other issues. While positive sanctions tend to enhance B's
willingness to cooperate with A on other issues, negative sanctions tend
to impede such competition."'148 Thus, positive sanctions rewarding a
party for its demobilization efforts might lead to greater cooperation in
the area of electoral activities. Similarly, increased interaction result-
ing from the use of rewards could serve as the basis for future collabo-
ration between the UN and the disputant. This result, it can be argued,
would be especially likely if the party that had been rewarded was inte-
grated into the governing authority of the post-conflict order. Thus, the
support and assistance that the African National Congress (ANC) re-
ceived from the UN while both crusaded against apartheid may func-
tion as one reason why the current ANC South African government has
undertaken active efforts to help bring conflicts in Southern Africa to
an end.14
9
The UN will also be interested in restoring the long-term economic
health of areas plagued by conflict. If it is not, disputes may ensue. 50
Positive sanctions might make a vital contribution to the economic re-
construction process. Moreover, given the role that private sector enti-
ties like multinational enterprises now play in the economic develop-
ment processes of a variety of countries, it may be wise for the UN to
integrate these actors into its attempts to use rewards as an induce-
what measures would be appropriate and which would not pass muster.
147. Baldwin, supra note 33, at 184.
148. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 32-33.
149. More pragmatic concerns such as regional stability may also account for South
Africa's activism in this area.
150. See Gregory Jowdy, Note, Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala: A
Proposal for Truth in Guatemala, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 285, 292 (1997) ("Much of
the Salvadoran civil conflict springs from this division between a landed elite and an im-
poverished peasantry.").
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ment strategy.
4. Scrutiny of the UN's Use of Positive Sanctions
Little monitoring of the UN's use of rewards is likely to occur.
Compared with a jurisdiction like the US, whose courts play a vigorous
role in appraising the legality of official conduct, judicial mechanisms
occupy a relatively peripheral place in the UN's constitutional ar-
rangements. 15 ' This marginalization imposes special responsibilities on
UN bodies and personnel to ensure that its conflict-resolution strategies
are compatible with UN principles. Besides this self-policing, NGOs
will probably assume a watchdog role, taking the UN to task for prob-
lematic policies.
15 2
E. Using Only Rewards or Employing a Multifaceted Strategy
To suppress conflicts, the UN might rely on strategies that utilize
rewards exclusively. Or, more multifaceted approaches, which combine
punishments with positive sanctions, could be employed. Of course, for
the foreseeable future, it may be difficult for the UN to preside over and
effectively use negative inducements like economic sanctions. Even if
this organization does enhance its capacity to utilize positive induce-
ment strategies, the UN would do well to prevent its limited prowess
with negative sanctions from atrophying. Indeed, as Kriesberg has con-
cluded, "[n]egotiations dependent solely on coercive or noncoercive in-
ducements provided by intermediaries or by parties not directly in-
volved in the conflict have not usually culminated in agreements."'
' 5 3
If the UN successfully managed to harness the power of both pun-
ishments and rewards, its pronounced compartmentalization, which is
widely thought to thwart its ability to deal with situations in a coordi-
nated manner, might actually function as an advantage. 5 4 As Ratner
has noted:
[I]f one party undertakes outrageous or illegal actions, the political or-
gans can adopt a strong, condemnatory position and signal to the par-
ties the firmness of the international community's view. Far from the
corridors of power in New York, the Special Representative could dis-
tance himself [sic] a bit and assume the role of mediator in a way that
151. The International Court of Justice has attempted to scrutinize the legality of ac-
tions taken by the Security Council, See W. Michael Reisman Note, The Constitutional
Crisis in the United Nations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993).
152. Cf. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975) (questioning the assumption made by some officials
"that their job is to make policy without regard to questions of constitutionality which rest
within the exclusive domain of the courts").
153. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 418.
154. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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furthers the settlement process. 155
The number of agencies in the UN means that there would be a
relatively large pool of candidates to engage in this "good cop, bad cop"
routine.156 For example, one component of a peace operation might take
a fairly hard-line stance in relation to a disputant while another would
promise to reward the party for greater compliance.
To be effective, this approach might require a great deal of orches-
tration. However, it would allow the UN to manage conflicts in a way
that states cannot. Governments, after all, place a premium on speak-
ing with one voice in the area of foreign affairs.157 To avoid the appear-
ance of inconsistency, they are not likely to modify or refine their
stances on specific issues often.15 8 The UN, meanwhile, may have fewer
qualms about shifting its position on particular matters.
Under a variation of this approach to conflict-resolution, the UN
might take responsibility for rewarding the parties when they cooper-
ate. If their commitment to peace wavered, states bordering the conflict
area might threaten the disputants. This course of action was pursued
in Mozambique. The UN directly disbursed rewards to the government
and RENAMO, including reconstruction and electoral assistance.
Meanwhile, when the settlement process seemed to be breaking down,
leading regional figures intervened to persuade these parties to settle
155. RATNER, supra note 8, at 80.
156. Id. at 80.
157. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83
VA. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (1997) ("In foreign affairs, the nation must speak with one voice,
not fifty.").
158. In states where power over the conduct of foreign affairs is distributed among
several branches, the achievement of an approach utilizing both positive and negative
sanctions simultaneously is possible. In a study of US human rights policy toward Indo-
nesia during the 1970s, Timo Antero Kivimaki has remarked:
[plublicly, the [US] Embassy [in Jakarta] alleged that it did not want sanc-
tions against friends and allies (such as Indonesia), but that political pres-
sures from the Congress were forcing its hand. Pressure from the Congress
and US public opinion could be used by [US Ambassador to Indonesia David]
Newson as leverage in human rights bargaining. Some US Embassy officials
have said that US officials in Indonesia had secretly encouraged US con-
gressmen to investigate human rights policies in Indonesia in order to gain
bargaining leverage at the administrative level.
Timo Antero Kivimaki, National Diplomacy for Human Rights: A Study of US Exercise of
Power in Indonesia, 1974-1979, 16 HUM. RTS. Q., 415 (1994).
In situations in which the executive branch has taken the lead in dealing with a foreign
affairs issue, it will be more difficult for it to adopt an approach utilizing both rewards
and punishments. The Economist, for example, has criticized the "Clinton administra-
tion's own careless policies towards Haiti-shifting ground under pressure, whether it be
from thugs at the harbour in Port-au-Prince, from public opinion, from the congressional
black caucus, from Florida voters, or whatever-that put credibility on the line in Haiti in
the first place." Nightmare, supra note 110, at 19.
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their differences peacefully. 159 Obviously, the viability of this approach
will depend on the existence of individuals in the region who command
the requisite moral authority and possess the means to make good on
their threats. 1
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F. Combining UN Rewards with Ones Offered by the Disputants
Themselves
Besides providing positive sanctions to cooperative disputants, the
UN might attempt to persuade the parties to a conflict to reward each
other. Kriesberg has asserted that "[i]ntermediaries can often provide
compensatory benefits to both adversaries, which, in turn, induces them
to make additional concessions to each other: witness the Camp David
negotiations with the Israeli and Egyptian governments." 161 Of course,
if the parties are emerging from a long conflict that has exhausted their
resources, they may lack the capacity to channel material rewards to
their adversaries. Some unilateral measures, however, are inexpensive
to finance. These include truce declarations, 162 troop withdrawals, de-
mobilization initiatives, and the establishment of truth commissions. It
can be argued that the structure of the Mozambican peace agreement
fostered cooperation between the governing Front for the Liberation of
Mozambique and RENAMO. Protocol III of the Rome Accords 163 stipu-
lated that RENAMO request funds to finance its electoral activities
from the Mozambican government, which would either provide the
needed resources or seek them from overseas sources.
164
Besides agreeing to pay for an advesary's return to civilian life, one
159. As The Economist reported:
In October Mozambique was due to hold its first free election. Led by...
[South African President Nelson] Mandela and [Zimbabwean President] ...
[Robert] Mugabe, other countries of the region warned its rival parties to ac-
cept the result and said that if need be they would send in a force to help
keep order. Then, only hours before the poll, Afonso Dhlakama, the former
rebel leader, said his Renamo movement would pull out. Both Mr. Mugabe
and South Africa's first deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, promptly got on the
telephone to persuade him to change his mind. Mr. Dhlakama complied,
Renamo took part in the election, and says its leader, accepts its defeat.
Neighborhood Watch in Southern Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 3, 1994, at 51.
160. In Mozambique, both of these conditions were present. South African President
Nelson Mandela enjoys almost universal respect. His country, moreover, is able to project
military might with relative ease.
161. Kriesberg, supra note 95, at 419.
162. More than a month before the signing of the Act of New York, the document that
ended El Salvador's civil war, in December 1991, the FMLN announced that it was sus-
pending its military activities. See Salvadoran Army to Continue Operations Despite Rebel
Truce, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 19, 1991, available in 1991 WL 3231671 ("The Salva-
doran military Monday refused to match a unilateral rebel cease-fire in effect since last
week and accused the insurgents of breaking their own truce.").
163. General Peace Agreement, supra note 78, at 111.
164. Id. The interaction between RENAMO and FRELIMO that this scheme might en-
gender may have functioned as the basis for greater cooperation between the parties.
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disputant can offer its counterparts particular positions or administra-
tive competencies in the post-conflict authority. If these are accepted, a
government of national unity (GNU) would exist. Managers of the
transition to democratic rule in South Africa used this approach suc-
cessfully. It also is said to have materially advanced at least one peace
offensive pursued in Angola. 165 In both contexts, the party that seemed
likely to win the upcoming electoral process or had, in fact, triumphed
at the polls, offered its rivals posts in specific ministries and/or ambas-
sadorships. 166 Although offers to establish a GNU have the advantage
of setting a precedent for direct cooperation between groups that have
been bitter enemies in a previous incarnation, these alliances may also
represent an extremely effective way for the dominant party to margi-
nalize political opposition in the emergent regime. Because they are a
part of the government, junior partners may experience difficulty credi-
bly criticizing official policy decisions. 167 Thus, given the key role that
vigorous political opposition plays in the functioning of many successful
democracies, GNUs may be problematic in the long run.
165. The international community pressured FRELIMO, which anticipated winning
the 1994 elections in Mozambique and did, but by a smaller-than-expected margin, to
bring RENAMO into some sort of power-sharing arrangement. Lamb, for example, has
reported:
Facing the political wilderness, Dhlakama wrested what concessions he
could. While publicly issuing a statement drafted by the British embassy
that the international community would investigate his allegations of fraud,
he also secured agreement from negotiators to pressure Chissano to give
Renamo members places in the new government and at least one provincial
governorship.
Lamb, supra note 112, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File. The
Economist indicated that "[t]he Americans, Portuguese (Mozambique's former colonisers)
and the United Nations would like to see the two sides strike a pre-election deal to share
power, as a way of giving the defeated party a stake in future stability. To this end, they
want Mr. Mandela's help." Good Neighbor: South Africa, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at
40. In the end, however, a GNU was not set up and no RENAMO provincial governors
were appointed.
166. After the 1994 elections, F.W. de Klerk, whose Nationalist Party finished second
to the African National Congress (ANC), became the country's second deputy president.
Chief Mangoosuthu Buthelezi, the head of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which fin-
ished a distant third, took over control of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Similarly, in An-
gola, "[flollowing the recommendations of intermediaries and trying to allay UNITA's
grievances, the MPLA-led government agreed on [the] creation of a government of na-
tional unity, offering UNITA four ministerial portfolios, seven vice-ministerial posts, as
well as three provincial governor and seven vice-governor posts." Leonid L. Fituni, The
Collapse of the Socialist State: Angola and the Soviet Union, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE
DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 143, 150 (I. William
Zartman ed., 1995).
167. Before leaving the South African GNU, the Nationalist Party encountered prob-
lems challenging public policies. See A Blacker Future for the Nats?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27,
1996, at 40.
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G. The Disputants'Access to Alternative Donors and Sources of
Funding
The UN may experience difficulty with reward-based strategies if
the disputant to be influenced can go elsewhere to meet its resource
needs. In his article on various attempts to use positive sanctions by
Middle Eastern states during the 1970s, Lawson asserted:
[O]n the whole, offers of rewards that were made under conditions of
increasing bipolarity succeeded in limiting if not terminating these con-
flicts. This result arose from the first place from a convergence be-
tween the dependence of relations associated with positive sanctions
and the pattern of dominance and subordination that characterize rela-
tions among countries in a bipolar order. It was also a consequence of
the inability of potential recipients in this situation to manipulate the
offers of positive sanctions by using them as bargaining chips to play
rival powers off against one another. 168
Presumably, influence attempts utilizing positive inducements
would be an even more effective vehicle to mold the actions of dispu-
tants if made in a unipolar environment. After all, there is no possibil-
ity that the party to be influenced will play the donor off of a rival since
the donor, by definition, lacks one. Thus, the success of UN efforts
making use of rewards will be partially determined by the number of
outside actors that have an interest in the conflict to be resolved. Due
to the relatively large number of external players that queued up to
play supporting roles in the settlement of the conflicts in Cambodia and
the former Yugoslavia, efforts using positive inducements may not be as
successful in these situations than in a post-Cold War backwater like
Rwanda.
Disputants that can rely on the assistance of a wealthy patron may
feel relatively inclined to reject UN initiatives to use rewards to gain
leverage over them. Therefore, the UN ought to stress the importance
of states using established channels for disbursing reconstruction and
development assistance to the factions involved in a given settlement
process. For example, in Cambodia, aid pledged by various states at the
1992 Ministerial Conference on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of
Cambodia was earmarked for projects approved by the SNC (Supreme
National Council)/UNTAC Technical Advisory Committee. In practice,
countries sometimes executed end-runs around this body. As Janet E.
Heninger has argued:
168. Fred H. Lawson, Positive Sanctions and the Managing of International Conflict:
Five Middle Eastern Cases, 11 INT'L J. 628, 650 (1985).
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The Thai government rebuilt roads in the border area to facilitate its
own logging interests. Other projects that were not submitted included
the rehabilitation of roads, schools, and health facilities in the [Na-
tional United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Coop-
erative Cambodia] FUNCINPEC zone by the United States. This effort
was the continuation of an aid program designed to bolster the non-
Communist resistance. Similarly, the Japanese government undertook
reconstruction of the bridge of Chrui Changvar as a gesture of goodwill
to the Hun Sen administration.
169
UN leverage over a disputant may be further enhanced by re-
stricting the disputant's ability to sell resources on world markets. For
example, even after Soviet support of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola government and South African and US aid to the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola dried up, these
parties used Angolan diamonds and oil to continue military operations
in this country.170 Thus, the successful use of positive sanctions may
need to rest on the use of negative inducements. In Angola, the UN ap-
plied economic sanctions to those areas under UNITA control. Simi-
larly, in Cambodia, the Security Council, in 1992, halted exports of tim-
ber from this country. The justification invoked for this latter action
was "to protect Cambodia's natural resources."'171 However, perhaps the
real logic driving it was to induce the Khmer Rouge to comply with the
Paris Accords by increasing its dependence on funds disbursed through
UN channels.
H. The Timing of Inducement Efforts
Positive sanctions may be more effectively employed during specific
stages of a conflict's lifespan than others.
172
1. Before the Conflict
It may be crucial to deploy rewards before conflicts turn violent.
Indeed, the importance of taking measures early on in the development
of a conflict has been emphasized by Steven John Stedman. According
to him:
169. HENINGER, supra note 135, at 59.
170. See Paul Taylor, With Mischievous Outsiders Gone, Angola Creates Its Own Suf-
fering, WASH. POST, July 28, 1994, at A20 ("The government draws revenue from offshore
oil wells that produce 550,000 barrels a day, according to official Angolan estimates.
UNITA draws at least $100 million a year - perhaps much more - from diamonds it ex-
tracts from mines in northeastern Angola ......
171. Id. at 62.
172. Of course, it may be difficult to separate a given conflict from other periods in his-
tory that have seen strife between the same parties. Kriesberg, for example, notes "it is
not possible to isolate instances with clearly marked beginnings and ends." Kriesberg,
supra note 95, at 407.
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[C]onflict emerges from tangible interests, but as soon as the conflict
turns overtly violent, concerns about security and survival coexist with
the issues that caused the conflict. Resolution of conflict necessarily
becomes more difficult, since problem solving must work on two dis-
tinct levels: the issues that prompted the conflict in the first place, and
the ending of the violent expression of the conflict. 1
73
Thus, rewards may prove particularly potent during the prelude to
a conflict. In addition to mediating between the potential combatants,
the UN might intervene and offer rewards to discourage those who are
believed to be fueling the dispute. This strategy may prove successful
because many internal conflicts run through a stage marked by the
"formation of a single movement led by charismatic organizers who seek
to unite disparate groups and force the attention of the government
to... [its] grievances."'174 Or, action could be taken to eliminate the
roots of the conflict, especially if they are predominantly economic or so-
cial.
The problems with offering positive sanctions during the early
stages of conflicts should be obvious. First, at any given time, there are
a multitude of situations where stresses between groups and interests
seem to be present. 175 Even the best intelligence will be unable to de-
liver reliable predictions regarding the ones likely to explode into actual
hostilities. 176 For example, according to David Gompert, "[tihe $4 bil-
173. Stephen J. Stedman, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa, in CONFLICT
RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 367, 388 (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds., 1991).
Similarly, L. Ronald Scheman and John W. Ford have remarked that "[ilnternational eco-
nomic leverage is most influential in the early stages of potential disputes." Scheman,
supra note 92, at 199. At the same time, they proffer little empirical data to back up this
assertion.
174. I. William Zartman, Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Con-
flicts, in ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN END TO CIVIL WARS 3, 13 (1. William Zartman
ed., 1995).
175. Ernie Regehr has argued:
The capacity of the UN to intervene is immensely complicated by the fact
that the descent into this type of war is usually slow and gradual. Civil wars
are not declared; they are inadvertently drifted into. There is typically no
clear moment of crisis and thus no consensus on when and how the interna-
tional community should intervene.
Ernie Regehr, Warfare's New Face, WORLD PRESS REV., Apr. 1994, at 14.
176. There are some contexts, like smoldering tensions existing at the margins of con-
flicts already involving actual fighting, which seem particularly apt to degenerate into
armed strife. A desire to thwart the spread of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Macedo-
nia explains the UN's decision to insert a peace-keeping operation, originally carried out
under the auspices of UNPROFOR, there. At the same time, more could have been done
to defuse hostility in Macedonia. For example, the UN could have followed the lead of the
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, which "organized a series of meetings be-
tween Greek and Turkish Cypriot community leaders out of which... a process of recon-
ciliation might develop." FETHERSTON, supra note 56, at 53.
In situations where a conflict has already broken out and threatens to spread to a
neighboring region, the disputants themselves may have a stake in ensuring that the
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lion aid carrot the EC ... produced [in 1991] could have been the last
hope for avoiding war, had it not been dangled in front of the Yugoslavs
at least a year too late."'177 The UN has become more adept at collecting
and processing information. However, its intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities still lag behind those of many governments. States routinely
fail to foresee even massive transformations in the international sys-
tem.178 For example, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) devoted
a massive amount of resources to tracking events in the former Soviet
Union and its sphere of influence. However, the collapse of authoritar-
ian socialism in Eastern Europe caught the CIA off guard.
Second, the disputants to be influenced might hold entirely genu-
ine, although exaggerated, expectations of what they can accomplish by
taking up arms against an adversary. The political platform of Russian
ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhironovsky, who promised to reincor-
porate Alaska into a resurgent Russian Empire under his leadership,
embodies this tendency. 179 It was also operative during the period be-
fore the fighting in the Balkans. Politicians of various ethnic back-
grounds in this region staked claims on a greater Serbia or Croatia,
which invariably encompassed all or most of the former Yugoslavia's
territory. 8 0 Given what these parties and other disputants around the
strife remains contained. As The Economist has reported:
But while the Russians have been wielding a big stick, they have also been
dangling, at least in Ingushetia [a region bordering Chechnya] a carrot.
Since 1994, they have pumped in money: Ingushetia enjoys a special 'off-
shore' tax status within the Russian federation, bringing in $loom a year-
hence the new hotel and artificial lake. Now it is to become an international
tax haven, a would-be Russian Jersey.
Jersey in the Caucuses?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1996, at 48.
177. Gompert, supra note 36, at 35.
178. As Kenneth Allard has noted:
It has taken the United Nations several years of ever more intense involve-
ment in complicated operations before it has quietly admitted something
that military people have always known: intelligence is the key to any opera-
tion, including those designed to secure the peace. While 'information' is the
term of choice, operations in Somalia proved that, whatever it is called, in-
telligence has a crucial role to play at the lower end of the conflict spectrum
as well as in other places.
KENNETH ALLARD, SOMALIA OPERATIONS: LESSONS LEARNED 74 (1995).
179. See, e.g., All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 13, 1993) (reporting
Zhironovsky's desire "to reclaim American Alaska for Russia.").
180. Ed Vulliamy has noted that during the period leading up to the outbreak of hos-
tilities in the Balkans:
[N]owhere were the maps so ubiquitous as in former Yugoslavia, and no-
where were their frontiers so charged with historical emotion.... [Serb]
maps show a 'future Yugoslavia' in which Serbia encompasses all of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and all southern Croatia, leaving behind a rump around Zagreb
and Osijek and what looks like a vassal Dalmatia .... [while their Croatian
counterparts] show a Croatia that envelopes all of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which ceases to exist.
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world have hoped to gain through violence, few rewards were likely to
placate them.18' Meanwhile, the years of devastating fighting in the
Balkans have seen the combatants scale back their demands by modi-
fying negotiating positions, withdrawing from the fray, or teaming up
with a former adversary.
8 2
Third, heavy pre-hostilities reliance on rewards before conflicts in-
volve armed strife may create perverse incentives for other disputants.
A party that would not have otherwise resorted to violent conflict might
make noises about heading in that direction to collect inducements. As
Baldwin has argued, "[i]t is sometimes suggested, perhaps in jest, that
poor nations have an incentive to create or maintain an internal Com-
munist threat in order to qualify for foreign aid from the United
States."'1 3 If the UN made serious attempts to use positive induce-
ments to prevent the outbreak of conflicts, it might be viewed as a font
of free sustenance by unscrupulous players in the international political
arena.1
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2. At the Outset of Hostilities
The viability of using positive sanctions would seem to bottom out
after a conflict has begun, but before it is amenable to settlement. In
actuality, it may be critical for mediators, especially the UN, to rely
heavily on rewards for an eventual resolution to the conflict. As David
A. Lax and James K. Sebenius have argued:
If 'not ripe' [for settlement] is the diagnosis,... getting people in a
room together and employing all sorts of careful procedural means to
foster negotiation will be to no avail. The basic conditions for a negoti-
ED VULLIAMY, SEASONS IN HELL: UNDERSTANDING BOSNIA'S WAR 8-10 (1994).
181. As Stedman has written:
Individuals such as Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, Serbian Presi-
dent Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Ango.
lan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi and genocidal factions such as the presiden-
tial guard in Rwanda decided on civil war because they thought they could
prevail militarily and that the international community was powerless to
stop them.
Stephen J. Stedman, Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventative Diplo-
macy', FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1995, at 14, 18.
182. For example, efforts have been made to forge an alliance between Bosnian Croats
and Bosnian Muslims.
183. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 36.
184. It might be more effective to use negative inducements at the outset of conflicts.
For example, David Gompert has highlighted the role that a peace enforcement force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina during early 1992 could have played "to discourage violence before it
began." Gompert, supra note 36, at 37. Similarly, "General Romeo Dallaire, the brave
Canadian on the spot [in Rwanda], says that, given a few motivated soldiers, he might
have fended off many of the massacres." The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (book
review), ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 1995, at Sl.
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ated agreement will not be met since possible agreements appear infe-
rior to at least one side in comparison with its unilateral alternatives.
When this is the case, strategy should focus not on the negotiation pro-
cess but instead on actions away from the table that can reshape per-
ceptions in a manner that generates a zone of possible agreement.1
8 5
Richard Haass has exhorted actors attempting to resolve disputes
to spur this process along by trying "to get governments and their con-
stituents to recognize the costs of disagreement and the potential bene-
fits of agreement, as well as to expect compromises." 18 6 According to
Haass, mediators can alter the perspectives of disputants by offering
them military assistance, intelligence support, security guarantees, and
the commitment of an alliance. 8 7 Of course, the UN is not in a position
to provide such services. However, UN decisionmakers could make lim-
ited economic commitments to the parties.188
3. When Conflicts "Ripen"
Using rewards when conflicts ripen could be counterproductive.
According to Zartman, a conflict has reached this point when it:
is associated with two different sorts of intensity-called here plateaus
and the precipice-which produce different sorts of pressure-called re-
spectively deadlocks and deadlines. A plateau and its deadlock begin
when one side is unable to achieve its aims, to resolve the problem, or
to win the conflict by itself, and they are completed when the other side
arrives at a similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncom-
fortable in the costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A pla-
teau must be perceived by both not as a momentary resting ground, but
as a hurting stalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the
future, providing no later possibilities for decisive escalation or for
graceful escape. 189
However, it is sometimes unclear when a conflict has ripened. Ac-
cording to Kriesberg:
Whether circumstances are ripe for an agreement is unequivocally
clear only in extreme cases. Only sometimes is there no chance for an
agreement or the pressure to reach a settlement so strong it is difficult
to imagine failure, as when reaching a disengagement agreement be-
tween Egyptian and Israeli forces in 1973 was unequivocally neces-
185. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 59 (1986).
186. HAASS, supra note 23, at 146.
187. Id. at 147.
188. Id. at 146.
189. I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN
AFRICA 268 (1989) (emphasis added).
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sary.19o
Haass, meanwhile, has asserted that "it is important to keep in
mind that ripeness is dynamic; it can emerge as easily as it can disap-
pear. What may have been a ripe moment in Lebanon in 1982 soon
passed."19 1 Thus, it may be difficult to implement a positive induce-
ment policy when conflicts reach the ripeness point. Even if an ob-
server or mediator is able to ascertain that a given dispute has ripened,
it may be counterproductive to employ them at this stage of the conflict-
resolution process. Rewards given at this juncture may dull the pain
that has caused disputants to become more receptive to settlement.
Any flexibility that the party derives as a result of possessing rewards
may encourage it to be less accommodating in the positions it stakes out
at the negotiating table. 192 If rewards must be used, they might be ex-
plicitly linked to the disputant's accession to the agreement or to the
achievement of progress on issues that continue to divide the parties.
Such areas of disagreement are likely to exist. As Haass has asserted:
Ripeness is not either totally present or totally absent. Often only
parts of a problem are ripe for negotiation; it would be an error in most
cases not to address part of a problem in an attempt to solve the entire
problem. There is some risk in this-the easier unsolved parts of the
problem can in principle lubricate the more difficult ones-but this
danger tends to be outweighed by the need to reduce tensions and in
the process demonstrate that progress is possible. 193
4. After the Storm
The importance of formulating strategies to keep disputants en-
gaged in settlement processes should not be underestimated. It may
take months or even several years for the UN to implement the provi-
sions of a comprehensive accord. 194 The UN's experience with the
Khmer Rouge suggests that even after a disputant consents to coopera-
tion, it may subsequently withdrawal its support. It is possible that
such situations will be avoided by rewarding the parties for their con-
190. KRIESBERG, supra note 46, at 146.
191. HAASS, supra note 23, at 145.
192. When parties take steps that advance the settlement process, their patrons may
feel intense pressure to respond with rewards. Such actions, though politically expedient,
may be hazardous to the long-term health of the settlement of the conflict-resolution proc-
ess.
193. HAASS, supra note 23, at 144.
194. Deployments did not always take so long to effect. Upon being told in 1960 "to
whisk a UN force to the Congo, Brian Urquhart, top peacekeeper at the time, was under
the impression that Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) was on the Indian Ocean, not the Atlan-
tic, side of Africa. Nevertheless, he got 3,000 men to the right place in three days."
Rwanda, supra note 184, at $11.
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tinued cooperation. However, positive inducements are unlikely to suc-
ceed in contexts where the disputant has signed off on an agreement,
but has no intention of abiding by it. As Stedman has noted:
[I]f the UN is to continue to work to implement negotiated settlements
of civil wars, it must start to think strategically about a generic prob-
lem in such settlements: namely, that some of the antagonists are not
sincere towards ending the conflict. The UN operations in the Western
Sahara, Cambodia and Angola were undermined by parties whose
commitment to negotiations was tactical. 195
I. Rewards and the Roots of Conflicts
Reward-based strategies may prove more effective in disputes with
specific causes. What underlies strife is a subject that has received in-
tense scrutiny. According to Zartman:
Internal conflicts are about many different things in different cases,
but all aggravated grievances can be subsumed under two related cate-
gories-neglect and discrimination, or a distributional element and an
identity element. Without distributional deprivation, identity remains
a positive factor and not a motivation for conflict; without an identity
element, distributional inequities remain unfocused and nonmobiliz-
ing. The mix of the two elements may vary, situating the conflict to-
ward one end of the spectrum or the other.196
At the identity end of this continuum lie primarily ethnic wars like
the ones unfolding in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Burundi although
these conflicts have economic explannations. 197 Meanwhile, the conflict
in El Salvador served as a reminder that extreme distributional inequi-
ties will sometimes spawn mass violence. 198
If positive sanctions are more likely to take the form of material
support and incentives, it can be argued that their utilization would be
more successful in the latter category of conflict. After all, gaining more
resources is likely to explain why the disputant took up arms in the
first place. Indeed, the reward itself may provide the sustenance or en-
195. Stephen J. Stedman, UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and
Strategy, in BEYOND TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING 44, 55 (Donald C.F. Daniel & Bradd C.
Hayes eds., 1995).
196. ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 5.
197. See Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, 20
INT'L SECURITY 136, 136 (1996) ("Ethnic civil wars are burning in Bosnia, Croatia,
Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan,
Kashmir, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, and are threatening to break out in dozens of other
places throughout the world.").
198. See Marjorie Miller & Tracy Wilkinson, Despite Lingering Distrust, Salvador
Truce Holds Firm Central America, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at 1 ('Land is one of the
most complicated and, historically, one of the most divisive issues in tiny El Salvador.").
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titlement the faction seeks. However, the UN could also construct posi-
tive sanctions to enhance a given community's sense of identity. These
might take the form of safe havens, UN-sponsored truth commissions,
and assurances that the threatened group will receive representation or
be guaranteed special rights and privileges in the post-conflict order.19 9
Other disputants would have to cooperate before some identity-
enhancing rewards could become operational. Of course, inducements
designed to satisfy the material needs of the disputant would not be
completely out of place in conflicts driven by discrimination or denials
of identity. In these environemnts, the disputants' post-conflict need for
material support may be as pronounced as the identity grievances that
originally prompted the fighting.
200
Although ethnic and economic conflicts are likely to spawn a great
deal of suffering and instability in particular regions, strife involving
combatants who fight for the sake of fighting has featured more promi-
nently in the post-Cold War universe. As Martin van Creveld has
noted:
[W]ar, far from being merely a means, has very often been considered
an end-a highly attractive activity for which no other can provide an
adequate substitute. The reason why other activities do not provide a
substitute is precisely because they are 'civilized;' in other words,
bound by artificial rules.
20 1
Unfortunately, it seems likely that this harrowing reason for be-
coming involved in civil strife will grow in relation to other motives for
taking up arms. Robert Kaplan has argued that "[a]s anybody who has
had experience with Chetniks in Serbia, 'technicals' in Somalia, Ton-
tons Macoutes in Haiti, or soldiers in Sierra Leone can tell you, in
places where the Western Enlightenment has not penetrated and where
there has always been mass poverty, people find liberation in vio-
lence."202 Should combatants with such an orientation function as the
main protagonists in a given conflict, the utility of positive sanctions
would be marginal. 20 3
199. Part of the agreement hammered out at Lancaster House between the various
factions in the then-Rhodesia guaranteed whites 20% of the seats in the new country's
legislative authority during a transitional period. See Agreements Concluded at Lancas-
ter House Conference, Dec. 21, 1979, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 387, 394-95 (1980).
200. See, e.g., Angry Demobilised Bosnian Soldiers on Hunger Strike, Dec. 5, 1996,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, available in 1996 WL 12194071 ("A group of 100 Bosnian
building workers, including many former soldiers, are staging a hunger strike in Sarajevo
over poor living conditions, a Bosnian radio station reported Thursday").
201. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 218 (1991).
202. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1994, at 44.
203. As The Economist has reported, "[plart of the potency of the Shining Path lies in
its indiscriminate use of violence. It will kill officials, leftists, rightists, trade unionists,
tourists, anyone; on August 19th, for instance, it slaughtered 60 Indians in Peru's Ama-
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J. Positive Sanctions and the Nature of the Conflict
The success of reward-based strategies may be determined by the
complexion of the dispute the UN is seeking to end. Assuming that dis-
putes can be reliably characterized as internal or international, 2 4 much
of the literature on positive incentives deals with influence attempts
made in the context of international disputes. As Zartman has as-
serted, resolving internal conflicts can often be more difficult than
ending international ones. According to him:
[T]he most striking characteristic of internal conflict is its asymmetry,
one party (government) is strong and the other (insurgent) is weak....
Negotiations under conditions of asymmetry (asymmetrical negotia-
tion) are a paradox, because one of the basic findings about the nego-
tiation process is that it functions best under conditions of equality,
and indeed only takes place when the parties have some form of mu-
tual veto over outcomes.
205
The international community is not likely to task the UN with the
resolution of such conflicts. Fearing that its sovereignty might be un-
dermined, the overwhelmingly dominant party to the dispute (the gov-
ernment) is likely to do everything in its power to keep the UN or any
international organization from becoming involved in the settlement of
the conflict.206 For example, the UN's failure in Somalia partially stems
zon jungle." The Other Obstacles to Change, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 125.
204. In its Tadic ruling, the ICTY attempted to determine whether the Bosnian con-
flict was internal or international. The Tribunal commented:
[I]n 1993, when the Statute [of the International Tribunal] was drafted, the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both in-
ternal and international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an
international one, or as an international conflict that had subsequently been
replaced by one or more internal conflicts, or some combination thereof.
The Prosecutor v. Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction), U.N. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72,
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997).
205. ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 7-8.
206. In this respect, the UN efforts to end the disputes in such countries as El Salva-
dor, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Angola may represent an aberration. The parties con-
trolling the state structure in each of these contexts were severely weakened as a result of
prolonged war; they were pressured into accepting a UN presence by their Cold War pa-
trons or influential regional power brokers. Haiti is also an exception to this general rule.
Not only was the military takeover condemned universally, but Haiti exists in the shadow
of a superpower, which was unwilling to live with the massive refugee flows that the re-
pression unleashed by the junta generated. The uniqueness of Haiti is hammered home
by the international community's reaction to the events in the Gambia and Niger. While
the democratic governments of both countries have been overthrown by military coups,
there has been no talk of injecting a UN presence into these countries to restore them.
See W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794, 798 (1995) (criticizing the international community's failure to
respond to the 1994 coup in the Gambia and other military overthrows of civilian govern-
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from the meddling in that country by Sudan, which believed that if
UNOSOM II prevailed, the UN might attempt to resolve the long-
standing Sudanese civil war.207 Similarly, such countries as Indonesia,
China, Russia, Nigeria, and Colombia are likely to do everything in
their power to keep the resolution of the conflicts unfolding in these
states off of the UN's agenda.
Were governments to consent to international involvement in re-
solving conflicts within their borders, it is unclear how useful positive
sanctions would be in bringing an end to these disputes. The stark
asymmetries likely to exist in these environments may explain why it is
doubtful that using rewards will be successful. Insurgents might be dis-
posed to respond favorably to reward-based strategies. This posture
may advance, somewhat, the cause of peace. However, it seems less
likely that the UN could gain leverage over the government, which is
more likely to enjoy access to a wide variety of resources.
Where power imbalances are less extreme, the UN is more likely to
become involved. Zartman's generalization about the distorted balance
of capacities inherent in most internal conflicts may have applied to the
lion's share of disputes that unfolded during the Cold War.208 However,
it retains less pertinence now.20 9 What gives many internal conflicts
their asymmetry is the presence of a viable state structure. Those who
control it are able to mobilize resources easily.210 During the super-
power confrontation, the continued existence of the state during periods
of conflict was assumed. Assistance from the government's overseas al-
lies ensured that it continued to function. The side possessing it at any
stage of the conflict enjoyed considerable advantages over any force
challenging it. Of course, the state has come under unbelievable strains
ments).
207. Walter R. Meed, for example, has highlighted the role that Sudan played in the
strife in Somalia. According to him:
Somalia has a strategic location with the longest coastline on the Horn of Af-
rica. As chaos descended on that unhappy country, Iranian-oriented Muslim
fundamentalists--already in power in the Sudan nearby-looked likely to
gain control of all or part of a country that controls the sea-lanes through
which Middle Eastern oil flows to the United States, Europe and Japan.
Walter R. Mead, In Quagmire of Serbia, Path for U.S. Involvement, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27,
1992, Opinion, at 1.
208. See ZARTMAN, supra note 174, at 7-8.
209. Thus, many observers have characterized some internal conflicts as "wars of at-
trition." See Bosnia Counters Serb Offensive near Sarajevo, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18,
1992, at 5 ('Although the fighting was intense, Gen. Hussein Ali Abdel Razek, the Egyp-
tian commander of UN forces in Bosnia, saw it as part of a 'war of attrition' in the capital
that neither side had much chance of winning.").
210. Cf. Martin Jacques, A New Morality Could Grow out of Corruption in High Places,
TIMES (London), Mar. 28, 1993, available in 1993 WL 10564999 ("The kind of influence
exercised by the governing parties over the public sector means they enjoy access to vast
resources. The temptation to abuse this influence for party or personal gain is hard to re-
sist.").
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in many parts of the world. 211 In those situations where a functioning
state apparatus is no longer part of the political equation, conflict has
become more fluid. For example, since the beginning of the fighting in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and during the round of strife in Angola between
1992 and 1995, the battle lines in both conflicts fluctuated dramati-
cally. 212 Similarly, at the beginning of 1997, Laurent Kabila existed at
the margins of politics in Zaire. Barely five months later, he controlled
this country.21 3 In fact, where anarchy reigns in the sense that power
has become increasingly decentralized, factions, it can be argued, inter-
act with each other in much the same way as do disputing countries.
Thus, generalizations about the use of positive sanctions, which are of-
ten the product of study about their use in international conflicts, would
seem to apply to civil strife plaguing areas in which the state has either
withered away or been intentionally destroyed.
K Rewards and Bystanders
As the UN generates reward-based strategies, it should be con-
cerned about who is on the receiving-end of these measures. Ex-
combatants and bystanders are both potential targets. Individuals in
possession of the disputant's destructive capacity are well-situated to
prolong conflict or re-ignite it. Thus, the case for channelling positive
sanctions to this cohort seems compelling. Adopting this policy, how-
211. Zartman has noted that "[i]n the world after the Cold War, not only has the bipo-
lar, interstate system of world order dissolved, but in many places the state itself has
collapsed." I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, in
COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
1, 1 (1. William Zartman ed., 1995). According to Ernie Regehr, "[u]rgent wars are prop-
erly understood as civil wars. They are primarily a consequence of failed states-states
that are unable to forge a minimum national consensus and to meet basic human needs.
Current wars are typically desperate attempts by states to halt the spread of internal
chaos." Regehr, supra note 175, at 14. Finally, Ibrahim A. Gambari has written that "the
incidence of state collapse in Africa appear to have increased in the period since the high
point of the Cold War, continuing into the aftermath of superpower confrontation. Af-
rica's growing marginalization in the post-Cold War period may, in fact, have accelerated
the process of state collapse." Ibrahim A. Gambari, The Role of Foreign Intervention in
African Reconstruction, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 221, 221 (1. William Zartman ed., 1995).
212. At one point in the round of fighting in Angola that began in 1992, UNITA con-
trolled as much as 70% of Angola although the MPLA was able to hold on to Luanda and
the oil-rich province of Cabinda. However, due largely to the military training and assis-
tance that Executive Outcomes, a South African firm made up largely of ex-SADF per-
sonnel, provided to the government forces, the MPLA was able to reverse these losses and
was closing in on rebel strongholds when the latest peace agreement was signed. See, e.g.,
Mercenaries Changing Face of For-profit Fighting, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13434983 ('Executive Outcomes, based in South Africa, is active
throughout Africa including Angola.").
213. See James Rupert, In Rebel City, the Powers That Would Be, WASH. POST, May
15, 1997, at A25.
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ever, may generate a backlash among noncombatants, who, in many
cases, have borne the full brunt of the conflict. Experience suggests
that the UN alienates the populace at its peril. According to Heninger:
UNTAC's experience ... suggests that in the situations where consent
has been obtained, but where it may suspect for one or more parties,
the United Nations ought to take into consideration the views of the lo-
cal populace. The people's support for the UN mission may substitute,
in some instances, for the faltering commitment of a contending party's
leaders, thus helping to keep the mission going.214
However, the sheer intensity and depth of the desire on the part of
bystanders to see the strife end may decrease this possibility. Hen-
inger, for example, has underscored the Cambodian "people's over-
whelming desire for peace ... Similarly, Salvadoran and Mozambican
exhaustion with civil war lent support to UN peace-keeping." 215 Fur-
ther mitigating this risk of alienation is the fantastic success that the
UN has had in getting its message out via radio in various peace opera-
tions.216 This medium could be used to explain why rewards are being
targeted at a particular group.
L. Rewards and the Situation Prevailing within the Party to be
Influenced
1. Internal Dynamics
The political state of play within the party to be influenced may de-
214. HENINGER, supra note 135, at 131.
215. Id. At the same time, many have been guilty of overestimating the desire of com-
batants and their followers to make peace. As Lamb has noted:
Diplomats and UN officials tried to reassure themselves that the situation
was different. Mozambicans, they said, were tired of a war that left more
than half a million dead, displaced 4m people and created 1.5m refugees as
well as leaving the country devastated and littered with landmines. Renamo
was a spent force and Dhlakama had insisted he would not return to the
bush. Similar things were said in Angola in 1992 and in the suddenly empty
streets of Maputo, there was evidence here of a return to civil war.
Lamb, supra note 112, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, English Non-US File.
216. Heninger has mentioned:
UNTAC's information and education was a model for informing the popula-
tion about UN objectives and progress. It conducted a successful massive
civil education campaign in human rights awareness, mine precautions, and
electoral matters. Most important, it did a superb job of mass instruction in
some of the basic tenets of democracy.
HENINGER, supra note 135, at 121. Given this success, some have called upon the UN to
use radio and television to "head off or stop wars by mobilizing airwaves that are too often
used to set them off." Keith Spicer, Propaganda for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at
23.
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termine the success of UN rewards. Like states, political organizations
involved in strife are inevitably not unitary actors. Rather, they will be
comprised of factions vying with each other for control over charting the
course taken by the group.217 If militants are in ascendancy, induce-
ment efforts may prove ineffective.2 18 Lawson, for example, has pointed
to the domestic political equation in Iran as an explanation for the fail-
ure of an influence attempt using positive inducements.2 19 He has
speculated that the effectiveness of rewards will be determined by mul-
tiple domestic variables. These include the strength of interests favor-
ing a continuation of hostilities, whether the political costs of accepting
the positive sanctions outweigh continuing on with the conflict, and the
extent to which the rewards offered can be used by the target.220
Before the UN relies on rewards, it would do well to gather infor-
mation about the political dynamics inside the party to be influenced.
When it comes to disputants involved in conflicts considered marginal
to the security of the great powers, such data is likely to be difficult to
acquire. The sudden appearance of new parties in disputes only com-
plicates matters. 221 The absence of a functioning state apparatus in
many post-Cold War conflict areas would seem to make the task of
gathering reliable information even harder. Structures such as legisla-
tive bodies and regulatory agencies may be controlled, or lobbied by, dif-
ferent interest groups or factions under the umbrella of a given dispu-
tant. These activities have the potential of leading to a greater
awareness of what issues are important to, unite, and divide the differ-
ent factions in an organization and how deep these bonds and fissures
are.
217. See Issue of Multi-Party Politics in Sudan Causes Heated Debate, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 26, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2208488 ("Breakaway rebel factions
from the mainstream Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) have meanwhile rallied to
the junta.").
218. See, e.g., Bill Schiller, ANC-Pretoria Relations at Lowest Ebb, TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 10, 1991, at A19 (reporting that while negoations between the ANC and South Afri-
can government stalled, the ANC was "undergoing an internal struggle between doves
committed to negotiations, led by Mandela, and hawks who demand a more militant pos-
ture, lead by Chris Hani").
219. Lawson, supra note 48, at 321.
220. Id. at 321.
221. Late 1994, for example, saw the entrance of the Taliban into the conflict occurring
in Afghanistan. The Economist reported:
A new force is emerging in Afghanistan, the taliban. The word means "seek-
ers", and is generally applied to Islamic theology students. They have taken
control of Kandahar, a sizable town in the south, and are reported to be ad-
vancing on Ghazni, 140 kilometres (90 miles) from Kabul, the capital, and on
Sheikabad, which is even closer.
The taliban who have taken over Kandahar seem to have appeared out of
nowhere late last year and taken possession of the road between Pakistan
and Kandahar, before going on to capture the town itself.
With Gun and Koran: Afghanistan, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 1995, at 30.
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Where there is no state or in the case of actors, like rebel organiza-
tions, that are fighting for control, it can be argued that such patterns
of interaction and the attendant understanding that can be gleaned
from observing them disappear. Rather, internal decisionmaking proc-
esses may be ad-hoc or shrouded in secrecy. This posture allows the
group to present a united front to its adversaries and the rest of the
world. To realize this same imperative and to maximize scarce re-
sources, there may simply be no political debate within the organiza-
tion. After all, this activity consumes time and other scarce re-
sources. 222 Similarly, in entities led by charismatic leaders, discussion
may be a scarce commodity. In situations where the leader's word is ac-
cepted as law by an overwhelming portion of the organization's backers,
directing positive sanctions at this figure is not likely to change the
group's internal dynamics. At the same time, the absence of serious
contenders for leadership of the group might mean that it will be easier
for the person heading it to make a move in the direction of peace in re-
turn for a reward. If such figures are resistant to UN overtures, little is
likely to be accomplished.
The cohesiveness or political unity of disputants may influence UN
reward strategies. In many conflicts, especially those that have arisen
since the end of the Cold War, it is unclear how much authority those
who purport to command and control the party's rank-and-file actually
enjoy. 223 When a cease fire violation occurs, a breakaway group that no
longer recognizes the authority of the agent that has signed off on the
truce agreement may have committed it.224 Or, the violators, who are
only posing as rogue elements, may actually be acting pursuant to the
222. Georg Simmel, for example, has noted that groups tend to become more central-
ized when they are involved in conflicts. According to him:
The need for centralization, for the tight pulling together of all elements,
which alone guarantees their use, without loss of energy and time, for what-
ever the requirements of the moment may be, is obvious in the case of con-
flict. It is so obvious that there are innumerable historical examples where
such centralization supersedes even the most perfect peacetime democracy.
GEORG SIMMEL, CONFLICT 88 (Reinhard Bendix trans., 1955).
223. The history of the Euskadi Ta Euskadi (ETA) has been a succession of internal
conflicts. In 1966, the movement split into two groups, ETA-Zarra (Old ETA) and ETA-
Berri (Young ETA). The latter forsook violence and eventually became the Movimiento
Comunista de Espafia. In 1970, ETA-Zarra divided into ETA 5th Assembly and ETA 6th
Assembly. ETA 6th Assembly also gave up the armed struggle and re-named itself the
Liga Comunista Revolucionaria. Then in the mid-seventies there was yet another parting
of the ways when ETA 5th Assembly gave birth to ETA-Military and ETA-Politico.
military. Finally in 1981 ETA-Politiico-military was grievously weakened when it split
into ETA-pm (7th Assembly), whose members dissolved their organization the following
year, and ETA pm-(8th Assembly).
JOHN HOOPER, THE SPANIARDS: A PORTRAIT OF THE NEW SPAIN 223 (1986).
224. See, e.g., Nation-World Briefing, SALT LAKE TRIB. Jan. 9, 1996, at A2, ("NATO's
Warning: NATO officials, stung by a series of nasty cease-fire violations, told rogue ele-
ments from all Bosnian warring parties to stop shooting or face the consequences.").
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directives of the signatory. 25 These ambiguities may complicate the
conflict-resolution process.
Using rewards may prove particularly effective in efforts to gain
leverage over important subsets of a faction involved in a conflict. It
may, for example, be strategically helpful to deliver rewards to factions
that are only loosely aligned with the party's power structure. In re-
turn, they would withdraw from the conflict or activity support the
adoption of a settlement posture. 226 Such actions may hasten other de-
fections or cause the leadership to rethink its intransigence. Kriesberg
has highlighted the logic undergirding the selective application of nega-
tive incentives, concluding that "coercion may be applied divi-
sively .... [t]hus, it may be conducted selectively so that only a segment of
the adversary party experiences it. The segment of the conflict group
suffering a disproportionate burden of the fight may be especially likely
to become disenchanted with the struggle."227 This insight may pertain
to the discriminatory application of positive incentives as well. How-
ever, a faction would be singled out for a reward or promised one, not
punished or threatened with punishment.228
If attempts to bring about the defection of moderate elements fail,
the UN could target positive inducements at recalcitrant subsets of par-
ties. For example, the leadership of a group or those in control of its ca-
pacity to generate propaganda might be singled out for rewards in ex-
change for their agreement to make peace or simply bow out of the
strife.229 Of course, if these cohorts are not identifiable, the feasibility
225. Leonid L. Fituni has asserted:
UNITA's tactics at the negotiations were in many ways similar to that of the
parties in the Bosnian war: every time some kind of agreement had been
reached at the peace talks, UNITA tabled new demands, and cited disobedi-
ence of field commanders as the cause for the breakdown of ceasefires.
Fituni, supra note 166, at 154.
226. Referring to the reconstruction program that the international community is at-
tempting to put in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a senior European diplomat has said,
'[c]all it a bribe but economic reward is the best way of undermining the hardliners and
making peace stick. It is not happening and that is worrying.' See, e.g., Margaret de
Streel, Europe Eastern Update: A Roundup of East European Business and Political De-
velopments, Mar. 12, 1996, WALL ST. J. EUR. at 1. Similarly, "[w]hile working hard to es-
tablish good relations with major warlords like Aideed and Ali Mahidi, [Mohamed]
Sahnoun, [the Secretary-General's first special representative in Somalia], also bypassed
them by cultivating the support of clan elders, a traditional source of authority in Somali
society, for a sustained grassroots reconciliation effort along the lines initiated in north-
ern Somalia." Patman, supra note 29, at 90.
227. LOuis KRIESBERG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 169 (1973).
228. Kriesburg ignores the possibility that punishing a subset of a disputant will only
alienate it further. This possibility may function as another argument for rewarding it for
taking steps to remove itself from the conflict.
229. Keith Spicer, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that "[h]ate campaigns
on Serbian and Croatian television helped brew Bosnia's horrors." and has noted that
"[t]he Hutus' Radio Mille Collines ordered half a million murders and a death march of
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of this approach could be questioned.
An overly ambitious policy of encouraging defections may ulti-
mately generate anarchy. If the leadership of a disputant is induced to
go into exile, measures will have to be taken to accomodate the re-
maining fighters. These may be heavily-armed and subject to no
authoritative chain of command. Kriesberg has asserted:
Engaging in a common popular purpose submerges internal discord.
For example, there is some evidence that during civil rights campaigns
[during the 1960s in the American South], aggressive crimes by Ne-
groes decreased.... This can happen by absorbing energy and atten-
tion or by seeming to provide alternative ways of attaining sought-for
ends.2
30
The boundaries separating the military operations and criminal ac-
tivities of disputants in many conflicts may be decidedly hazy or even
nonexistent. Thus, it seems quite possible that former combatants
might resort to banditry. This scenario seems especially plausible if
they retain possession of the organization's destructive capacity and no
efforts are made to integrate them into civilian life. 231
2. Inducements as a Means to Alter the Internal Dynamics of a
Disputant
UN positive sanctions may change the distribution of power be-
tween different factions. Party cohesiveness could also be altered by
the use of rewards. Kriesberg, for example, has focused on the role that
President John F. Kennedy's offer of several inducements to the Soviet
Union played in Moscow's decision to sign on to the Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Agreement.23 2 In short, US gestures like the unilateral cessa-
tion of American atmospheric atomic tests were linked to the universal
observance of a similar moratorium. These concessions gave the Soviet
leader, Khrushchev, "something he could use to override his domestic
opponents to reach a weapons test ban."233 Similarly, strengthening
two million Rwandans." Spicer, supra note 216, at 23.
230. KRIESBERG, supra note 227, at 250-51.
231. As van Creveld has concluded:
[o]nce the legal monopoly of armed force, long claimed by the state, is
wrested out of its hands, existing distinctions between war and crime will
break down much as is already the case today in places such as Lebanon, Sri
Lanka, El Salvador, Peru, or Colombia. Often, crime will be disguised as
war, whereas in other cases war itself will be treated as if waging it were a
crime.
VAN CREVELD, supra note 201, at 294.
232. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
233. Kriesberg, supra note 55. at 12.
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RENAMO's leadership functioned as part of the logic pressed into ac-
tion by the UN to justify its establishment of a trust fund for this politi-
cal organization.
234
M Rewards and Perverse Incentives
Before the UN decides to rely on rewards, it should ensure that
these are not behavior-distorting in other contexts. This is a valid con-
cern. As Baldwin has noted, "[h]abitual use of positive sanctions is
more likely to encourage blackmail attempts than is habitual use of
negative sanctions."235 Until now, positive sanctions have played a pe-
ripheral role in international affairs. 236 Were their prominence to in-
crease, groups might attempt to extort rewards. Fortunately for the
UN, many of the disputants it is likely to interact with in the post-Cold
War era may lack an in-depth familiarity with UN activities in other
parts of the world. Ultimately, their awareness of previous UN reward
strategies may be determined partially by the amount of media atten-
tion such initiatives receive. 23 7 However, compared with military ef-
forts, which many media outlets scrutinize closely, the utilization of
positive inducements probably does not readily lend itself to intense
press coverage.
The UN can also minimize extortion efforts by establishing clear
linkages between its positive sanction and the action taken by the dis-
putant that is being rewarded. Thus, with regard to the RENAMO
trust fund, Boutros-Ghali made this connection. He noted that the
"monthly allowance [received by RENAMO] would be tied to scrupulous
implementation of the peace agreement according to the calendar ap-
proved by the parties concerned."238 Finally, disputants may be less
willing to argue that the UN's past use of rewards justifies their de-
mands for them if previous approaches utilized by this entity made use
of both positive and negative sanctions.
234. According to the Secretary-General, "[i]f the RENAMO leader is not enabled to
meet the expectations of his supporters, he will lose authority and prestige, and the entire
peace process will be destabilized." Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
235. Baldwin, supra note 45, at 36.
236. See discussion supra part III.A.
237. As Edward C. Luck has noted, news of the failed raid against Aideed quickly
reached the "thugs who run Haiti [and they] dispatched a handful of their henchmen to
the docks in Port-au-Prince to chant that it would become another Mogadishu. This was
enough to turn US troop-carrying vessels around..." Luck, supra note 237, at 77. Of
course, in the case of positive sanctions, disputants in one conflict would not attempt to
capitalize on failures to use them in another dispute, which was what the Haitian junta
did, but on their successful utilization. Thus, even if the UN is shaken down, it still wins
if the use of a reward ultimately persuades the disputant to lay down its arms.
238. Letter Dated, supra note 80, at 216.
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N. Prior UN Involvement with the Parties to be Influenced
What rewards accomplish may be determined by the UN's previous
dealings with the party to be influenced. Based on his study of various
cases in which positive sanctions were employed, Lawson concluded
that "countries that do not already have relatively substantial commer-
cial or financial connections with one or both of warring parties prior to
an attempt to use positive sanctions cannot use offers of economic assis-
tance or greater investment to establish such relations de novo as an
inducement to end the conflict." 239 Thus, it may be very difficult for the
UN to rely on positive inducement strategies. As an organization de-
signed to enhance international security, the maintenance of commer-
cial or financial ties with different actors on the world stage does not
rank high on the UN's agenda. 240 Rather, most of its dealings take
place on the political level although it is true that states and NGOs do
receive development and humanitarian assistance from such parts of
the UN system as the United Nations Development Programme. The
UN might make use of these contacts to gain leverage over the parties
to an international dispute. However, these will be of little use in many
internal conflicts because it does not routinely interact with nongov-
ernmental political entities241 although there are some noteworthy ex-
ceptions to this rule.
242
The UN's ability to employ positive sanctions may also depend on
its presence in the theater of the conflict. For example, UN decision-
makers may feel that rewards must be distributed rapidly to be effec-
tive. They could also feel that the measures to be taken should reach a
large number of actors. Thus, inducement strategies might have made
more of a difference in Cambodia than in Angola. After all, the UN had
developed, as a result of its Cambodian multidimensional operation, a
relatively elaborate infrastructure in that country. 243 Meanwhile, in
239. Lawson, supra note 168, at 651.
240. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 1 (declaring that the core function of the United Na-
tions is "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.").
241. As Sydney D. Bailey has remarked:
A major problem for the United Nations has been that international peace
has often been endangered by the aspirations and actions of entities other
than states, and that the Organization is so constructed that its organs pre-
fer to deal with states rather than with dissident political organizations, in-
surgent groups, liberation movements, communal minorities, and the like.
SYDNEY D. BAILEY, How WARS END: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION OF
ARMED CONFLICT, AT 1946-1964 21 (1982).
242. For example, the UN certifyed SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representative
of the Namibian people." See G.A.Res. 31/152, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at
136, U.N.Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
243. See Mats Berdal & Michael Leifer, Cambodia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM
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Angola, during UNAVEM III, the few UN personnel there were engaged
primarily in electoral monitoring and demobilization.
244
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Findings of Part III
Since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy experts have at-
tempted to prescribe the optimal level of great power involvement in
conflict-prone areas around the world.245 Branding their opponents
"neo-isolationists," many of the participants in this discourse insist that
outside actors actively suppress overseas strife. William Pfaff, for ex-
ample, has asserted that "[m]uch of Africa needs, to put it plainly, what
one could call a disinterested neo-colonialism" by European countries.
246
A policy of "engagement wherever, whenever" may have been viable
to pursue during the Cold War. Today, it is less tenable due to a variety
of political and economic obstacles that the great powers confront at
home. Ironically, this disengagement may allow the UN to take advan-
tage of the full promise of reward-based strategies. Indeed, this Article
has attempted to show that as the number of outside actors involved in
a given conflict area shrinks, so does the number of potential agents
who are in a position to dole out favors. Thus, the UN is likely to be
able to gain more leverage over the disputants in a unipolar environ-
ment than in contexts where a variety of sources of support exist. Po-
litically, the UN may enjoy more flexibility in its interaction with dispu-
tants in situations where the great powers, particularly the US, are not
actively involved.
There are other reasons for keeping states out of the dispute-
resolution process. As conflicts ripen, states may be pushed by domestic
constituencies to reward their clients if these parties begin to appear to
be settling. Elites should not succumb to these demands. After all, the
conflict's resolution may be delayed if disputants do not experience the
pressure usually associated with the ripening of a conflict. If they do
not feel this, these parties may be less inclined to make peace.
Surfacing at a number of points in Part III is the proposition that
the UN should be able to employ negative and positive strategies simul-
1991-1994, at 25, 25 (James Mayall ed., 1996) ("At a cost of around US $1.7 billion, 22,000
military and civilian personnel were deployed [in Cambodia] .... ').
244. See STEPHEN M. HILL & SHAHIN P. MALIK, PEACEKEEPING AND THE UNITED
NATIONS 160 (1996) (noting that fewer than half of the expected 7,500 UNAVEM III
troops had arrived when their policing duties began).
245. See, e.g., Richard N. Haass, Paradigm Lost, FOREIGN AFF. Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43
(evaluating multiple foreign policy postures for American decisionmakers).
246. William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go Back into Africa, FOREIGN
AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 2.
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taneously to settle conflicts. Possession of this capacity would allow it
to pursue a generally more dynamic strategy when called upon to end
conflicts. Once subject to economic sanctions, a disputant would be de-
prived of its access to income and supplies, thus increasing the amount
of leverage the UN could achieve through a later use of positive sanc-
tions. The UN's decentralized structure, which features autonomous
agencies subject, more or less, to the gravitational pull of the Secretar-
iat, appears to lend itself to the utilization of a multipronged approach
to conflict-resolution. Thus, in some instances, the institutional bal-
kanization of the UN may actually endow it with the ability to pursue
relatively varied negotiating strategies.247 Decisionmakers can pursue
numerous goals and use diverse methods simultaneously. Over time, as
it becomes apparent which ones are being achieved, these can be accen-
tuated.
This Article has stressed the contribution that intelligence is likely
to make in UN efforts to end conflicts. Indeed, the form that rewards
take and when they are offered is likely to be shaped by the overall so-
cial, economic, and political context in which the conflict-resolution pro-
cess is unfolding. Intelligence, in turn, will be required to ascertain this
information. To generate reliable intelligence, the UN can pursue sev-
eral different approaches. For example, it may attempt to tap into con-
ventional, covert intelligence-gathering mechanisms like satellites,
drones, remote sensing devices, and human intelligence. 248 These efforts
raise a host of profound legal, political, and security questions.
249
UN rewards may encourage disputants to voluntarily open them-
selves up to outside scrutiny. This would facilitate UN intelligence-
gathering efforts and allow the UN to evade the problems that crop up
when clandestine attempts to accumulate intelligence are made. In con-
trast, punitive policies may make gaining intelligence about disputants
even more difficult. Conflict, after all, may spawn the formation of a
siege mentality within the disputant or cause it to go on a war footing,
cutting off some or all of its contacts with the outside world.
250
The UN should make it clear that it is using rewards to settle con-
flicts. If it does not, there may be confusion about what it is trying to
accomplish. The recipient of the positive sanction as well as individuals
observing the UN influence attempt may misconstrue the gesture,
247. See supra text accompanying notes 154-158.
248. See, e.g., Captain Gregory P. Harper, Creating A U.N. Peace Enforcement Force: A
Case for U.S. Leadership, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 49 (1994) ("As for intelligence, the
United Nations clearly will need some type of permanent capability.").
249. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENY.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 321, 321 (1996) (asserting that "[tihe intelligence gathering activities
of international organizations, however, generate ethical and practical problems similar
to those caused by the efforts of nation states.").
250. Cf. sources cited supra note 23.
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thinking it is a gift and thus warranting no response. 251 There are
other reasons for establishing linkages between UN reward strategies
and the action being rewarded. If, for example, positive inducements
are granted when a conflict begins to ripen, it should be clear that they
are contingent on the parties finding common ground on questions that
continue to divide them. Also, by continually emphasizing that its re-
wards are tied to the party's unwavering commitment, the UN may be
less likely to be blackmailed in future situations. Finally, explicit con-
nections made between the positive inducement and the action being
rewarded may allow the UN to rebut charges that it is behaving in a
partial manner.
B. Consequences for International Law
If the UN placed more faith in reward-based strategies, clearer
rules and regulations governing their use will need to be developed.
UN decisionmakers will have to spearhead this process. NGOs are
likely to play a crucial supporting role. The decisions ultimately arrived
at will be subject to little judicial scrutiny.2 2 Thus, it is crucial that ef-
forts are made to ensure that the strategies used dovetail with the prin-
ciples undergirding the UN's work.
By articulating rules for its positive inducement efforts, the UN
would be confirming the importance of shifts taking place in the inter-
national law-making process. The post-Cold War era, after all, has seen
non-state actors, including the UN and NGOs, become an increasingly
important presence in the formation of international norms and legal
arrangements. 25 3 Thus, by articulating norms governing its use of posi-
tive sanctions, the UN would be part of the international community's
move away from a conception of international law formation that is ut-
terly dominated by the nation-state.
By formulating rules for its reward strategies, the UN would be
able to set a precedent for the use of positive inducemets by other im-
portant actors, including states. Usually, governments spearhead the
process of creating norms regulating the conduct of international af-
fairs. For example, states played a key role in the development of cus-
toms and legal instruments governing the conduct of armed hostilities,
which had come into force long before the UN came into being. 25 In
251. See discussion supra part III.B.
252. See discussion supra part IV.D.4.
253. See, e.g., Jost Delbruck, The Role of the United Nations in Dealing with Global
Problems, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 277, 292 (1997) (noting that "many other U.N.
organs, including the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the subsidiary organs
created under treaty law drawn up under the auspices of the U.N., allow NGO participa-
tion").
254. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
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important respects, these rules privilege the interests of states. For ex-
ample, some of the legal protections available to participants involved
in an international conflict are not applicable to combatants waging an
internal war.255 Thus, governments enjoy relatively pronounced freedom
of action in how they prosecute a war against their own citizens. This
flexibility shrinks when they have been attacked by a hostile neighbor-
ing regime.
By taking the lead in generating customs, or even codifying norms,
to regulate how rewards are employed, the UN would be in a position to
ensure that it has more of a say in the substance of these rules. As an
institution that increasingly interacts with NGOs and other non-state
entities, the policies it adopts might be more sensitive to the needs and
aspirations of these important actors. In contrast, if states themselves
controlled the process by which rules regulating reward strategies were
articulated, the resulting regime might be very different.
If a UN-inspired body of rules regulating reward strategies devel-
oped, states electing to make use of positive inducments might feel
bound by it. The possibility of UN conflict-resolution strategies shaping
future state action underscores the importance of UN efforts remaining
consistent with the principles and values this entity is attempting to
inject into the conduct of foreign affairs around the world as a new cen-
tury dawns.
571-82, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 65-74; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277-2309; and the Convention with Respect to the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803-26.
255. See, e.g., William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Of-
fense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539 (1997) (noting that "... nor do the grave breach
provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to internal conflicts.").
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RESCHEDULING As THE GROUNDWORK FOR
SECONDARY MARKETS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
Ross P. BUCKLEY*
§ 1 INTRODUCTION
The secondary market in the debt of less developed countries
(LDC), now known as the "emerging markets', has been newsworthy
throughout the 1990s because of its explosive growth 2 and the profit-
ability of some investments in these markets.3 However, few people
appreciate how the strategy of repeated reschedulings in the 1980s laid
the groundwork for the subsequent rapid development of this market.
This little known role of reschedulings is the focus of this article.
The first response of international commercial banks to the debt
crisis in 1982 was to reschedule the current debt of LDCs. Fresh loans
were extended to permit the payment of interest upon the rescheduled
debt.4 This remained the standard response throughout the 1980s and
received the imprimatur of the U.S. government in the Baker Plan.5
1. Associate Professor of Law, Bond University. While all responsibility remains
mine, I would like to thank Michael Chamberlin and Jonathon Murno of the Emerging
Markets Traders Association for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2. The market existed in nascent form before the debt crisis but really started to
grow after 1982. In 1983, market volume was, in the absence of accurate figures, ap.
proximately $500 -700 million face value debt. In 1984, total volume had risen to an es-
timated $2-2.5 billion. In the Spotlight, BANKNOTES 8 (providing an interview with Mar-
tin Schubert). By 1990, turnover had reached $100 billion; and by 1996, due to the
conversion of most loans into Brady bonds, turnover was equivalent to $5,300 billion. See
Brian O'Reilly, Cooling Down the World Debt Bomb, FORTUNE, May 20, 1991, at 123, 124;
Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATIN FINANCE 19, 26 (1992); cf. NMB Postbank - leading
the field, IFR REVIEW OF THE YEAR (supp. 1990) at 78, (stating an estimate of $75 billion).
The 1996 figure is from Emerging Markets Traders Association, 1996 DEBT TRADING
VOLUME SURVEY (March 17, 1997).
3. Emerging Market Debts Extend Gains in U.S., REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 4,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
4. While the scale of debt restructurings in the 1980s was unprecedented, sovereign
debt restructurings themselves were not new. Between 1956 and 1974 eleven nations re-
scheduled a total of $7 billion of debt in thirty restructurings. From 1975 to 1981, four-
teen nations rescheduled a further $10 billion of debt in twenty-five separate restructur-
ings. See CHANDRA H. HARDY, RESCHEDULING DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBTS, 1956-1981:
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (1982); see also Peter H. Lindert, Response to Debt
Crisis: What is Different About the 1980s, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 238 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989).
5. In October 1985, at the joint meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank in Seoul, South Korea, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker announced his
"Program for Sustained Growth" for highly indebted nations. The program, dubbed the
"Baker Plan," became the nucleus of the U.S. government debt policy for the next three
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§ 2 A TYPICAL RESCHEDULING PACKAGE
A regular pattern for rescheduling6 soon formed in 1983. 7 The first
step in most reschedulings of commercial bank debt was to establish a
steering committee to act as an advisory group and have a liaison with
all bank creditors. The members of this committee were usually the
major money-centre banks.8 The steering committees required the
debtor to complete, or enter into, a rescheduling of its official debts.
The term "official debts" refers to debts to other governments 9 or inter-
national institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary
Fund [hereinafter IMF].I0
years. See Jeffrey Carmichael, The Debt Crisis: Where Do We Stand After Seven Years?,4
RESEARCH OBSERVER 121, 125 (July 1989). The plan proposed substantial new loans from
commercial banks and official agencies tied to policy reforms in the debtor nations. The
Baker Plan aimed to defeat the debt crisis through long-term growth in the debtor nations
(as opposed to the short-term stabilization programs of the preceding three years). In
Secretary Baker' s words, "increased financing not only will ease current debt servicing
difficulties, but will facilitate and support domestic policy changes to increase economic
growth." Morris Goldman, Confronting Third World Debt: The Baker and Bradley Plans,
559 THE BACKGROUNDER 6 (January 22, 1987). However, neither the commercial banks
nor the official agencies came close to lending the targeted amounts of fresh funds (Cline,
supra p. 87-88). Perhaps, the most important aspect of the plan was the explicit acknowl-
edgment by the governments of the developed world that a solution to the debt crisis re-
quired their involvement. RICHARD A. DEBS, DAVID L. ROBERTS & ELI M. REMOLONA,
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE - DEBT SWAPS
13 (1987).
6. See Steven M. Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin Ameri-
can Debt Revolution, 10:1 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 97 (1988) (stating that the regular pat-
tern was modeled on the Mexican procedures).
7. The pattern formed quickly, as much out of the power of precedent (especially
when everything was so rushed), as out of any careful analysis that the form of the re-
schedulings was the best possible; see Mark A. Walker & Lee C. Buchheit, Legal Issues in
the Restructuring of Commercial Bank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, in INTERNATIONAL
BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 459,
459-60 (D. Bradlow ed., 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BORROWING].
8. A major tension in the rescheduling years was that the minor creditors became
increasingly convinced over time that the steering committees, comprised as they were of
banks heavily committed to the debtor nations, did not properly represent their interests
and were in a position of conflict of interest. See Robert D. Sloan, The Third World Debt
Crisis: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, WASH. Q., Winter 1988, at 103.
9. Including, for instance, debts to the trade finance authorities of such governments
like the Export-Import Bank in the U.S. or the Export Credit Guarantee Department in
the U.K. The rescheduling of official debts is handled through the "Paris Club" (which is
named after its usual place of meeting and was first formed in 1956 for the consolidation
and renegotiation of Argentina 's trade debts and supplier credits). The Paris Club has
no fixed membership, no office and no permanent administrative staff. Its members con-
sist of the major creditors of the nation whose request for rescheduling is under consid-
eration. Karen Hudes, Co-ordination of Paris and London Club Reschedulings, chap 17A
in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, at 451.
10. Trade finance and interbank credit lines were usually expressly maintained and
not rescheduled. See Lee Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructur-
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The second step of most steering committees was to require the
country to implement, or enter into, an economic program designed by
the IMF." The IMF conditioned its loans upon reformation of domestic
economic policy in a process which became known as "structural ad-
justment."
12
In addition to rescheduling official debts and adherence to the
structural adjustment program, the other elements of a typical re-
scheduling included:
(a)new commercial bank loans, usually with a grace period on in-
terest repayments of between two and four years;
1 3
(b)new IMF loans for a three year period; 14 and
(c)the rescheduling of existing commercial bank loans over longer
maturities and with substantial grace periods on capital repayments. 15
From the beginning, loans were grouped for rescheduling based on
their due dates. For instance, all $4.8 billion of Brazilian loans due in
1983 were rescheduled in one agreement. 16 From 1982 to 1984, debts
falling due in the next year were generally rescheduled together.
7
ing, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1988).
11. Jeffrey Sachs, Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 24 (J. Sachs ed., 1989). Soon after the crisis broke the IMF stepped into the
role of economic overseer for debtor nations seeking a rescheduling. The commercial
banks had firm views on the need for economic austerity by debtor countries but consid-
erations of national sovereignty made direct commercial bank involvement in the eco-
nomic policies of debtors a political impossibility. As an international institution, the IMF
was able to play this supervisory role, but only at the cost of much resentment from
within the debtor nations. Lee C. Buchheit, Comity, Act of State, and the International
Debt Crisis: Is There an Emerging Legal Equivalent of Bankruptcy Protection for Nations?,
79 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L. L. PROC. 126, 135 (1985).
12. "Structural adjustment" was a "stunningly bland name." See DUNCAN GREEN,
SILENT REVOLUTION - THE RISE OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 11 (1995)
(discussing policies with a stunningly high human cost). See WALDON F. BELLO, DARK
VICTORY: THE UNITED STATES, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND GLOBAL POVERTY (1994);
Jerry Dohnal, Structural Adjustment Programs: A Violation of Rights, 1 AUST J. HUM.
RIGHTS 57 (1994); SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT (1988).
13. David Suratgar, The International Financial System and the Management of the
International Debt Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING - NEGOTIATING AND
STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS, 459, 493,494 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed.,
1986). Considerable pressure from the IMF and the central banks of the commercial
banks, home countries often had to be brought to bear to persuade the commercial banks
to "voluntarily" make these new loans.
14. Id. at 495 (indicating that the IMF funds were typically only a fraction of the new
money extended by the commercial banks).
15. Id.
16. Robert Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem, in LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNNING FOR THE FUTURE 12 (Rob-
ert Pastor ed., 1987).
17. Id. at 12, see tbl 1.3. Occasionally, in this period, debts falling due in the next two
years were rescheduled together.
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However, these annual reschedulings were burdensome and by 1984-
1985 the trend was to negotiate multi-year rescheduling agreements.' 8
Accordingly, all of Mexico's loans due from 1985 to 1990 were resched-
uled in one agreement. 19
New money to facilitate interest payments accompanied most of the
reschedulings. The title "new money loans" is misleading since the
money never reached the debtors but went directly to their accounts
with the lending banks.2 0 In reality, the new money was a method of
capitalizing interest payments in advance. 21 It was usually less than
the forthcoming interest payments and as a result the net transfer of
resources was in favor of the banks.2 2 Fresh capital to support economic
development in the region was virtually non-existent in the 1980s.
In the early debt reschedulings, the banks demanded a substantial
premium to compensate for the high risks of such lending. As a result,
rescheduling increased the financial burden on the debtors. The aver-
age interest rate was the LIBOR23 plus 2.2 percent 24 and generous fees
averaged 1.2 percent of the loan.2
5
As the cycle of reschedulings continued, both the interest rates and
fees were progressively reduced. By 1984 the average margin over
LIBOR was 1.77 percent and average fees were 0.8 percent. 26 Later
still, the Mexican rescheduling of 1987 set a new low standard for inter-
est rates at 13/16 th over LIBOR.27 Banks had finally learned that
higher premiums created higher risks by increasing the burden on
debtors.
28
18. Implementation of multi-year restructurings began in 1984. See Lee Buchheit,
You 'II Never Eat Lunch in This Conference Room Again, 1988 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11
(1988). (indicating that these restructurings had, then unrecognized, subsequently sub-
stantial benefits for the secondary market). See also UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL BANK BEHAVIOR AND THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 15 (1989) [hereinafter ECLAC/CTC].
19. The amount rescheduled was $48.7 billion. See Pastor, supra note 16. See also
Buchheit, supra note 11, at 132 (considering multi-year restructurings).
20. Sachs, supra note 11, at 26.
21. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18, at 114.
22. SACHS, supra note 11, at 10.
23. LIBOR is an acronym for the London Interbank Offered Rate and represents the
cost of banks funding themselves in the London interbank market.
24. Pastor, supra note 16, at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Sloan, supra note 8, at 109.
28. See Hossein Askari, Third World Debt and Financial Innovation: The Experience
of Chile and New Mexico 21 (1991).
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§ 3 THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THE RESCHEDULINGS
From the outset some believed that rescheduling was a placebo that
would never solve the debt problem. 29 Most, however, believed that by
buying time the debtor nations could trade their way out of their prob-
lems. 30 Time did significantly ameliorate the problem for the banks. 31
As the 1980s progressed, the borrowers kept servicing their debts and
the banks kept booking the profits from these massive loans. 32 The
banks accumulated reserves and increased their primary capital
33 so
that by the end of the decade a default would not have threatened the
solvency of most banks. Indeed, one could characterize the entire
thrust of the debt restructurings of the 1980s as an attempt to prevent
a massive shakeout in the international financial system. As a senior
official in the General Accounting Office said in 1989, "we believe that
the efforts up until recently - all the restructurings... were measures
to get us from there to here without crashing the banking system."
34
In contrast, time did nothing but worsen the economic plight of the
borrowers. 35 As Carlos Marichal wrote in 1989:
Repayment of the debts has meant enormous sacrifices for the peo-
ples of Latin America. At the urging of the bankers and the officials of
29. Pastor, supra note 16, at 11.
30. Id. Many believed in late 1982 and 1983 that the crisis was one of short-term li-
quidity, not solvency. See, e.g., CARLOS MARICHAL, A CENTURY 0 F DEBT CRISIS IN LATIN
AMERICA 239 (1989) (indicating that rescheduling was an entirely appropriate response to
the problem).
31. Sloan, supra note 8, at 103-11.
32. Indeed, with the exception of Bank America, the net income of the nine largest
U.S. banks continued to rise throughout the period from 1982 to 1986, while the debt cri-
sis was imperiling the very existence of many of these major banks it was also, ironically,
enhancing their short-term profitability. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18, at 61.
33. The nine largest US commercial banks nearly doubled their capital from $29 bil-
lion in 1982 to $55.8 billion in 1988. The ratio of the Latin American exposure of these
nine banks to their capital decreased from 176.5% to 83.6% over the same period. See
Atsushi Masuda, Mexico's Debt Reduction Agreement and the New Debt Strategy, 11
EXIM. REV. 26, 36-37 (1991).
34. Testimony of Dr. Allen Mendelowitz, Director of the Trade, Energy and Finance
Division of the General Accounting Office, before the International Banking Subcommit-
tee, Federal News Service (June 27, 1989) p. 9 of 32 pages of testimony.
35. In Latin America, real GDP per capita fell dramatically in the 1980s and the net
capital flow was substantially in favor of the developed world. See Jesus Silva-Herzog,
The Costs for Latin America 's Development, in LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS, supra note
16, at 35; Harold James, Deep Red: The International Debt Crisis and its Historical Prece-
dents, in AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Summer 1987, at 331, 340; see also Askari, supra note 28,
at 19. On the effect of the rescheduling years on Latin America, see Carmichael, supra
note 5 at 139; Rudiger Dornbusch, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 310; Lindert, supra note 4, at 262-63; and Sloan, supra note
8, at 111. In sub-Saharan Africa, where most debt was to official lenders, the situation
was even more dire: See Abbey, Growing out of debt - the African problem, in THIRD
WORLD DEBT: MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES (Stephany Griffith-Jones ed., 1989).
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the International Monetary Fund, governments have imposed painful
austerity programs on their citizens. . . to extract sufficient revenue for
paying foreign debts. These programs have led to... a sharp deteriora-
tion in basic living standards. Despite these sacrifices, there has been a
steady worsening of the economic situation in most countries... [and]
record levels of unemployment intensify the misery and discontent. 36
Neither did more time help matters. As Duncan Green wrote in
1995:
An investment collapse has left the region burdened with a crum-
bling infrastructure of potholed roads, electricity blackouts and water
shortages which will take decades to make good.... In human terms,
the failure has been far more profound ... terrible damage [has been
inflicted] on the poor. By 1993, 60 million more Latin Americans had
been driven below the poverty line, bringing the total to nearly half of
the population.
37
The debt crisis has been, primarily, a financial problem in the
West. In Latin America it has long been a political and social issue to
provide sufficient food, adequate shelter and basic healthcare. 38
§ 4 RESCHEDULING AND THE SECONDARY MARKET
However, while the direct effects of rescheduling and the accompa-
nying structural adjustment programs on the debtor nations were ad-
verse in the extreme, the indirect effects of rescheduling were more
positive. The rescheduling process facilitated the growth of the secon-
dary market for LDC debt and the secondary market in turn eased the
burden on debtor nations. The market benefited the debtors by first
permitting formal and informal debt buy-backs 39 which, when secon-
dary market prices were as low as 20 percent of the face value, were a
particularly good investment of foreign exchange for debtor nations.40
36. See MARICHAL, supra note 30, at 237; see also Wade Mansell, Legal Aspects of In-
ternational Debt, 18 J.L. AND SOC'Y 381 at 388-90 (1991). The burden of the rescheduling
years has fallen mostly upon the very poorest people in the debtor nations.
37. Duncan Green, Hidden Fist Hits the Buffers, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 1995,
at 35; see also CARLOS CASTANEDA, UTOPIA UNARMED 5 (1993) (stating that "[d]uring the
1980s and through the beginning of the 1990s, the hemisphere suffered its worst economic
and social crisis since the Depression. In 1980, 120 million Latin Americans, or 39 per-
cent of the area' s population, lived in poverty; by 1985 the number had grown to 160-170
million; toward the end of the decade it was estimated at the appalling figure of 240 mil-
lion").
38. Political demonstrations in Latin America in the late 1980s and in Africa to this
day are commonplace in protesting the harsh conditions imposed by servicing the foreign
loans. See MARICHAL, supra note 30, at 237-239; Dohnal, supra note 12, at 68.
39. As their name implies, debt buy-backs involve the acquisition of the debt by or on
behalf of the debtor either directly from the creditors or through the secondary market.
40. Buy-backs came in many forms in the 1980s, including official programs operated
by the debtor governments in Brazil, Chile and elsewhere. Another important form was
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Second, the market made necessary 4' and facilitated42 the Brady Plan
which brought with it an element of debt relief.
Growth of the Secondary Market
The rescheduling process supported the growth of the secondary
market by: (1) replacing a multiplicity of debtors with one debtor; (2)
consolidating the indebtedness in a handful of agreements; and (3)
standardizing the transfer provisions in those agreements.
[1] The Replacement of Many Debtors With One
In most rescheduling agreements, and the accompanying new
money agreements, the debtor was the sovereignty. Occasionally, the
debtor would be the nation's central bank and the sovereign would be
the guarantor. In either case, all the loans would thereafter trade at
the one price based on the sovereign's credit. Without rescheduling,
trading this debt in the secondary market would have required knowl-
edge of the creditworthiness of hundreds of different borrowers. For in-
stance, in Mexico alone there were over 50 borrowers before 1982, the
the repurchase of private sector debt by Latin American corporations. For instance, be-
tween 1983 and 1988, Mexican corporations almost halved their level of indebtedness
from $22.3 billion to $14.5 billion principally through buy-backs. In Brazil, these private
buy-backs were often initiated by a foreign investor who would enter into an agreement
with a local company that the company would redeem its foreign debt in local currency
when the debt was acquired and tendered to it by the foreign investor. It has been esti-
mated that $3 billion of Brazilian debt was discharged in this manner in 1988. See,
Comments of Rudiger Dornbusch on the article by Bulow and Rogoff, The Buyback Boon-
doggle, 1988 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 675 at 699. With hindsight,
debt buy-backs proved to be the principal source of debt relief for Latin American debtors
in the 1980s and the most effective method of debt reduction available. For a more de-
tailed analysis of the role of buy-backs, see Buckley, Debt Exchanges Revisited - Lessons
from Latin America for Eastern Europe, Nw. J. INT'L L. & REV. (forthcoming May 1998).
41. The market made the Brady Plan necessary by enabling some regional U.S. and
continental European banks to dispose of their LDC debt portfolios in the late 1980s.
These banks were able to do this because their exposures were usually relatively small,
their loan loss provisions relatively large, and their capital relatively healthy. This led to
a breakdown in creditor solidarity as these banks began to refuse to participate in the ex-
tensions of new money which accompanied each restructuring under the Baker Plan.
This unraveling of the Baker Plan made necessary a new approach.
42. The secondary market in loans facilitated the Brady Plan in four ways: (i) the
market provided the prototype (as the relevant parties could see the loans trading like
bonds each day, it was a small step to conceive of their securitisation into bonds); (ii) the
market provided a secondary market for the bonds; (iii) the market established there was
investor appetite for such securities; (iv) the market discounts afforded a strong argument
for debt relief. The combined effect of these four factors was so significant that without
the secondary market the Brady Plan may have been too large a step into the unknown to
attract the support of the U.S. Treasury and, without the support of, and strong persua-
sion of bankers by, the U.S. Treasury, the Brady Plan would not have come to pass.
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great majority consisting of private sector corporations. 43 The range of
prices, the need to know the credit of each separate borrower, and the
lack of fungibility between separate loans made to borrowers in the one
country would each have complicated and reduced the volume of trad-
ing in this market.
Another effect of rescheduling had significant advantages for the
architects of the process. The leader banks,44 as the dominant members
of the steering committees for the reschedulings, devised and directed
this rescheduling process and thereby obtained advantages which are
not widely appreciated. The leader banks had generally been the most
adventurous group of lenders in the 1970s and had "tended to depend
on income from special deals with riskier clients willing to pay higher
fees, commissions and interest to gain market access."45 These "riskier
clients" were usually private sector borrowers of marginal creditworthi-
ness. In the reschedulings the leader banks often improved their secu-
rity after the fact by converting their private sector loans into resched-
uled sovereign loans. 46 The challenger and follower banks had a higher
proportion of their exposure to more creditworthy debtors such as the
sovereigns and major parastatals and, thus, benefited much less than
the leaders from this rescheduling process.
47
43. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT EQUITY
CONVERSIONS - A GUIDE FOR DECISION MAKERS 18 (1990). Admittedly, the borrowers of
the largest amounts by far were the sovereign and parastatals, like Pemex.
44. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribbean
& United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations identified three groups of lend-
ers, leaders, challengers and followers, as follows: (i) The "leader" banks were all United
States banks and essentially dominated syndicated lending in the 1970's (Chase Manhat-
tan, BankAmerica, J.P. Morgan and Manufacturers Hanover); (ii) the "challenger" banks
were from North America, Europe and Japan and competed aggressively with the leaders
for the lending busines (Lloyds, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Tokyo, Bankers Trust, Chemi-
cal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto Dominion, Commerzbank Bank of
Nova Scotia and Long Term Credit Bank of Japan); (iii) the "follower" banks were all
non-U.S. and had a strong interest in lending to the region without being as aggressive as
the leaders and challengers (National Westminster, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Dresdner,
West Deutsche LB, Royal Bank of Canada, Midland Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Industrial
Bank of Japan and Banque Nationale de Paris) ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 14-15 & 59-61. In the words of the U.N. study, at 61, "it seems that the
leaders used their domination of the bank steering committees to gain particular advan-
tage in terms of greater security for their more risky exposure and an improved income
stream from fees and punitive interest rates".
47. The standard theoretical reason given by the leader banks for requiring the sov-
ereign guarantee of all outstanding foreign indebtedness, both private and public, was
that upon the onset of the debt crisis most debtor governments took control of all foreign
exchange in their economy by requiring private sector entities to sell their foreign ex-
change to the Central Bank. If the government wished to centralize control of foreign ex-
change, the creditors argued, then the government must also assume responsibility for
the repayment of all indebtedness incurred in that nation. The practical reason given by
the leader banks was less subtle - if the government wanted the creditor' s cooperation
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[2] The Consolidation of Indebtedness in Fewer Agreements
Without rescheduling, the mechanics of secondary market trading
would have been difficult. The transferability of the loans was the
product of contract- each loan agreement had a provision which regu-
lated whether and how the obligation was transferable. Before re-
scheduling, the indebtedness of the 1970s was recorded in thousands of
lengthy loan agreements and trading the debt would have required ac-
cess to, and knowledge of, these agreements. The research required for
each transfer would have substantially slowed trading and substan-
tially increased the related legal costs. These difficulties were high-
lighted in 1993-94 when Russian debt began to be actively traded in the
secondary market. 48 The Russian loans had not been rescheduled and
their trading posed many problems. In the words of a trader, "These
loans were never meant to be traded.. . . There is [not] the ... degree of
commonality between all the loans that you found with Latin American
debt."49 That degree of commonality was a direct product of the re-
scheduling process.
The adoption of multi-year rescheduling agreements and compen-
dious new money agreements for Latin American debt in the resched-
uling years dramatically reduced the number of agreements which evi-
denced and governed the debt. For most nations, by 1988 the majority
of their debt which was tradable in this market was to be found in a
handful of rescheduling agreements and two or three new money
agreements.50 For instance, in Mexico by 1988, the multiplicity of loan
agreements with over 50 borrowers had been reduced to a handful of re-
structuring agreements and a similar number of new money agree-
ments5 1 with Mexico the borrower or guarantor in each. Accordingly,
traders and their legal advisers had to understand only a relatively
small number of agreements to be equipped to trade all of Mexico's out-
standing loans.
52
[3] The Standardization of the Transfer Provisions
Of all the standard clauses contained in sovereign loan agreements,
the secondary market was principally concerned with the proper identi-
on the rescheduling of public sector debts, then it must cooperate by assuming its private
sector' s exposure. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN EXTERNAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT 8 (1995).
48. Russia: trading needs simplified, 1017 IFR 42, Feb 12, 1994. Russian debt has
since been securitised in a Brady-style rescheduling.
49. Id.
50. See Pastor, supra note 16, see table 1.3 at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id. (indicating that each of these agreements had essentially identical transfer
provisions).
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fication of the tranche of debt being sold, the interest rate and the
transfer/assignment clause. Reschedulings meant that the trans-
fer/assignment clauses became relatively quickly standardized for most
of a country's indebtedness. Furthermore, certain clauses were adopted
in the restructuring agreements of more than one country-and this fur-
ther standardized matters.5 3 The explanation for this trend is simple.
5 4
The community of lawyers actively engaged in sovereign debt restruc-
turings was quite small. 55 It was common for one firm to act in a num-
ber of reschedulings, often simultaneously.5 6 Naturally, the documents
from the previous transaction were used as precedents for the latest re-
scheduling and the transfer/assignment clause was rarely the subject of
much negotiation. The form offered up by the lawyers for the creditors
would often survive untouched in the final agreement.
5 7
The standardization of the transfer provisions greatly facilitated
the secondary market's trading of these loans. After lawyers had
drafted a standard assignment agreement, the documentation of day-to-
day transactions could be handled by supervised paralegals and thus
legal costs were greatly reduced. Without widespread debt reschedul-
ing, the number of loan agreements with various transfer provisions
would have required an attorney's input for each assignment.
5 8
53. For instance, the transfer provision was in substance identical in each of (i) the
$3,700,000,000 1985 Term Credit Agreement dated as of August 1, 1985 among the Banco
Central de la Republica Argentina as Borrower, the Republic of Argentina as Guarantor,
Citibank NA as Agent, and others; and (ii) the New Restructure Agreement dated as of
August 29, 1985, among the United Mexican States as Obligor, Banco de Mexico as the
Central Bank of the United Mexican States, and others. Furthermore, the same provision
saw service again, this time with a simple addendum as to participation under the In-
creased Costs Clause in both (a) the Restructuring Agreement dated as of December 16,
1986 among the Republic of Chile as Obligor, Compagnie Luxembourgeoise AG -
Dresdner Bank International as Servicing Bank and others; and (b) the $925,000,000
Credit Agreement dated as of May 20, 1985 among the Central Bank of the Philippines as
Borrower, the Republic of the Philippines as Guarantor, Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company as Agent and others.
54. As stressed by those closely involved in the process, "it would be incorrect to sup-
pose that any trend toward an increasing standardization of the documentation for sover-
eign debt restructuring results entirely from a considered and rational judgment....
There [is] a more human explanation for this phenomena": Walker & Buchheit, supra
note 7, at 459-60. The explanation is the power of precedents. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 460 (stating that the one firm, however, would usually only act for either
creditors or debtors in each of the restructurings in which it was involved).
57. See Peider Konz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12 HASTINGS INT' L & COMP. L.
REV. 527 at 532 (1989) (stating that "concrete experience has shown... that sovereign
borrowers have often given too little autonomous thought to some of the key provisions of
loan or loan restructuring agreements").
58. The standardization of transfer procedures and documentation was further as-
sisted by the work of the Emerging Markets Traders Association which produced stan-
dard form trade confirmations for many classes of asset (see Emerging Markets Associa-
tion 1994 Annual Report at 9), a standard loan assignment (see Standard Terms for
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§ 5 CONCLUSION
Rescheduling replaced the numerous debtors in less developed
country with a single debtor.59 It replaced the hundreds of loan agree-
ments which evidenced the foreign indebtedness of most nations with
typically less than ten. Often it replaced the wide variety of transfer
provisions in those loan agreements with only one or two provisions. In
short, the rescheduling process created a legal environment in which
the debts of one country were almost fungible, i.e. the terms governing
all of one nation's indebtedness were so similar that most creditors were
indifferent as to which particular agreement governed the indebtedness
they were to sell or buy. 60 The necessary groundwork had been laid for
an efficient secondary market.6 1
Assignment of Loan Assets, April 15, 1996 (copy on file with the author) and Emerging
Markets Traders Association 1995 Annual Report at 11), and a netting facility (see Emerg-
ing Markets Traders Association 1994 Annual Report at 9). Over time, the netting facility
matured in 1995 into Match-EM, an instantaneous matching system for the confirmation
and settlement of trades (see Emerging Markets Traders Association 1996 Annual Report
at 5) and ultimately, in 1997, into the Emerging Markets Clearing Corporation (see
Emerging Markets Trading Association 1996 Annual Report at 9-10).
59. Or two, if one is technical and distinguishes cases in which the sovereign is debtor
from those in which the central bank is debtor and the sovereign is guarantor - the sec-
ondary market made no such distinction.
60. An exception was when, under some debt-equity schemes, only certain indebted-
ness was eligible for conversion into equity.
61. Whether the market was efficient in an economic sense is a separate issue; see
generally Suk Hun Lee et. al., The Behavior of Secondary Market Prices of LDC Syndi-




CORINNE A.A. PACKER, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW; Institute for
Human Rights; Abo Akademi University, Finland (1996); ISBN
951-650-546-5; 213 pp. (paperback).
The right to reproductive choice has gained recognition as an im-
portant international human right. The Right to Reproductive Choice
discusses the issues surrounding the implementation of reproductive
freedom contained in international, as well as national, instruments. It
takes a critical look at the need for reproductive freedom and the inher-
ent problems with current reproductive policies.
Packer begins by discussing the importance of reproductive choice
as a fundamental human right. The freedom and power to control ones
own reproductive capacities directly impacts many other contemporary
problems. For example, reproductive choice impacts women's health,
population control, gender equality, and attempts at sustainable devel-
opment. Chapter two outlines the various policies and conventions that
have been adopted which contain provisions for reproductive choice and
gender equality. It outlines the sources for provisions such as family
planning, education, and access to contraception. Although there are
numerous international and regional conventions and charters, each
contains differing provisions that provide for rights such as: the right to
found a family; that right to decide the number and spacing of children;
the right to family planning information; and the right to family plan-
ning services. Despite the fact that the instruments maintain a com-
mon theme, there is inconsistency in articulating solutions among the
various documents.
Chapter three discusses numerous effects that can result from re-
productive policies. Many states practice coerced sterilization and abor-
tion as part of their reproductive policies. Of the countries that provide
reproductive options, methods of implementation vary dramatically.
The lack of uniformity enables states to use reproductive methods as a
further control over women's bodies. Thus, states may have a duty to
provide methods of obtaining reproductive choice; however, there is no
method of regulating how these duties are fulfilled. This section also
addresses the importance of technology and what impact it may have on
a state's duty to provide reproductive options.
The book's next section begins to analyze reproductive choice from
a perspective of the obstacles and challenges that face implementation.
Chapter four describes the incentives and disincentives that are incor-
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porated into international and national population policies and the co-
ercive detrimental effect these have on women's lives. Additionally,
these policies further impede the realization of gender equality. Many
proponents of reproductive choice support the use of incentive and dis-
incentive programs. The lives of many women in developing countries
are pervaded by poverty and limited access to resources. Thus, offering
incentives for family planning is a coercive means of controlling the
world's impoverished women. Reproductive choice as a freedom be-
comes illusory as women' bodies are controlled by population policies.
Subjecting women's bodies to state controls augments the gender ine-
quality that already exists in many areas of the world.
Chapter five continues the discussion of achieving equality for
women and the numerous human rights violations that continue to per-
vade the lives of women internationally. The problems with consistency
and implementation are augmented by the states' failure to report vio-
lations. Policies in population control are making headway but leaving
the roots of gender inequality in tact. Disparities in gender treatment
are rooted in many of the world's religions and cultures. Without ad-
dressing the underlying cause for gender inequality, reproductive poli-
cies do not necessarily result in the reproductive freedom intended in
such agreements as the Women's Convention.
After addressing the numerous problems that the current conven-
tions and policies contain, Packer dedicates chapter six to other legal
means that may assist women in their battle for reproductive freedom.
Although the means of additional assistance is limited, Packer dis-
cusses the importance of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) for
improving the enjoyment of reproductive choice. NGO's assist by moni-
toring state actions and publishing state reports. These publications
are beneficial because they publicize human rights violations as well as
a state's adherence to its reproductive choice policies.
In the last chapter of the book, the author addresses sensationalis-
tic violations that pervade the discourse on reproductive choice. There
are violations such as forced pregnancy and sterilization that are be-
ginning to gain international recognition as a basis for political asylum.
Although the circumstances where these types of violations are recog-
nized is limited, the existence of such possibilities provides additional
legitimacy to the necessity for reproductive choice.
Although this book does not articulate solutions to the problems
posed, that was not what the author purported to do in creating this
text. The author successfully brings international reproductive polices
into an individualistic realm, which enables the common person to un-
derstand the problems that face domestic enforcement of international
policy. This writing is an excellent starting point for anyone interest in
the problematic aspects of reproductive choice on a global level. The
book addresses many various sources of international reproductive pol-
icy, specific examples of domestic application, and provides a sufficient
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overview of the struggle for reproductive choice and the necessity that it
becomes an international priority.
Melanie A. Gilbert
OKECHUKWU C. IHEDURU, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
Associated University Presses, Inc.; London (1996); ($45.95);
ISBN 0-87413-552-4; 300 pp. (hard cover).
Through the context of the international shipping industry, this
book presents the ongoing conflict involving the industrialized states'
struggle to maintain global hegemony and the lesser-developed states'
futile attempts to implement change in the regimes that govern its in-
ternational relations. Specifically, evidence of the Southern states'
failed demand for a new international economic order (NIEO) has been
seen through their quest for a new international maritime order
(NIMO), which emerged soon after the 1974 United Nations Convention
on a Code of Conduct for Linear Conferences. In relations between the
North and South, trade has been acknowledged as the major contribu-
tor to this asymmetry. This book emphasizes the role of shipping as the
channel through which trade has occurred.
Consideration of three African states (Cote' d'Ivorie, Ghana and Ni-
geria) and four states in southeast Asia (Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand
and South Korea) provide examples of the South's fruitless experiences.
Through these specific models, the author analyzes empirical generali-
zations and strident attempts by the South to restructure the liberal
order of world shipping. In this respect, numerous tables, charts and
graphs are included to illustrate the relevant figures. The book com-
bines this data with such related issues as technological changes, the
skewed distribution of power in world shipping, and the role of agency
and intragroup politics in development. All of these issues contributed
to the retardation of the shipping industry in the South.
The book' main argument is that the frustrations of "late-
industrialization," as experienced individually and collectively by the
South's developing states, played a leading role in the failure of the
South to establish a NIEO or its derivative, the NIMO. The author ex-
plores other factors leading to the South's inability to affect change, in-
cluding underdeveloped national merchant fleets, an inability to keep
pace with developments in the maritime industry, a significant head-
start by the traditional maritime powers, arrogant nationalism and a
foolish and costly unwillingness to engage in regional cooperation.
Throughout, the book pays a balanced emphasis to all aspects of in-
ternational shipping. The first few chapters introduce the reader to
some key historical issues, whose stubborn presence continues to affect
the contemporary shipping industry. Here, an attempt is made to ar-
ticulate the essential elements of the NIMO. Had the South succeeded
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in their challenge, Iheduru posits, the NIMO might have replaced to-
day's liberal shipping order. The next few chapters consider the de-
structive impact of the decline of the shipping conference system, the
growing threats from independent shipping operators and the hobbling
nature of intraregional maritime competition. It is in this section that
the author notes the African states' catch-22: remaining united in their
struggle against foreign shipping lines while independently pursuing
nationalist shipping policies and objectives. Finally, the book focuses
on the timeliness of the issues of maritime order and international ine-
quality, as they coincide with current political economy scholarship.
Through the course of the past century, economic inequality has
come to gain status as an inevitable given in the international arena.
Iheduru's book approaches this issue through the global shipping indus-
try and its all too often over-looked, ultra-competitive nature. To the
South, it is a very serious issue; one upon which the importation of food,
clothing and other essential goods relies. In his work, the author effec-
tively highlights a problem whose waters, without full international at-
tention, will only get rougher before they calm.
David J. Katalinas
HUGH POTTER, PORNOGRAPHY: GROUP PRESSURES AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, The Federation Press, New South Wales,
Australia (1996); ISBN 1-86287-215-5; 180 pp. (paperback).
Contrary to its title, this book is not an in depth analysis of what
"pornography" means or a straight-forward answer as to whether it is a
good or bad thing. Rather, the author, Dr. Hugh Potter, chooses to ex-
amine the variety of definitions different social groups choose to attach.
For some groups, pornography may mean any depiction of non-marital
sexual relations, while other groups may see it as depictions as violent
non-consensual sex. The book is not about individuals and their rela-
tionship to pornography, but rather how the issue of pornography is
used Es a tool to promote self-interest.
The author's analysis throughout concentrates on an organizational
level. References to the works of individual writers are used, but only
in the context of various group perspectives on pornography. Potter
uses the case of Australia and the X-rated video industry, consumers
and regulators as his starting point which to compare the various posi-
tions of argument. Throughout the text, Potter uses data from surveys
of Australian X-rated video purchasers and those who regulate the in-
dustry as further foundation into these perspectives.
In the early chapters of the text, Potter outlines the Functionalist
and Conflict approaches to the study of deviant behavior and social
problems. In examining the Functionalist approach, Potter examines
the Christian Critique of pornography. As an example of the Conflict
approach, Potter analyzes the radical Feminist case against pornogra-
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phy. The author concludes that while the two positions are related in
some ways, they both express different ideas about the moral world
which should exist upon the elimination of pornography.
With the theoretical frameworks explored, Potter presents a brief
history of Australian pornography chapter five. Potter focuses on the
Australian video and magazine classification scheme to define exactly
what an X-rated video is and how the classification came into being.
From a legal standpoint, prior to 1945, there was no legislative concern
about pornography due to general censorship legislation which essen-
tially covered all media. In a legal sense, the word pornography did not
and still does not exist in the Federal legislation. What currently does
exist is an X-rating for video products which was developed in 1994
which "officially" makes such videos unavailable in Australia.
However, as Potter explains, the presence of "video nasties" in the
country is recognized. The availability of print and video pornography
in Australia is quite open. Potter takes the opportunity in chapter six
to examine the conduct as opposed to the content of this industry.
Chapters seven through nine are data-related chapters which take
a look at the individual. While choosing to focus on a "structural"
rather than "individual" approach, the author submits statistical data
to support his conceptual hypothesis. Potter feels strongly about struc-
tural approaches to the study of social behavior because "in the end,
however, the individuals do not matter, only the social structure."
Potter's concluding remarks assert that neither pornography nor
sexuality is the issue asserted. Rather, the real issue is the need for so-
cial groups to separate themselves from each other. It comes down to
the various social groups' inability to believe in their own "moral supe-
riority" that leads to heated battles on issues of pornography. Stereo-
typing, a necessary human activity, is eventually what this book is
about. The author is interested in how groups of individuals proclaim
their positions on issues such as pornography, homosexuality, gun con-
trol, pedophilia, abortion, or any other issue of social contention and
then seek to have others accept that group's position as the best posi-
tion.
Overall, the author provides an interesting viewpoint on how social
groups use various controversial issues (in this case pornography) as a
major symbol to try and impose their version of proper morals on oth-
ers. The examination of the Australian system of dealing with pornog-
raphy issues is interesting in providing a framework for Potter's "bigger
picture" regarding the true issues involved.
Jeffrey N. Holappa
SEAN D. MURPHY, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE
UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER,
University of Pennsylvania Press; Philadelphia (1996); ISBN 0-
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81223-382-4; 427 pp. (hardcover).
In a comprehensive study of humanitarian intervention and its
relevance to the United Nations, author Sean D. Murphy has provided
rare scholarship. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS
INAN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER may, indeed, be the only work of its kind
on a subject of ever more political, legal and ethical importance. As
such, this monograph is an invaluable and timely contribution to the
contemporary polemics of humanitarian intervention - particularly in
light of the recent horrors of Rawanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
awakening of the international community to seek and demand solu-
tions to mitigate human suffering caused by corrupt or ineffectual gov-
ernments. Edited by Burns H. Weston, the book is the twenty-first vol-
ume in the Procedural Aspects of International Law Series. This series
has been devoted to diverse areas of international legal studies by high
profile scholars for over thirty years. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION is
a fine addition to this body of work.
The author begins this study with an analysis of what "humani-
tarian intervention" could mean, and the problem of the broad ambigu-
ity of the term as it has historically been understood and applied. He
then constructs a working definition, attempting to identify the general
contours of the issue: "humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of
force by a state, group of states, or international organization primarily
for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from wide-
spread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights." Each
element of this statement is then briefly analyzed, supporting a dis-
crete, well-articulated and theoretically satisfying definition which
serves as the nucleus of the work.
Once the working definition is established, Murphy briefly assesses
the concept of humanitarian intervention vis-a-vis the matrices of in-
ternational law, moral philosophy and political theory. This is helpful
to the study, demonstrating the need to be wary of the conceptual dy-
namics by which humanitarian endeavors must be justified. The
author then outlines the methodology of his study. Although all tradi-
tional sources of international law are tapped, Murphy puts noteworthy
emphasis on Michael Reisman's "incidents" genre, finding it particu-
larly appropriate for the study of the infrequent occurrences of humani-
tarian intervention. Indeed, an entire chapter is structured by this
methodology whereby Murphy simply states the essential facts of six
recent international incidents, and then assesses the actual impact of
the intervention.
In addition to recent acts of humanitarian intervention, the history
of its use is carefully traced. Murphy begins with ancient legal tradi-
tions (principally Greco-Roman), and carries the concept of humanitar-
ian intervention through medieval Christian Europe, and up to the ad-
vent of the nation-state (the works of Grotius and Vattel). Further
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nineteenth- and twentieth-century history of the concept is evaluated
in terms of the growth of positive law and European intervention,
leading to the effect on humanitarian intervention of the Covenant of
the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Then the U.N.
Charter itself is examined for the critical elements relating to human
rights and use of force. Finally, Cold-War interventions are evaluated
chronologically, and related developments to the U.N. during that pe-
riod are similarly considered.
Once brought current on the status of humanitarian intervention,
the reader is provided with a thorough articulation and analysis of the
critical issues of the day. For example, Murphy dedicates an entire
chapter to the problem of unilateral humanitarian intervention. Here
he examines rules-oriented, policy-oriented and philosophy-oriented ap-
proaches to the problem. Murphy then concludes with an evaluation of
the criteria typically formulated by scholars to regulate the use of uni-
lateral intervention in the event the U.N. Security Council is unable to
act as an authority on the issue. He finds such definitive approaches
incompatible with the nature of humanitarian intervention which must
be accommodated to varied and unpredictable situations.
The critical issue of this work is the UN's current role in setting
standards and regulating humanitarian intervention. On this, Murphy
examines the Security Counsel's new role and the role of other U.N. or-
gans, as well as regional arrangements under the U.N. Charter.
Moreover, the means, limitations and difficulties encountered with U.N.
intervention is evaluated. Murphy concludes with suggestions for im-
proving the efficacy of U.N. intervention. He emphasizes that policy-
makers must: take threats to peace seriously; pursue ad hoc but princi-
pled action; clearly identify the type and severity of human rights
deprivation; enhance the power of the Secretary-General and special-
ized agencies; and ultimately, find ways to deter human rights abuses a
priori. These, Murphy finds, are all shortcomings in the current state
of affairs with respect to U.N. humanitarian intervention.
In addition to the rich scholarship on the issue of humanitarian in-
tervention and the U.N., international law scholars will be quite happy
with Murphy's Bibliography and Appendix of U.N. Documents. The
Bibliography is neatly outlined topically, as well as by type of source.
One section is even outlined sub-topically by geographical source. The
Appendix of U.N. Documents is similarly structured to mitigate some of
the arduousness of evaluating U.N. Security Resolutions in terms of
their applicability to humanitarian endeavors and to specific countries.
Moreover, the source quality is extremely high, tapping the most cur-
rent publications, as well as the most renown scholars. Humanitarian
Intervention will prove to be a great resource to students and policy-
makers alike.
Cathleen Hopfe
1998

